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PREFACE 
This study concerns the collapse of congressional authority during 
the last four years of the American Revolutionary War, 1780 through 1783. 
The primary objective is to discover what caused congressional authority 
to wane, by examining political and economic relations between the 
stat.es and Congress. Within this context it focuses upon several criti-
cal events and problems in order to examine their effects on congres-
sional-state and interstate relations. Among the events studied are the 
military crises in 1780, the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line in 1781, 
the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, the Yorktown 
Campaign in 1781, the Philadelphia mutiny in 1783 and the congressional 
proposals for reforming the nation's finances in all four years. Among 
the problems examined are the internal financial difficulties of the 
states, the constitutional relationship between Congress and the states, 
relations between state and congressional officials, and the conflicts 
between states over territorial claims. Throughout this study the author 
assumes that the views of the participants on both the national and lo-
cal level, regardless of how accurate, were of paramount importance in 
determining both national and local policy during these critical years. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his major adviser, 
Dr. H. James Henderson, for his patience, guidance, encouragement, and 
gentle prodding throughout this study. Special thanks are also extended 
to the other members of the committee, Dr. Theodore L. Agnew, Dr. DougJas 
D. Hale, Dr. Bertil Hanson and Dr. Michael M. Smith. Mere expressions 
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of appreciation and thanks, however, do not begin to pay the debt the 
author owes these five men for freely giving of their time and talents 
during his course of graduate study. The most that the author can do 
is to try in the future to emulate their scholarship, teaching ability 
and genteel conduct. 
A note of thanks is also extended to Patricia Patterson for per-
mitting the author free rein in the library's Non-Book Room. The 
author also owes a large debt to his brother, John ii. Fowler, not only 
because he gave the author access to much needed data in the library at 
the University of Oklahoma but also for thirty years of keen intellectual 
competition and loving companionship. 
Finally the author wishes to express a special note of love and 
appreciation to his wife, Zora, and his two children, Jimmy and Marti 
Kay; to Zora partly because she typed all the drafts of this study, 
partly because she carried more than her fair share of family responsi-
bilities during five years of graduate study, but mostly for simply 
being Zora; and to the children because they accepted without complaint 
a part-time father. 
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The period 17 80 through 17 83 encompassed four of the most crucial 
years of the American Revolution. These were the years of crisis, con-
fusion, and despair. During this time the armies of Great Britain rees-
tablished Royal government in two southern states, captured one American 
anny, completely routed and demoralized another, and threatened imminent 
defeat and occupation of two other states. The new nation lay almost 
prostrate before the onslaught. Its financial system was in ruins. It 
could no longer raise or adequately support an anny. Underfed, under-
clad, and rarely paid, the Army itself grumbled, threatened, and in 
some cases actually mutinied in order to redress its grievances. The 
Revolution, despite the expenditure of so much blood and treasure, ap-
peared near collapse. 
Historians who have examined these years of the Revolution gener-
ally agree that a breakdown of congressional authority created many of 
the problems of the period, but they cannot agree upon the causes of the 
breakdown or its duration or even its significance. Much of the debate 
on the collapse of authority has centered upon Congress' instrument of 
government, the Articles of Confederation. The classic at tack upon the 
Articles, of course, is that of John Fiske. Hriting in the late nine-
teenth century, he saw little that was good in the Confederation govern-
ment and sharply criticized the Articles for their weaknesses as a 
1 
frame that rendered the nation incompetent to manage the economy and 
foreign affairs. Indeed he coined the name for the years between 1783 
and 1787 by calling it the "critical period" of American History. 1 
2 
Modern historians are unwilling to see the period as quite so crit-
ical as Fiske did. Many scholars, however, do see the ratification of 
the Articles in 1781 as marking a definite breaking point between the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. For example, John C. 
Miller blames the ratification itself for the decline of congressional 
power. He notes that prior to ratification Congress was a revolutionary 
body without either legal authority or legal restraint. Once the Arti-
cles were ratified Congress gained legitimacy but lost power. Hiller 
also believes that the Confederation government was a retreat from the 
idea of national union which some radicals had expressed early in the 
Revolution. 2 On the other hand, John Richard Alden argues, without 
documentation, that the central government after the ratification of 
the Articles was more powerful than it had been at the time of the 
3 
Second Continental Congress. 
Edmund Cody Burnett, disagreeing with both Miller and Alden, as·-
serts that the ratification had very little effect on the power of Con-
gress. He notes that while Congress was indeed an extralegal body for 
the first five years of its existence, in practice it held itself 
1John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (Boston, 
1916), pp. 55-57, 98-101. 
2 
John C. Miller, The Emergence-'?.£~ Na~ion, 1783-1815 (Glenview, 
1972), p. 5. 
3 John Richard Alden, The American Revolution, _177 5-1783 (New York, 
1954), p. 177. 
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within the bounds of the Articles from the moment when they were first 
offered to the states for ratification. It should be noted, however, 
that Burnett does not ex:plain either the grmving ill-repute of Congress 
after 1781 or the increasing inability of that body to muster quorums 
for congressional business. Instead he is content with merely chroni-
1 . 4 c ing events. 
Other historians, such as Max: Farrand, view the collapse of Con-
gress as a direct result of the end of the war. Farrand argues that 
once the reason for unity--the war--disappeared the states simply went 
h . 5 t eir own way. Dan Lacy also views the breakdown as a postwar problem 
except that he focuses his attention on the immediate postwar depres-
sion. 6 John C. Miller, besides arguing the effects of the ratification 
of the Articles, also partly blames the nation's financial difficulties. 
He believes that the fall of the Continental currency during the period 
brought down with it the prestige of Congress. 7 
Even Merrill Jensen, one of the champions of the Articles, notes 
that in 1783 Congress temporarily collapsed and gives yet another cause. 
He argues that congressional power was seriously weakened in the years 
1781 through 1783 because of conflicts which developed between two 
4Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress: A Definitive His-
tory of the Continental Cong;ess from Its Inception in-177 4 to March 
1789 (Ne~ York, 1964), p. 502ff. --- -· - -- --- -- ---
5 Max: Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution ~_the United Stat~ 
(New Haven, 1913), p. 1. 
6 Dan Lacy, The Meaning 2!_ the American Revolutio~ (New York, 1964), 
pp. 308-309. 
7John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783 (Boston, 1948), 
pp. 652, 658-659. 
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groups in Congress. The first he identifies as conservative national-
ists, or those who, from the onset of the Revolution, agitated for an 
all powerful central government; the second he calls democratic radi-
cals, or those who viewed the goal of the Revolution as establishing a 
highly decentralized national government as the only way to insure lib-
erty. He believes that in the years 1781 through 1783 the nationalists 
temporarily gained control of Congress and attempted to further central-
ize power in the Confederation's government. Failing to accomplish 
their ends the nationalists went home in disgust; leaving Congress 
temporarily without leadership until the radicals could reorganize them-
8 
selves and reassert control. 
Several historians have accepted Jensen's interpretation of the 
nationalist-radical conflict during the period and have concentrated 
their attentions on the financial problems of Congress which intensified 
the struggle between the two groups. Jackson Turner Main emphasizes the 
importance of the conflict and concentrates his examination on the im-
post of 1781. He asserts that the impost "failed because it offended 
those who feared a consolidation of power in central government." He 
further argues that the struggle over the impost presaged the arguments 
which would be used for and against the new Federal Constitution in 
1787 and 1788. 9 
Forrest McDonald also argues that the conflict between nationalists 
and radicals deepened because of financial difficulties. He believes 
8Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States 
Durin__g_ the Conf eder ati-m;_- (New York, 19 67) , pp. 4--S:- 83. 
9Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: 
tutlon, 1781-1788 (Chapel Hill, 1961), p. 75. 
Critics of the Consti-
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that the nationalists were able to gain control of Congress in 1781 be-
cause of the mutiny of the Pennsylvania line on January first of that 
year. After that event even some of the radicals realized that the 
central government would have to be strengthened if the Army was to be 
paid and supplied. Congress, therefore, reluctantly shifted the con-
trol of itsr finances to one man--Robert Morris. Morris and the nation-
alists failed, McDonald asserts, only because the war ended shortly, 
and thus freed the radicals from their commitments to increase national 
power and permitted them to return to the pursuit of those local aspir-
ations which had been the source of the Revolution in the first place. 
Finally, E. Jam~s Ferguson, the preeminent financial historian of 
the American Revolution, notes that the nationalists' drive was caused 
by the necessity of reinvigorating the war effort. A part of the na-
tionalists' program was to institute such conservative economic reforms 
as the elimination of paper currency, the establishment of heavy tax.a-
tion, and the abandonment of price controls. Leading this movement 
towards laissez-faire economic policies was Robert Morris who was backed 
by the nation's mercantile community. Unable to override state opposi-
tion the nationalists turned to the Army, helping to foment the Newburgh 
conspiracy. Their efforts, however, were defeated by the loyalty of 
Gen<f~ral George Washington and because Congressmen could not get their 
constituents in the states to accede to a strengthening of congressional 
11 
power. 
lOForrest McDonald, ! ;elurib.l:!,S ~: The F.ormation 21_ the Juneri~ 
Republic, 1776:-~ (Boston, 1965), pp. 14'1'17. 
11E. James Ferguson, The American Revolution: A General !Us tor;'_, 
1761,-1790 (Homewood, 1974r:-pp. 174-184. 
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While the studies noted above generally agree that a collapse or 
congressional authority occurred and locate that collapse in the years 
1780 through 1783, each has a limited angle of vision. Each fails to 
explain adequately the impact of its particular cause upon the all im-
portant relationship between Congress and its constituent parts, the 
individual states. It is only by investigating the effects of events 
and policies on that relationship that one can fully explain the loss of 
congressional authority. Consequently, this study examines congression-
al-state relations in detail during the period 1780 through 1783. 
Within this context it explores the effects. of three particular causes 
mentioned by other historians as possible sources for the loss of con-
gressional authority. The first was the crisis in congressional finan-
ces, which began in the latter part of 1779 and continued throughout 
the remainder of the war. The second was the ratification of the Arti-
cles of Confederation in March, 1781, which finally established the 
union of the states on a legal basis. The third was the impact of the 
end of the war which resulted from the successful Yorktown campaign in 
October, 1781, and the consequent ratification of the preliminary arti-
cles of peace by Congress in April, 1783. 
The thesis of this study is that although these events affected the 
relationship between Congress and the states, the events themselves did 
not measurably alter the authority of Congress. Instead, they only re-
vealed and amplified the inherent weakness of the national government 
created by the revolutionaries. At the heart of this problem lay the 
power retained by the states either to accept or to reject congressional 
resoltuions. This power, reserved by the states partly from inexperi-
ence but mostly from fears of centralized authority, plagued the 
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efficient conduct of national government from the onset of the war until 
the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787 and 1788. It was 
often employed because the revolutionaries, in designing their system 
of government, created a straight line relationship between Congress, 
state governments, and the people rather than the triangular relation-
ship familiar under the Federal Constitution; that is, the state govern-
ments owed their existence to the citizens of their respective states, 
while Congress was a creature of these state authorities. But there 
was no direct relationship between Congress and the people. State gov-
ermuents were often trapped between the needs of their constituents and 
the demands of Congress. When required to choose between the two, they 
invariably chose the former. The pressures of the events during the 
years 1780 through 1783 forced state governments to make these decisions 
more frequently and, in the process, the states increasingly conflicted 
with one another and with Congress. The confrontations became so in-
tense that it was inevitable that the collective voice of the states, 
Congress, would lose much of its prestige and consequently much of its 
authority. 
A corollary thesis of this study is that the growing tensions be-
tween the states in the years under investigation led to movements both 
toward and away from creating a stronger national government. As con-
stituted under the Articles of Confederation, without sufficient powers 
to enforce its resolutions and with no permanent income of its own, Con-
gress became a battleground for competing state interests. On one issue 
·or another, most states believed that Congress was being used by some 
states to strip others of their rights and property. In order to allev-
iate these conflicts, some members of Congress such as James Madison 
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and Joseph Jones of Virginia, and James Duane of New York, advocated 
increasing the powers of the national government by giving Congress an 
independent income and coercive powers to carry out its resolutions. 
They believed that making Congress less dependent upon the states for 
its authority was the only way to insure that their states would be pro-
tected from encroachments by other states. A second group of delegates, 
however, opposed increasing congressional authority. Such men as David 
Howell and Jonathan Arnold of Rhode Island argued that to augment con-
gressional power would only enhance the opportunities of the other 
states to make inroads into their states' sovereignty. Thus many of the 
opponents and some of the advocates of an altered Congress operated from 
the same frustrations and the same fears--frustrations with the inabil-
ity of the national government to solve the problems of interstate con-
flicts and fears that this inability could damage the sovereignty of 
their individual states. 
This study also contains several subordinate themes which comment 
upon other factors that aggravated the conflicts between the states. 
The most important, perhaps, concerns the lack of an integrated national 
polity. From the earliest settlements, the colonies developed in vir-
tual isolation from one another. In different sections of America, the 
colonists created social, economic, and political institutions which 
both suited their particular environments and conformed to the reasons 
which had impelled them to emigrate from Britain. On the eve of the 
Revolution the colonies had achieved different states of community de-
velopment. During the war, the compact organization of the New England 
town was much more effective in calling forth its resources than was 
the rambling county system of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the one 
l1and, people in New En;jlan<l could not understand the difficulties caused 
by such factors as space in large states like Virginia. On the other, 
southerners resented the charges leveled at them by ~Jew Englanders that 
they had done less than their fair share of the financing and the fight-
ing, when they believed that they were doing everything possible. 
Other subordinate themes concern the problems of conununication, of 
intrastate conflict, and of local administrative ineffectiveness. 
Throughout the war communications were hampered by both distance and 
the British, which in turn, prevented a perfectly coordinated war effort 
and which caused long delays in executing congressional policies. The 
problem of internal disputes within some states sometimes altered the 
manner in which a specific state would respond to congressional resolu-
tions, or worse still, would prevent action on a particular policy alto-
gether. Finally, in forming their governments most states incorporated 
the same administrative methods and units which had been employed by 
their colonial governments. These practices, however, proved ineffec-
tive in organizing the states' resources for prosecuting the more modern 
warfare of the Revolution. Thus, even though most states had adequate 
men and material to comply with congressional resolutions, they often 
could be called forth only by the most brutal use of force. Since state 
governments owed their existence to their citizens, most were unwilling 
to use such coercion except in times of immediate danger to their par-
ticular states. 
The arguments which support this thesis and which will be document-
ed in succeeding chapters are as follows: It is almost axiomatic that 
in the early part of the war the states feared the creation of a strong 
national government. The Revolution itself had been prompted by the 
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abuses of British administration, and the states were determined that 
their labors would not result in the development of an equally abusive 
national government. Consequently, the states created a central govern-
ment which could exercise very little authority unless its actions were 
consented to by the states. Congress, as it developed during the war 
and under the Articles of Confederation, was the product of these fears. 
In many ways it might indeed be compared to an international organiza-
tion of independent states formed solely for the purpose of prosecuting 
the war. The states well knew the kind of government they had created. 
It was no accident that the official designation of the Continental Con-
gress was the United States in Congress Assembled; nor was it a grammat-
ical quirk that Congress was used as a plural noun; .. ~.:£·, "Congress 
are," "Congress were," and "Congress have." 
Nevertheless, despite its lack of independent powers, Congress as 
an administrative and legislative body could be effective, but only so 
long as the states remained basically in harmony with one another. Un-
der the pressure of several crises of the war in the period 1780 through 
1783, however, harmony and cooperation among the states virtually dis-
appeared to be replaced by disunity and competition. During these years 
the states began to argue that both Congress and its administrators were 
inflexible, insensitive, and unjust, They asserted that national admin-
istrators often rigidly adhered to congressional orders when it appeared 
to the states involved that such orders were not justified because of 
local circumstances. More importantly, states argued that Congress 
failed to adjust its demands to accommodate adequately the particular 
difficulties of individual states. 
To the states, this last issue became especially apparent on the 
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prob.Lem of financing the war effort. Early in the war the states had 
granted Congress the power to print money in order to support its activ-
ities. The states were supposed to back this currency through contribu-
tions. But by late 1779, partly because of inability to pay, partly 
because of reluctance, and partly because it seemed sufficient to let 
Congress print money without supporting it, the states had never fully 
backed any issue of Continentals. The resulting inflationary spiral 
threatened to completely wreck the war effort. Thus, Congress stopped 
the presses. As a substitute for the Continental currency, in early 
1780, Congress decided to requisition supplies directly from the states 
at fixed prices. It also determined to issue new bills of credit to 
replace the old currency at a recommended f~{ed ratio of forty old bills 
for one new. In addition, it also insisted that before the new bills 
could be issued the old had to be called in and destroyed. The states 
were asked to pass specific taxes for that purpose. In effect, in early 
1780 Congress placed the financing of the war directly into the hands of 
the states, while it acted only as a requisitioning and dispersing agent. 
One result of these new financial proposals was to bring permanent-
ly to the surface the resentments of the states toward one another. As 
Congress began to implement its system each state government discovered 
reasons why it could not fully comply with the requisitions. Each jus-
tified its non-compliance by claiming that because of peculiar circum-
stances its citizens had contributed more than their fair share to 
Continental expenses. To support these assertions some state officials 
argued that the method used by Congress to assign state quotas was ineq-
uitable because Con8ress based its assessments on inaccurate population 
statistics compiled in the early part of the war. Others asserted that 
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in the previous four years of warfare their states had been frequently 
either ravaged or partly occupied by the enemy, thereby reducing these 
states' sources of revenue. Still others noted that their states were 
the sites of the maneuvers of the Continental Army and out of necessity 
they had been required to make up the difference between the Army's 
needs and the contributions of other states. 
The state governments compensated for these injustices to their· 
constituents by either ignoring or defying congressional financial re-
quests. Many states continued to issue their own currency despite con-
gressional wishes to the contrary. In addition, state assemblies were 
slow to pass legisl~tion necessary to collect specific taxes to support 
the new bills. When they did so, the exchange rates they set often 
differed from the forty-for-one ratio requested by Congress. When asked 
to explain their actions, state officials answered that they had only 
responded to local economic circumstances and to the necessity of de-
fending their economies from adverse legislation passed by surrounding 
states. They also argued that their own financial difficulties were at 
least as serious as those of Congress and insisted on knowing when Con-
gress would make its long awaited adjustments of accounts between the 
United States and the individual states. The net result of these grow-
ing conflicts was that the new financial system never worked effectively. 
The resentments towards Congress increased in mid-1780 when the 
British began military operations in the Southern states. In the months 
which followed both Georgia and South Carolina fell to the enemy, North 
Carolina became a battleground and Virginia was invaded. Virginia and 
Maryland pleaded with Congress for immediate military and financial aid. 
Congress replied that it would try to help but because of its own 
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financial problems Virginia and Maryland should not count on aid. Con-
gress did everything it could but in the process only increased the 
dissatisfaction of the other states. The campaign obviously raised the 
cost of the war but now three states, Georgia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina, were virtually excluded from sharing the additional financial 
burden. The other ten states over which the increased costs were appor-
tioned complained that Virginia and Mqryland could do more, while these 
last two states argued that the other eight were leaving them in the 
breach. 
As the financial and military woes of the South worsened, Virgin-
ians became desperate. Unable to raise an effective army or to finance 
their own defense and frustrated because of the minimal aid received 
from their brethren in Congress, some Virginians even began to question 
the effectiveness of republican government. In June, 1780, after a 
British raid had disrupted the Virginia assembly, Richard Henry Lee de-
manded that Congress send General Washington southward irmn.ediately and 
give him dictatorial powers to requisition men and provisions so that 
he could drive the British from the South. 
Towards the end of 1780 other states besides Virginia also were 
becoming increasingly frustrated by congressional ineffectiveness. Many 
of them hoped and believed that congressional power could be increased 
or at least could be made more efficient by the simple expedient of ra-
tifying the Articles of Confederation. They asserted that legally 
establishing the national government c;:ould ease the financial problems 
of prosecuting the war; first because a legitimate government would en-
hance the chances of acquiring foreign loans and second, because the 
Articles contained in Article VIII a specific method for apportioning 
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taxes upon the states based on the amount of improved land in each 
state. Other delegates believed that the only way the national govern-
ment could be strengthened was to make its instrument of government 
legal so that it could be amended. 
Both groups were equally disillusioned. Those who believed that 
the financial problems would be eased quickly discovered that Article 
VIII was impossible to implement because of the lack of data on improved 
lands in each state. Those who looked to strengthening congressional 
power through the amendment process discovered that the unanimity re-
quired was also impossible. Congress desperately sought some other 
method for financing the war. Proposals ranged from the sale of western 
lands to a tax upon all lands and finally to an impost on imports and 
prizes •. 
Delegates from individual states opposed each of these methods. 
Among their arguments were expressions of the old fears of central gov-
ernment. For example, some delegates argued that the power given to 
Congress under the proposed impost to appoint officers in each of the 
states to collect the taxes was a dangerous infringement upon state 
sovereignty. But ·in private letters between delegates and their state 
governments the real reasons for opposition were expressed in terms 
which indicated fears that such taxes were designed to take advantage 
of the wealth of particular states. Thus the states began to view the 
attempts to establish federal taxes as methods which some states would 
use to rob other states of their property. 
Another problem which arose repeatedly during the period 1780 
through 1783 and which reduced the authority of Congress by increasing 
the states' resentments of one another was that of disputed territories. 
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Though the problems of overlapping colonial claims had existed prior to 
the period under discussion, in the years 1780 through 1783 the ques-
tions were pursued much more vigorously both inside and outside of Con-
gress. Perhaps the most important of these disputes was that among 
those states which had claims to territory in the west, principally New 
York, Connecticut, and Virginia. Maryland refused to ratify the Arti-
cles of Confederation until these states had surrendered their western 
claims to the United States. Reluctantly, these states conceded, in 
principle, to surrendering the western territories. The actual imple-
mentation of the cessions, however, caused considerable turmoil and bit-
terness in Congress among the states involved. Other territorial 
disputes which occurred during these years and which were heatedly de-
bated on the floor of Congress included the struggle of the Hampshire 
Grants (Vermont) to obtain independence from New York and New Hampshire 
and the dispute between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the Wyoming 
Valley in northeastern Pennsylvania. 
While the Articles of Confederation provided in Article IX a com-
plicated method through which these disputes could be settled, the con-
flicts involved the issue of basic state sovereignty, and the states 
concerned were never convinced that Congress could or would be objective 
in its judgements. This became evident as each state tried to use the 
Confederation's method for resolving conflict strictly to its own advan-
tage, maneuvering the questions in Congress by either supporting or 
opposing consideration until such time as one or the other of the dis-
putants had achieved an advantage in the alignment of the states on 
that particular question. The states which believed themselves victim-
ized by these maneuvers naturally reacted in anger. Their respect for 
16 
Congress as it was constituted under the Articles of Confederation di-
minished while their fears increased that in the future their sover-
eignty would be impinged upon further by the other states acting in 
concert in Congress. 
Still other seemingly minor crises arose among the states throughout 
the period. Sometimes such crises involved conflict between states over 
congressional orders; at other times they concerned direct confronta-
tions between states themselves. These crises intensified the resent-
ments of states against not only Congress but each other as well, adding 
further to the reluctance of the states to fully cooperate with one 
another. For example, Pennsylvania complained bitterly of Delaware's 
violations of congressional requests for embargoes. New York resented 
Connecticut's raids upon Long Island. Many states condemned Governor 
William Livingston of New Jersey when he unilaterally set exchange 
ratios for Continental dollars in such a manner that surrounding states 
were flooded with more than their fair share of the old Continental cur-
rency. Maryland was angered by the capture of one of its vessels, 
bearing a flag of truce and carrying supplies for Maryland prisoners in 
New York, by ships operating out of the ports of Rhode Island. All of 
these crises, along with many others, served to increase the tensions 
among the individual governments which made up the Confederation. 
In addition to these direct and indirect confrontations among indi-
vidual states, there were also incidents between congressional adminis-
trators and the states which created further irritations. Some of these 
conflicts involved Congressional Connnissaries. In New York, Timothy 
Pickering, acting as Congress' Commissary, refused to pay for forage he 
confiscated for use of the Continental Army in a manner acceptable to 
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New York's State Agent, Udny Hay, and was arrested by New York offic-
ials. In Maryland the Continental Agent refused to accept beef cattle 
on the hoof, insisting that Maryland pay the cost of slaughtering the 
animals and salting the meat as per congressional orders, even though 
Maryland argued that it had experienced enormous expenses in obtaining 
the cattle in the first place. Many other incidents involved the newly 
created Department of Finance and its head, Robert Morris. As was evi-
denced by the sharp exchanges between Morris and some state governors, 
many states felt that he lacked both appreciation for their particular 
exertions and sympathy for their desperate financial conditions. 
Again, the net result was a further erosion of respect for Congress and 
a consequent diminution of congressional authority. 
Indicative of the decreasing significance of Congress in the years 
1780 through 1783 was the attitude of delegates towards congressional 
service. Many delegates felt neglected by their constituents. They 
believed themselves overworked, overlooked and underpaid. Time after 
time they requested either to be replaced or at least to be adequately 
supported by their home states. In most cases their requests were 
virtually ignored. Consequently many delegates, when offered the oppor-
tunity, readily accepted positions as judicial officers or as members 
of assemblies in their home states rather than continue their odious 
duties in Philadelphia. 
Part of the reason for the low prestige of congressional service 
was the confusion over the role delegates were expected to play. 
Throu.ghout the existence of the early Congresses delegates served tuo 
I 
functions. State govermnents expected them to:protect the interests of 
their home states and to convey to their constituents the congressional 
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point of view. In this sense the members acted as ambassadors repre-
senting specific sovereignties. Thus both before and after the ratifi-
cation of the Articles voting in Congress was done by states. At the 
same time, however, delegates were also expected to coordinate and di-
rect the nation's war effort and in this capacity t.o make ipdependent 
judgements and vote as individuals. Thus the members often acted as 
national legislators attempting to instruct their states rather than as 
state emi,ssaries. 
During the period under discussion the dichotomy between these two 
roles became starkly apparent. Congressmen with a large view of nation-
al distress recognized the need for closer state cooperation and empha-
sized their role as legislators by pleading with their states to comply 
with congressional resolutions. But as local distress increased, state 
governments insisted that their delegates represent their interests 
exlusively. Consequently, as the conflicts among the states increased, 
many congressional delegates considered themselves little more than 
spies sent by their state governments to analyze each decision in terms 
of how much harm such decisions would do their states. 
As the rewards of congressional service declined delegates were 
often reluctant to attend. Thus Congress frequently was left without 
sufficient representation to decide significant questions. By late 1783 
the lack of congressional prestige and the difficulty of obtaining quor-
ums almost paralyzed the activities of Congress. Many important deci-
ions were either not made or else suffered inordinate and dangerous 
delays. For example, in November and December, 1783, Congress was un-
able even to muster enough states to ratify the definitive articles of 
peace with Great Britain even though the peace commissioners had noted 
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that the exchange of ratifications had to take place in London on March 
1 of the following year. 
The growing tensions among the states, the inability of Congress 
as structured under the Articles of Confederation either to ease the 
tensions or to bypass them, and the lack of authority in Congress to 
enforce its decisions, led to agitation both inside and outside Congress 
to equip that body with more effectual powers. The primary group out-
side Congress that supported additional powers was the Army. One of the 
natural by-products of a united revolution was the creation of a nation-
al army whose concern for prosecuting the struggle with Britain trans-
cended state boundaries. Obviously this concern had been present since 
the onset of the Revolution, but in the period 1780 through 1783, be-
cause of the lack of unity among the states on questions of finance, 
the years of effort by the Army threatened to prove unavailing. Conse-
quently much of the impetus for a stronger national government came from 
the supporters of the Army who feared that if Congress did not reform 
itself in order to adequately support the Army, America risked losing 
the war. 
Inside Congress the movement towards strengthening congressional 
authority was also partly motivated by fears of American military de-
feat. More important, however, was the belief that Congress lacked the 
authority to prevent conflic-ts between the states and, in fact, actually 
encouraged interstate conflict because of the way Congress was struc-
tured. Some delegates argued that the Articles permitted the individual 
states too much power to thwart the will of the majority. As with rati-
fication itself, one state for its own selfish purposes could block the 
execution of a policy considered vitally important by all other states 
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until it had wrenched unjust concessions from some of the states in the 
majority. These delegates also deplored Congress' lack of coercive 
powers. They argued that even when Congress was able to. make decisions, 
it was impossible to get states to comply if they chose not to. This 
meant that either the policies had to be abandoned or else those states 
which complied had to assume the burden of those which did not. 
Thus, almost immediately after the ratification of the Articles, 
some delegates began to agitate for constitutional revision. Among 
their proposals was that of giving Congress the power to force laggard 
states to comply with congressional requisitions and orders. They also 
proposed to alter the number of states required to set policies. Some 
argued that policy should be set by a simple majority of all states 
rather than the majority of nine states required by the Articles of Con-
federation. Others believed, in order to bypass state absenteeism, that 
decisions should be made binding by a simple majority (but not less than 
five) of the states present at a particular session. 
As noted previously, many historians have argued that these at-
tempts at amending the Articles of Confederation were guided by nation-
alists whose primary goals was to create a powerful national government 
to which the states would be much more fully subordinated. These his-
torians have identified the nationalists primarily as economic conserva-
tives whose main concern was to protect the country's economic interest 
groups. Their opponents have been desribed as strong states' rightis·ts 
who feared that strengthening national government would lead to the 
< 
destruction of state sovereignty and to limitations upon liberty. Some 
of the delegates, such as Robert Morris, fit these definitions, but 
others did not. 
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Among those who did not fit the definition was a group of dele-
gates, led by James Madison, who indeed were nationalists, but who were 
nationalists of an odd sort. When the vital interests of thei~ states 
were involved in congressional disputes, they worked strenuously to de-
fend those interests. They also strove to strengthen the central gov-
errnuent, but primarily to protect state sovereignty, not to subvert it. 
They believed that only by giving the national government greater 
authority could victory over Britain be achieved, thus assuring the 
independence of their particular states. They also believed that mak-
ing the national government as independent as possible of state influ-
ence was the only way that Congress could become an objective judge of 
interstate conflicts. To create such an authority would obviously limit 
state sovereignty to a certain extent, but it would also guarantee that 
if state sovereignty was sacrificed, it would be sacrificed equally by 
all. 
In essence this group of delegates emphasized their role as nation-
al legislators rather than as state emissaries. The crises of the per-
iod under discussion caused many of these men to look beyond the needs 
and desires of their own states for solutions to problems which were 
essentially national in scope. At the same time, as the peculiar dis-
tresses of individual states increased, state governments often demanded 
that their delegates adhere more stringently to their role as state 
emissaries. The rapidly diverging perceptions of the role delegates 
were supposed to perform led to confusion, frustration, and ill-will, 
and therefore to a further erosion of congressional authority. 
Nevertheless, it would be this group of men, pragmatic politicians 
and solid supporters of the rights and interests of their respective 
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states, who would be primarily responsible for stumbling onto a method 
for balancing liberty and authority in the national government at the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787. Their solution, based upon their 
experiences in the Continental and Confederation Congresses and reached 
through painful compromise, would be to initiate a dynamic, creative 
tension between the interests of the states and the interests of the 
people by establishing a direct relationship between the central gov-
ernment and the people, thus completing the third side of the familiar 
Federal triangle. Only then would the states be assured protection 
from each other and from an arbitrary national government. 
But in the years 1780 through 1783 these men failed to create a 
stronger national government. The nationalist drive itself was the pro-
duct of disunity in Congress. If Congress had been able to maintain 
the consensus of the states for its policies, then it also would have 
maintained its prestige and authority, and a nationalist movement would 
not have .been necessary and may not even have developed. Conversely, 
since Congress had lost its authority because of interstate strife, 
there was little hope that the nationalists could regain the necessary 
consensus among the states without devising a system whereby each state 
would be guaranteed its sovereignty. During the years 1780 through 1783 
the nationalists were unable to create such a system, and the end of 
the war would assure that for at least a few more years they would not. 
The termination of the war meant that it was no longer immediately ap-
parent to the states why such enforced cooperation by a strengthened 
national government was necessary. Thus, stripped of its prestige and 
authority by the conflicts of the last years of the war, Congress was 
allowed to drift lethargically through the next four years. So 
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effectively had the prestige of Congress been destroyed that even when 
the people of the states finally realized the necessity of establishing 
a stronger national government they abandoned the discredited Confeder-
ation altogether and adopted a new constitution. 
In the following chapters each of the arguments outlined above will 
be explored in detail. It should be noted that in doing so the evi-
dence which will be emphasized will be that of the written communica-
tions of the delegates of Congress and of congressional and state 
officials. Sometimes their view of events differed markedly from the 
actual events as they unfolded. But, since their perception of events 
colored the decisions which would be made on the local and national 
level, their views of the various crises during the period 1780 through 
1783 is of paramount importance in investigating their actions. In 
addition, it should be cautioned that many concurrent forces working 
towards national integration did exist during the period under investi-
gation. It is not, however, the function of this study to assess those 
unifying factors but rather to explore those factors which inhibited a 
more rapid development of national unity. With this understanding the 
detailed discussion of these years can now connnence. 
CHAPTER II 
CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS PRIOR TO 17 80 
The crises in congressional-state relations during 1780 through 
1783 originated in the inadequate solutions of two major problems in 
the previous four years of warfare. The first of these problems was 
the difficulty Congress faced in creating a national government which 
would provide not only direction for the war effort but also protection 
for the states from the kinds of abuses associated with British adminis-
tration. The second problem, closely related to the first, was finding 
some equitable and efficient method for financing the war. In both 
cases, the solutions forced upon Congress mirrored the states' fears of 
centralized authority and reflected the states' struggle to protect 
their particular interests. In both cases, the solutions aggravated 
rather than alleviated the conflicts between the states. Consequently, 
Congress entered the critical year of 1780 with neither a ratified au-
thority nor a stable financial structure with which to prosecute effec-
tively the war against Britain, 
Congress' solution to the problem of union was the Articles of Con-
federation. The best history of the writing and ratification of that 
document is Merrill Jensen's Articles of Confederation. 1 Throughout 
1Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation ~ the Social-




his discussion, however, Jensen emphasized the debate between "conserva-
tive" nationalists and "radical" states' rightists as the most important 
element in the shaping of the Articles. While he quite properly argued 
that the states were primarily concerned with protecting their own sov-
ereignties, his preoccupation with the conflict between nationalists 
and radicals led him to discount the conflicts between the states them-
selves. Much of the states' fear of central government stemmed from 
their beliefs that a strong national government would lead, in one man-
ner o~ another, to their being oppressed by other states. Thus, the 
writing of the Articles was often influenced by states either seeking 
advantages in the national council or in preventing possible encroach-
ments on an advantage they might already enjoy in Congress. The result 
of their efforts, reflected clearly in the problem of financing the war, 
was the creation of a central government whose lines of authority were 
so nebulous that it could neither efficiently prosecute the war nor 
effectively guarantee the sovereignty of individual states through arbi-
tr~ting interstate conflict. 
As early as July, 1775, Benjamin Franklin proposed a sketch for a 
confederation which would have established a "League of Friendship" 
among the states. Under his plan, Congress would have control of war 
and peace, foreign affairs, general commerce, currency, and Indian re-
lations. The government was to be supported by each colony supplying 
money in proportion to its number of male polls between sixteen and 
sixty years of age. Representation would be apportioned at one for 
every 5,000 polls. It would have an executive council of twelve mem-
bers, and the Articles themselves could be amended by a simply majority 
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of the colonies. 2 
Because the delegates were concerned with a possible reconciliation 
with Great Britain, they defeated Franklin's plan and did not consider 
a plan of union again until June, 1776. By then, Congress was preparing 
to declare independence, and, anticipating the event, it resolved on 
June 11 to appoint a conunittee to draft articles of confederation. The 
following day Congress chose the conunittee, consisting of one member 
3 from each colony. A month later, on July 12, the conunittee reported 
and laid before Congress the so called "Dickinson draft" of the Arti-
cles for the members' consideration. 4 
This draft incorporated many of the provisions of Franklin's plan 
in determining what powers Congress could exercise and in designing the 
general form of the national government. But it differed markedly in 
the detail of the structure and in how Congress could exercise its au-
thority. Under the Dickinson draft, taxes would be based upon the num-
ber of all inhabitants of every age and sex within each colony (except 
Indians) and allowed each colony to have only one vote in Congress. It 
also provided that major decisions such as war, the assessment of taxes 
and the apportionment of troops required the agreement of the delegates 
of nine colonies, while all other decisions necessitated the assent of 
seven colonies. The Dickinson draft also gave Congress the authority 
to set the boundaries of those colonies whose charters or purchases 
2continental Congress, Secret Journals ~the Congress~ the 
Confederation (Boston, 1820), Vol. I, pp. 267-273. Hereinafter, SJ. 
3rbid., pp. 273-274. 
4rbid., pp. 275-288. 
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from Indians gave them claims to lands in the West. 5 
Congress immediately began debating the various provisions of the 
draft, but their progress was painfully slow. Samuel Chase of Maryland 
observed that some delegates did not see the necessity of a confedera-
tion. Expressing the view of the majority of members, however, Chase 
argued that without a union between the states: "We shall remain weak, 
distracted and divided in our councils; our strength will decrease; we 
shall be open to all the arts of the insidious court of Britain, and no 
Court will attend to our applications for assistance before we are con-
federated." Emphasizing the last Chase asked: "What contract will a 
foreign State make with us when we cannot agree among ourselves? 116 The 
concern for national credibility, however, did not measurably divide 
Congress into nationalists and radicals. According to Abraham Clark of 
New Jersey the debate centered instead on two articles: "One for fixing 
the Quota of the States towards the Public expense, and the other 
whether Each State shall have a Single Vote or in proportion to the 
Sums they raise or the Numb[er] of Inhabitants they contain. 117 
By early August the debates over these two issues of taxation and 
representation had become so intense that some members of Congress 
5Ibid. In his discussion of the Dickinson draft, Jensen emphasized 
its nationalist potential, but it can also be seen that Dickinson was 
acting as a representative of a landless, small state. For an excellent 
discussion of the constitutional implications of the Dickinson draft 
see Jensen, Articles of Confederation, pp. ~29-138. 
6 
Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee, July 30, 1776, in Edmund Cody 
Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress (Washing-
ton, 1921-1936), Vol. II, p. 32. ---ilereinafter, IMC. 
7Ahraham Clark to James Caldwell, July 31, 1776, LMC, Vol. II, 
pp. 132-.33. 
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doubted that a confederation ever would be achieved. William Williams, 
a delegate from Connecticut, writing to Joseph Trumbull, declared: "We 
make slow Progress in them [the Articles] as every Inch of Ground is 
disputed and very jarring Claims and Interests are to be adjusted among 
us, and then all to be agreed to by sev[eral] Legislatures, so that be-
tween both I almost Despair of seeing it accomplished. 118 Despite 
Williams' pessimism, the Conunittee of the Whole finally produced a draft 
of the Articles on August 20, which did not alter Dickinson's draft to 
any great extent, and offered it to Congress for further consideration. 9 
But the final arguments on the proposed Articles were delayed by the 
press of other events, and they do not appear to have been considered 
again until April, 1777. On the eighth of that month Congress resolved 
10 
to debate the Articles two days a week until they were completed. 
Congress, however, was able to consider the confederation only 
sporadically until October. 11 Meanwhile, on the days it was discussed, 
some parts of the Articles were decided. In April Thomas Burke of North 
Carolina led a debate on the second article because, for him, it was not 
explicit enough in its guarantee of the rights of the states. Observing 
that "it expressed only a reservation of the power of regulating the 
internal police" to the states and that it consequently resigned every 
8william Williams to Joseph Trumbull, Aug. 7, 1776, LMC, Vol. II, 
p. 41. 
9sJ, Vol. I, pp. 288-299; and Jensen, Articles of Confederation, 
p. 139-.-
10sJ, Vol. I, p. 239. 
11The Articles were debated in 1777 on April 8, 21, 25; May 5; and 
June 23, 25, 26. Ibid., pp. 299-301. 
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other power to the confederation government, he proposed an alteration. 
He wanted to insure that a future Congress would be prevented from abus-
ing its authority by rewriting the second article so "that all sovereign 
power was in the states separately," and that only expressly enumerated 
powers could be exercised by Congress and then only in conjunction with 
the states. In all other cases he urged that the states be permitted 
to "exercise all the rights and power of sovereignty uncontrolled." 
0 d 1 b V . . . B k f 1 ' h' ff 12 ppose on y y irg1n1a, ur e was success u in is e ort. 
Nevertheless, Congress still continued to quarrel over three major 
problems--voting, taxation, and western lands--causing further delays 
in completing the Articles. Each of these issues dominated the debates 
on the Confederation from the outset because they were so intimately 
connected with the interests of particular states. The first two in-
valved conflicts between large and small states and between states with 
large and small slave populations. The last primarily concerned what 
might be termed "landed" and "landless" states which possessed or lacked 
13 
claims to the undeveloped West. The solutions to these problems, 
more than any other aspect of the Articles, determined the shape of 
national government during the rest of the Revolution and during the 
confederation period after the war. 
Both Dickinson's and the conunittee's drafts of the Articles incor-
porated one practice already adhered to by Congress, that of voting 
12 
Thomas Burke to the Governor of North Carolina, Apr. 29, 1777, 
LMC, Vol. II, pp. 345-346. 
13Jensen presents, perhaps, the best discussion of these conflicts, 
thought he still tends to overemphasize the nationalist-radical contro-
versy that was obviously inherent within the conflicts. Jensen, 
Articles of Confederation, pp. 140-160. 
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in Congress by states. Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania asserted: 
"Let the small Colonies give equal money and men, and then have an equal 
vote. But if they have an equal vote without bearing equal burthens, 
14 
a confederation upon such iniquitous Principles will never last long." 
Benjamin Rush, also representing Pennsylvania, made several points, 
among them that voting by states would promote factions in Congress and 
in the States and that it would lead to a reluctance to admit new colo-
nies into the confederation. He also declared: "He have been too free 
with the word independence; we are dependent on each other, not totally 
independent states. 1115 On the other side, fearful of being swallowed 
by the large states, men from small states such as Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut asserted that delegates in Congress represented states not 
. d. "d 1 16 in .tvi ua s. John Witherspoon from New Jersey supported Sherman by 
arguing: "Colonies should in fact be considered as individuals; and 
17 that as such in all disputes they should have an equal vote." The 
problem continued to plague Congress in the debates of 1777; so much 
so that Thomas Burke noted in May: "A difficulty occurs, I fear, will 
be insuperable: that is how to secure to each State its separate Incle-
pendence, and give each its proper weight in the public councils." 
Burke did not believe that a solution would be found and predicted that 
"after all it is far from impossible that the only Confederation will 
14John Adams, Notes of Debates, July 30, 1776, in Worthington 
Chauncey Ford et al. eds., Journals of the Continental Congress 
(Washington, 1904-1937), Vol, VI, p.-Y079. Hereinafter, JGC. 
15rb id., p. 1081. 
16Ibid. 
17 
Thomas Jefferson, Notes of Debates, JCC, Vol. VI, pp. 1102-1106. 
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be a <lefensive alliance. 1118 
In October, 1777, the large states, led by Virginia, proposed a 
number of remedies for this problem. On the seventh it was moved that 
the three least populous states, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Georgia, 
be given only one vote and all other states allowed one vote per 50,000 
inhabitants. This was rejected as was another recommendation to appor-
tion votes at one per 30,000 citizens, Next came the attempt, also 
defeated, to apportion representation according to the amount of taxes 
paid. After rejecting the efforts of Virginia and the large states, 
Congress finally accepted the article as written; that is that each 
19 state would have one vote in Congress. Those large states which 
finally consented to the unit method of voting perhaps agreed with 
Samuel Adams of Massachusetts that the requirement of Article IX that 
nine states had to concur on major congressional decisions would bal-
ance the threat that the small states might combine against the inter-
20 
ests of the larger. Virginia, however, made one last attempt to alter 
the method of voting on October 30 by supporting an amendment to the 
clause necessitating the decision of nine states on major questions. 
After the words "unless nine states shall assent to same" it had been 
proposed to add: "Provided, that nine states so assenting shall compre-
hend a majority of the people of the United States excluding negroes and 
d . 1121 In ians; ..• This alteration was also defeated and the one vote 
18 
Burke to the Governor of North Carolina, May 23, 1777, LMC, Vol. 
II, pp. 370-371. 
19sJ, Vol. I, pp. 301-306. 
20 
Samuel Adams to James Warr.en, June 30, 1777, LMC, Vol. II, p. 392. 
21sJ, Vol. I, pp. 324-325. 
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per state provision became a permanent part of the Articles. 
The next problem, the method of taxation, was equally difficult to 
solve. The Dickinson draft had provided that taxes would be apportioned 
according to population. The difficulty of this method, one which 
caused much acrimonious debate, was the question how slaves were to be 
counted. Southern slaveholding states argued that slaves were property 
and not people, at least for the purpose of taxation. Thus Samuel 
Chase argued that he would accept taxes based on population but only if 
Negroes were excluded. Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, attempting to 
mediate the growing differences between the northern and southern states 
over the issue, even proposed a compromise, rejected by both sides, in 
which two slaves would count as one freeman for the purpose of taxa-
tion. 22 Towards the end of the debating in July and August, 1776, 
John Witherspoon proposed the ultimate solution to the problem. Arguing 
that the measure of a nation's true wealth was in its land and the im-
provements on the land, he proposed that Congress base its apportionment 
the valuation of lands and houses. 23 on 
Delegates from New England, as their states contained more improved 
land than other states, naturally objected to this mode of taxation as 
inequitable, and thus Congress was unwilling to accept this solution 
until October, 1777. Even then the New England delegates attempted to 
include southern slaves in the valuation by supporting assessments based 
on the value of all property except household goods, but failed. 
22 . 
Adams, Notes of Debates and Jefferson, Notes of Debates, July 30, 
1776, JCC, Vol. VI, pp. 1079-1080, 1099-1100. 
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Jefferson, Notes of Debates, JCC, Vol. VI, p. 1101. 
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Finally, by the narrowest of margins (the four southern states and New 
Jersey voting ay, the four New England states, no, while New York and 
Pennsylvania were divided), Congress accepted and incorporated into the 
Articles the provision that taxes would be based upon the value of all 
lands granted or surveyed within each state and the buildings and im-
24 
provements thereon. 
The final problem, that of control over western territories, rap-
idly became the sole issue which delayed ratification. 25 Throughout 
the debates over the Articles, the landless states argued that Congress 
ought to have the power to control western territory and to set bound-
aries on those states which claimed jurisdiction to either the Missis-
sippi River or to the South Sea. They argued that such claims, if 
allowed, would make large states like Virginia even more powerful be-
cause of the income which they could derive from the sale of those 
26 
lands. The issue remained undecided in 1776, and the landless states, 
led by Maryland, continued to agitate the question. In October, 1777, 
they tried three times, unsuccessfully, to give Congress some measure 
of control over the western lands. The first plan, presented on the 
fifteenth~ proposed that every state lay before Congress a summary of 
the grants which gave them claims to western territory. The second at-
tempted to give Congress the sole and exclusive right to fix western 
boundaries and dispose of all lands beyond for the benefit of the 
United States. Finally, the landless states tried to empower Congress 
24sJ, Vol. I, pp. 307-310. 
25 
Jensen, Articles~ Confederation, pp. 192-193. 
26 
Adams, Notes of Debates, Aug. 1, 1776, JCC, Vol. VI, pp. 1082-
1083. 
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1 . h 1 . 27 to · ay out new states in t e western c aims. Indicative of the ada-
mant positions maintained by both sides, and of the growing tensions 
between the two, was that rather than a softening of demands which may 
have eventually led to compromise, each attempt by the landless states 
tended to be more aggressive than the last. 
With debate temporarily ended on these three major problems, the 
delegates quickly moved to protect the rights of the states, even in 
those areas where Congress was supposed to have exclusive jurisdiction. 
For example, in the article granting Congress the power to enter into 
treaties and alliances, the delegates insisted "that no treaty of com-
merce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective 
states shall be restrained from i~posing s~ch imposts and duties on for-
eigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the 
exportation or importation of any species of good or commodities what-
28 
soever." To the article which empowered Congress to control Indian 
affairs the delegates added: ''Provided that the legislative right of 
any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated. 1129 They 
also modified the prohibition against state issuance of letters of 
marque and.reprisal to read that such prohibition would exist "unless 
in case of pirates and then until such time as the danger was past or 
Congress declared otherwise. 113° Finally, the delegates significantly 
altered the method for settling interstate disputes. Article IX 
27 sJ, Vol. I, pp. 312-314. 
28Ibid., pp. 316-318. 
29 rbid., pp. 322-323. 
30Ibid., p. 316. 
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originally granted Congress the right of "deciding all disputes and 
differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or 
more states concerning boundaries, jurisdictions, or any other cause 
whatsoever. II But the delegates abandoned this general clause and 
devised a complicated, specific method whereby the states themselves 
ld d 'd d' 1 d' 31 wou ec1 e isputes, using Congress on y as a me iary. 
Finally finishing its work, Congress submitted the Articles to the 
32 
states for ratification on November 11, 1777. But as the Articles 
were on their way to the states, they were accompanied by much criti-
cism. Cornelius Harnett, writing to his colleague from North Carolina, 
Thomas Burke, declared: "The child Congress has been big with, these 
two years past, is at last brought forth . . I fear it will by several 
Legislatures be thought a little deformed, --you will think it a Mon-
ster.1133 Indeed, Burke did object strenuously to many of the Articles' 
provisions because they either made Congress too powerful or violated 
the sovereignty of the states. On one hand he argued against the powers 
accorded Congress in Article IX because many of those powers could be 
exercised in times of peace; on the other, he believed that the require-
ment included in Article IV, that states extend all the rights and priv-
ileges of citizens to their states to the citizens of other states, 
31 Ibid., pp. 319-322. For a discussion of these and other 
modifications of the Articles see Jensen, Articles of Confederation, 
pp. 177-184. 
32sJ, Vol. I, pp. 348-349. 
33 c l' H B k N 13 1777 LM 1 orne ius arnett to ur e, ov. , , ~c_, Vo . II, pp. 
547-548. 
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. 1 d h . f . d. "d 1 34 vio ate t e sovereignty o in ivi ua states. Nathaniel Folsom, 
writing to President Meshech Weare of New Hampshire, objected to the 
Articles' provision for apportioning taxes because southern slaves had 
been discounted and because some states had more improved land than 
35 
others. 
The objections to the Confederation, as they came in from state 
legislatures, displayed a mixture of concern over protecting the inter-
ests of particular states, fears of congressional power, and even de-
sires to increase congressional authority. Massachusetts, still 
disturbed because southern slave property had been discounted by the 
Articles' mode of assessing taxes, wanted Article VIII, which establish-
ed the system of taxation, amended so that Congress could alter the 
method from time to time "until experience shall have showed what rule 
f . . 11 b 1 d 1 . t1 3 6 o apportionment wi e most equa , an consequent y most Just. 
Both the landless states of New Jersey and Rhode Island insisted that 
Congress be given control of those lands which had been vested in the 
37 
Crown prior to the war. New Jersey, without significant ports of its 
own, also insisted that Congress be given exclusive control over com-
38 
merce. 
In addition, states with few slaves, such as New Jersey and 
34 
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Pennsylvania, objected to the provisions of Article IX which permitted 
apportioning quotas of troops among the states according to the number 
of 11white 11 inhabitants and wanted that word stricken. 39 On the other 
hand, South Carolina, with a large slave population and fearing the 
influence of free Blacks insisted that the word 11whi te" be used in 
Article IV which required that states extend rights and privileges to 
the free citizens of other states. South Carolina also wanted to raise 
the number of states required to make major decisions from nine to 
eleven, but at the same time to reduce the number of states required 
for amendment from thirteen to eleven. It also desired to remove Con-
gress' authority to establish courts for piracy and permit it only to 
declare what constituted piracy. 40 In the aggregate, most of the pro-
posals were not aimed at either strengthening or weaking the Confedera-
tion but at satisfying the peculiar interests of specific states. 
Nevertheless, most states considered the Confederation so important 
that they authorized their delegates to sign the Articles whether their 
own objections were incorporated into the document or not. The Maryland 
delegates sununed up the feelings of Congress in a letter to their 
state's governor. "A Confederation at this critical juncture appears 
to Congress of such momentous consequence, that [we are] satisfied a 
great majority are resolved to reject the amendments from every State, 
not so much from an opinion that all amendments are improper, as from 
the conviction that if any should be adopted, no Confederation will take 
place, .•• " The delegates further observed that the dangers inherent 
39rbid., pp. 358-364, 364-365. 
40 rbid., pp. 365-369. 
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in such a course and from those "which may arise from partial Conf eder-
acies" had "determined some States to accept the Confederation, altho' 
founded on principles not altogether consistent, in their opinion, with 
justice and sound policy. 1141 
Noting the reluctance of his fellow delegate, Henry Laurens, to 
sign the Articles without specific instructions from the South Carolina 
legislature, John Mathews urged that such instructions be forwarded im-
mediately. He argued: "This I am clear in, from what 1 have seen, and 
know since I have been in Congress, that if we are to have no Confeder-
ation until the Legislatures of the Thirteen States agree to one, that 
we shall never have one, and if we have not one, we shall be literally 
a rope of sand and I shall tremble for the consequences that will fol-
low at the end of the War. 1142 
During July, 1778, ten states ratified the Articles, followed by 
43 New Jersey in November and by Delaware in February, 1779. Maryland, 
however, remained· recalcitrant over the issue of western lands. It had 
sounded the warning in late June, 1778. At that time Maryland presented 
its objections to the Articles and, not content to wait until all the 
other states were heard from, insisted that its objections be considered 
immediately. On June 22-23, Congress defeated all of Maryland's objec-
tions including its most important one. Maryland proposed to add to 
Article IX after the words "no state shall be deprived of territory for 
the benefit of the United States" that "the United States in Congress 
41The Maryland Delegates to the Governor of Maryland, June 22, 1778, 
LMC, Vol. III, p. 314. 
42 ' ' 
John Mathews to John Rutledge, July 7, 1778, LMC, Vol. III, p. 322. 
43g, Vol. I, p. 402. 
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assembled shall have the power to appoint commissioners, who shall be 
fully authorized and empowered to ascertain and restrict the boundaries 
of such of the confederated states which claim to extend to the river 
Mississippi or South Sea." The vote on this proposal clearly showed the 
alignment of the landed and landless states. New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina and Georgia voted no; Mary-
land, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Rhode Island voted ay; and 
N Y k d . 'd d 44 ew or was iv1 e . While the rest of the landless states finally 
ratified the Articles in spite of this defeat, Maryland refused to do 
so. Consequently, the Articles remained unratified until 1781.· Mary-
land's refusal even led Virginia and.Connecticut to authorize their 
45 delegates to confederate without Maryland. Congress, however, re-
fused. 
Thus, Congress was forced to continue operating for some time with-
out a ratified authority. But even if the Articles had been ratified, 
it is probable that the situation would not have changed. The fears of 
the states both of central authority and of each other had reduced the 
potential usefulness of the Confederation government: Both before and 
after the writing of the Articles, congressional authority depended 
solely upon the willingness of the states to cooperate with one another. 
The failure of the states to create a central government with solid 
lines of authority and their failure to ratify even the one they crea-
ted was· symptomatic of their inability to achieve this cooperation. 
Equally illustrative of the fluid relation between Congress and the 
441bid., pp. 352-353. 
45 rbid., pp. 415-417, 422-423; 
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states and of the states with one another were the problems encountered 
in financing the war. 
Well before the colonies declared their independence from Great 
Britain Congress sought some method to finance its activities. As early 
as June, 1775, Congress appointed a committee to borrow £6,000 "for the 
use of America" and declared that the lenders would be paid in full 
with interest at a later time when Congress would make ample and full 
provision. 46 Later that month, however, Congress authorized the emis-
sion of $2,000,000 in bills of credit, valued in Spanish milled dollars, 
f h d f f Am . 47 or t e e ense o erica. In July it issued yet another 
48 $1,000,000. At the end of that month Congress finally decided upon a 
method to support those emissions. On the twenty-ninth it resolved to 
set quotas for each colony based upon the number of inhabitants of all 
ages including Negroes and mullattoes in each. Congress requested the 
states to submit official returns of population, but in the meantime, 
it provided for the redemption of the $3,000,000 already issued on es-
timates of population in each colony. The funds were to be raised 
through whatever method each colony found efficacious and were to be 
paid in quarterly payments on or before the last day of November, 1779, 
49 
1780, 1781, and 1782. In December Congress authorized the emission 
of yet another $3,000,000 based upon the same formulas as that of July, 
except that the quarterly payments were due in Novembers of 1783, 1784, 
46JCC __, Vol. II, p. 79. 
47 Ibid., p. 103. 
48 Ibid., p. 207. 
49 rbid., p. 221. 
50 1785, and 1786. 
Throughout the following year of 1776 military activities forced 
41 
Congress to continue to emit bills of credit, issuing at least another 
51 
$19,000,000. The printing of so much fiat currency along with the 
pressures of the intensifying warfare led naturally to inflation and to 
depreciation of the currency; so much so that on January 14, 1777, Con-
gress was impelled to pass a series of resolves. First, it declared 
that anyone who would not accept the bills of credit issued by Congress 
or who asked for more of them than for silver and gold "ought to be 
deemed an enemy of the liberties of these United States," It requested 
the states to end such "pernicious practices" through legislation and 
through making the Continental bills a legal tender. In addition, Con-
gress urged the states to begin paying off their portion of the debt 
consistent with the situation of their inhabitants. 52 In transmitting 
the resolutions to the states, the President of Congress, John Hancock, 
declared: "The depreciation of the continental currency having been 
for some time past a most growing evil, it became absolutely necessary 
· d d · · t 1153 to provi e some reme y against i . 
The states also attempted to control the depreciation of the cur-
rency through a series of regional conventions to fix the prices of 
labor and goods. The first such meeting occurred in December, 1776,. 
SOJCC, Vol. III, pp. 390, 457-458. 
51E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill, 1961), 
p. 30. See also JGC, Vol-:-TV, p. lSl; Vol. V, p. 599; and Vol. VI, 
p. 1047. -
52JCC, Vol. VII, pp. 35-37. 
53 John Hancock to the.Maryland Assembly, Jan. 14, 1777, LHC, Vol. 
II, pp. 217-218. 
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when committees from the four New England states, New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, met on the twenty-fifth at 
Providence, Rhode Island, to discuss the defense of that state. The 
convention ordered a number of troop movements within that state, but 
it also made a number of recommendations to the legislatures of the 
participating states. Among them, it suggested that the states issue 
no more currency and instead support their activities through taxing 
and borrowing. If, however, they were forced to emit more money be-
cause of emergencies, they should set a time limit for its redemption 
of no more than three years and pay four percent interest. In addition, 
the committees submitted a table of fixed prices for both labor and 
d h . 1 . 1 54 consumer goos to t eir egis atures. 
The meeting itself demonstrated the fluid relationship between 
Congress and the states which, in this case, was caused in part by the 
temporary isolation of the New England states from both Congress and 
the rest of the states. When Congress received the convention's report 
there was a serious constitutional debate on whether or not it should 
even approve of the meeting. Eventually the resolution which would be 
debated was one which declared that the peculiar circumstances of the 
New England states, as they were cut off from communication with Con-
gress, "rendered the Appointment and Meeting of the Committee proper and 
54National Archives, Papers ~the Continental Congress (Washington, 
1957ff), R80, Item 66, Vol. I, pp. 249-284. The National Archives has 
placed the 196 Items of the Papers ~ the Continental Congress on 204 
reels of microfilm. Hereinafter the Papers will. be cited as followed: 
PCC, Reel Number - designated R, Item number, Volume number - if 
applicable, and page number. 
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necessary, and consequently, worthy of the approbation of Congress. 
Benjamin Rush and John Adams argued that the convention, in ordering 
troop movements, had assumed congressional prerogatives. Noting that 
most of the business conducted at the convention was chiefly continen-
tal, they compared the actions of the four states to four counties with-
in a single state which had done the same thing. 56 On February 12, 
1777, the motion lost by one vote; when it was reconsidered on the fol-
lowing day, the states were equally divided. 57 
The debate on the twelfth was particularly important in helping to 
define congressional-state relations. Thomas Burke reported: "At 
length the general opinion was that Congress had necessarily a right to 
inquire into the cause of any meeting and also to know what was trans-
acted at any such meetings, and also to require an explanation for any-
thing that was alarming to the whole, or any one of the States; " 
He observed that Congress believed these rights to be necessary if it 
was to assure that no injury would result to a state from outside its 
borders, "But that Congress had no right to prohibit meetings, or cen-
--58 sure them if the transactions in them were not injurious to others." 
Congress, however, was keenly interested in one aspect of the meet-
ing which it believed might prove a deterrent to inflation. This was 
the convention's recommendation to fix prices. On the fourteenth Con-
gress debated the possibility of regulating prices in each region of 
55JCC, Vol. VII, p. 88. 
56B ' ' R h D. F b 4 1777 LMC V 1 II 234 235 enJ amin us , iary, e . , , __ , o . , pp. - . 
57 JCC, Vol. VII, pp. 88, 88n. 
58 
Burke, Abstract of Debates, Feb.·12, 1777, LMC, Vol. II, p. 249. 
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59 the country. The desire to implement such a practice swayed Congress 
towards approving the convention. 60 On the following day Congress fi-
nally approbated both the meeting of the New England States and its 
recommendations for the defense of Rhode Island. It also approved the 
convention's price fixing regulations but disapproved the permission 
given to strike state currencies in emergencies. At the same time Con-
gress proposed that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, and Virginia meet at Yorktown, Pennsylvania, on the third Monday 
in March, and that North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia meet at 
Charleston, South Carolina, on the first Monday in May. Both meetin::;s 
were to consider price regulations similar to those set by the New 
61 England states. The only convention to meet, however, was that of 
the middle-states at Yorktown which submitted its proceedings to Con-
gress on April 15, 1777. 62 
.,. 
Despite Congressional hopes that regulating prices through regional 
conventions would control inflation, the Continental currency continued 
to depreciate. States discovered that fixing prices irritated their 
citizens and that they were unenforceable. Congress itself only in-
creased the problem by continuing to issue bills of credit throughout 
1777, adding an additional $12,000,000 to the money supply by November, 
59 
Rush, Diary, Feb. 14, 1777, LMC, Vol. II, pp. 250-253. 
60 
Burke, Abstract of Debates, Feb. 15, 1777, LMC, Vol. II, pp. 
253-254. 
61JCC, Vol. VII, pp. 124-125. 
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1777. 63 Finally recognizing that if the currency was to achieve sta-
bility and halt depreciation, taxes would have to be levied to support 
at least part of its emission, Congress reluctantly began a money requi-
sition system which required the states to pay taxes immediately rather 
64 
than at some distant date in the .future. On November 22, 1777, Con-
gress requeste'd the states to raise $5,000,000 for the use of Congress 
in 1778 and apportioned that amount among the states. Once again basing 
its quotas upon estimated population, Congress assured those states 
which were overcharged that they would eventually be repaid the differ-
ence at six percent interest. On the same day, it also recommended that 
those states which had not done so already open loan offices so that the 
Continent could borrow from private citizens. Moreover, states were 
requested to issue no more state currency where sufficient Continentals 
'l bl . 1 . d. 65 were avai a e as a circu ating me ium. 
Still believing that if the states would only regulate prices de-
preciation could be controlled, Congress also called for another series 
of regional meetings to be held early in 1778 for the purpose of fixing 
the price of labor. All the states north and east of Maryland were re-
quested to meet in New Haven, Connecticut, on January 15; Maryland, 
Virginia and North Carolina were to convene at Fredericksburg, Virginia, 
on the same day; and North Carolina and South Carolina were to meet at 
Charleston, South Carolina, on February 15. Meanwhile, Congress re-
quested each state to fix prices temporarily until the results of the 
63JCC, Vol. VII, pp. 161, 371; Vol. VIII, p. 497; and Vol. IX, 
p. 873. 
64 Ferguson, Power£!_ the Purse, pp. 33-34. 
65JCC, Vol. IX, pp. 955-957. 
66 
meetings were known. 
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The only one of these meetings which actually materialized, howev-
er, was the one at New Haven. Attempting to assist the meeting, Con-
gress even ordered the Board of War not to set prices unless they were 
in accord with the resolutions of the New Haven convention. 67 Assem-
bling on January 20 and electing Thomas Cushing of .Massachusetts as its 
President, the convention proposed that all goods and services be rated 
on the basis of prices in 1774. Wages for laborers, mechanics, and 
farmers were permitted an advance of 75% over those of 1774. With the 
exception of a few items, American manufacturers and producers were per-
mitted a 75% advance. Cloth was rated at 100% over 1774. In addition, 
importers were permitted a 25% increase over 1774, while innkeepers 
could advance their prices on "foreign potables" by 50% and on forage 
by 75%. In its report the convention also included a table of suggested 
prices for several commodities. To ally the suspicions of the respec-
tive states as to whether or not their neighbors were conforming to the 
resolves of both Congress and the convention, the committee at New Haven 
recommended that each state write circular letters to the other states 
. . f h . 1 . d d. 69 giving an account o t eir reso utions an procee ings. 
Upon transmitting the minutes of the meeting to Congress, Cushing 
warned that regulating the prices of labor and goods would not stem 
66 rbid. 
67 JCC, Vol. X, p. 55. 
68.Minutes of the New Haven Convention, Jan. 20, 1778, PCC, R40, 
Item 33, pp. 340-342, 355-362. 
69rbid., p. 364. 
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inflation unless other congressional resolutions were obeyed as well. 
He believed it essential that the states impose heavy taxation to re-
duce the amount of money in circulation. He also urged that there be 
no further emissions of bills of credit and argued that Congress must 
begin calling in, by loans or taxes, those bills already emitted under 
. h . 70 its aut ority. The recommendations, however, were buried in congres-
sional committees and never officially considered on the floor of Con-
71 gress. In part, this was because optimism over the French Alliance 
had temporarily reversed the depreciation during mid-summer of 1778, so 
that the Continental had risen to four to one in specie. 72 
Meanwhile, the money requisition system introduced by the resolu-
tion of November 22, 1777, proved ineffective because the states failed 
to submit their quotas. The state governments experienced their own 
financial difficulties as they had to raise money to recruit soldiers 
for both the Continent and their own militias, to pay for their own 
military operations and defense, and to support their civil establish-
ments. Unwilling to tax their citizens further, the states continued 
to rely upon Congress' emissions of paper money to support the Conti-
73 nent's war effort. 
With inadequate support from the states, Congress had little 
choice but to continue printing paper money, issuing more than 
70Thomas Cushing to the President of Congress, Jan. 30, 1778, PCC, 
R40, Item 33, pp. 329-330. 
71JCC, Vol. VII, pp. 172, 322-324; and Vol. VIII, pp. 472, 843. 
72 Ferguson, Power~ the Purse, pp. 32, 32nl9. 
73Ibid., p. 35. 
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$63,000,000 in 1778. 74 With each issue the currency increasingly in-
flated and, despite the temporary abatement of depreciation in the sum-
mer, the rate of exchange of Continentals for specie rose again in the 
fall and winter of 1778, reaching almost eight to one by the end of the 
75 year. In December Richard Henry Lee despondently reported to Governor 
Patrick Henry of Virginia: "Division among ourselves, and the preci-
pice on which we stand with our paper money, are, I verily believe, the 
source of their [the enemy's] hope .. II He was certain "that the 
loss of our liberty seems at present more likely to be derived from the 
state of our currency than from all other causes." 76 
In early 1779, recognizing that if its finances were to be salvaged 
it must both recall a part of its previous emissions and support its 
future issues, Congress made increasing demands upon the states for 
taxes. On January 2 Congress called upon the states to remit their 
quotas of $15,000,000 for the use of the Continent in 1779 and for an 
additional $6,000,000 a year over the next eighteen years in order to 
redeem the emissions and loans made by Congress prior to December 31, 
1778. Congress also provided that bills issued before 1779, which were 
received as part of these quotas, would be used first to pay the inter-
est on bills of credit and then to pay loans. The excess over the 
77 amount needed for those two purposes would be destroyed. On May 2, 
74 
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1779, Congress called on the states to pay an additional $45,000,000 
78 into the Continental treasury. Meanwhile, Congress continued to emit 
bills of credit, hoping that the states would comply with its money 
79 requisitions. 
The states, however, did not comply, and depreciation of the cur-
rency increased dramatically during 1779, the rate of exchange reaching 
80 nineteen to one in July and approaching forty to one by December. As 
the financial situation approached crisis proportions, Congress desper-
ately sought some new financial system which would avert disaster, As 
early as July the Conunittee for Regulating Departments suggested that 
Congress stop its emissions of currency altogether and begin to rely 
81 upon the states to supply specific provisions. Consequently, on 
September 1, 1779, Congress resolved to issue no more than $200,000,000 
82 in bills of credit. How Congress was to avoid issuing more money be-
came apparent on September 3. On that day Congress noted that so far 
it had issued $159,958,800 and under the resolution of September l could 
issue an additional $40,051,120 to complete the $200,000,000. But Con-
gress resolved that it would emit only so much of the remainder as would 
be necessary "before adequate supplies can be otherwise obtained, rely-
83 ing for such supplies on the exertions of the several states." 
78d.f.£, Vol. XIV, P• 626. 
79.:!£9_, Vol, XIII, pp. 139, 209, 408-409; and Vol. XIV, PP• 548, 
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Preparing the way to achieve what it hoped would be financial stability, 
Congress also requisitioned additional money from the states in order 
to call in all of its emissions and to finance the campaign for 1779. 
On October 6 it declared that in addition to the sums called for on 
November 27, 1777, January 2, 1779, and May 21, 1779, the states should 
provide their portions of an additional $15,000,000 monthly. The first 
payment was to be made by February 1, 1780, and by the first days of 
succeeding months through October, 1780. 84 Meanwhile, still another 
meeting of northern states was convened in late October, 1779, at Hart-
ford, Connecticut, to attempt once again to fix prices. 85 Congress 
apprbved the meeting and recommended that all states fix prices at no 
more than twenty times their equivalent in 1774. 86 
Since its new plan developed slowly, Congress also decid~d to issue 
the rest of the $200,000,000 before turning to the states with specific 
requisitions, making the last issue of $10,000,140 on November 29, 
1779. 87 Once that was almost spent Congress finally began to implement 
its new requisition system. On December 12, 1779, it requested specific 
supplies of Indian cor~, wheat, and flour from several states to be de-
livered to the Army. Virginia was to supply 20,000 barrels of Indian 
corn by April 1, 1780. On the same day Maryland was to have delivered 
5,000 barrels of flour and 5,000 barrels of Indian corn, and 
84Ibid., p. 1147. 
85Minutes of the Hartford Convention, Oct. 20-28, 1779, PCC, R40, 
Item 33, pp. 375-,382. 
86 JCC, Vol. XV, pp. 1290-1291. 
87 Ibid., pp. 1076, 1171-1172, 1285, 1324-1325. 
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Pennsylvania 50,000 barrels of flour or its equivalent of wheat. Dela-
ware was asked to deliver its quota of 10,000 barrels of flpur and New 
Jersey a part of its 8,000 barrels of flour as soon as possible. Con-
necticut was also requested'to provide 8,000 barrels of flour at some 
88 time in the future. Two days later, on the fourteenth, Congress 
further defined its new plan of finance by declaring: "That all the 
states shall be called upon to furnish their quotas of such supplies as 
may, from time to time, be wanted for carrying on the war; .. 1189 On 
the seventeenth Congress also provided that whenever any state procured 
its quota of supplies, all purchases of such articles by conunissaries 
90 and quartermasters in these states would cease. 
Thus the nation entered the new year of 1780 in the process of 
abandoning one revenue system an.cl adopting a new one. The reluctance 
of the states to support congressional finances had almost led to fiscal 
ruin. Now Congress, in .effect, surrendered the financial responsibili-
ties for prosecuting the war to the states. It would no longer continue 
the disastrous practice of printing fiat currency, but would depend upon 
the states themselves to purchase and deliver specific s1Jpplies direct-
ly to the Army. The damage, however, had already been done. The lack 
of cooperation among the states to insure that the nation's finances 
were placed on a sound footing during the first four years of the war 
had led to a burgeoning inflation. Struggling under the burden of in-
flation and against the military pressures brought to bear by the 
881bid., pp. 1371-1372. 
89 rbid., pp. 1377-1378. 
golbid., p. 1391. 
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British in 1780, the states would be both. unwilling and unable to shoul-
der the new load Congress had placed on them. 
Lack of state cooperation not only left the finances of the country 
in a serious crisis but it also left Congress without legal authority. 
Congress had written Articles of Confederation, but because the var.ious 
state delegations struggled to achieve special advantage or special pro-
tection, little remained in that document with which to e'stablish an 
efficient national government. In fact, the Articles did little more 
than formalize those powers Congress was already employing. But with 
or without the Articles congressional authority remained almost totally 
dependent upon the consent of the states. This dependence became clear-
ly evident during the crisis-ridden year of 1780, when the new financial 
system and the activities of the British would lessen further the coop-
eration of the states, worsening the nati'on' s financial condition and 
bringing its military efforts to the brink of disaster. 
CHAPTER III 
NEw PLANS AND OLD PROBLEMS 
By the opening of the year 1780 the decision of Congress to stop 
the money presses.had left the nation's economy virtually without cen-
tral control. The announcement, which indicated Congress' own lack of 
faith in the currency, accelerated the already rampant inflation. 
Trapped between the failure of one fiscal system and an as yet unformed 
new one, the struggling nation appeared on the verge of collapse. Con-
gressional inability either to stem the inflation or to supply adequate-
ly its own military establishment during the last months of 1779 
seriously weakened the prestige and, thus, the authority of Congress. 
Though it finally established a new revenue system, the ef~ective em-
ployment of that system depended more than ever upon the cooperation of 
the individual state. The financial difficulties of the states, caused 
in large part by the inflation of the previous four years, and the 
emerging belief that some states were using Congress to gain special 
privileges, however, meant that the state cooperation so necessary to 
the new plan would not be forthcoming. Thus by the end of June, 1780, 
Congress' finances appeared once again near collapse. 
In the interim between the old system and the new, the inunediate 
sufferer was the Army. Rampant. inflation drove prices rapidly upward, 
and by early January soldiers were paying eight d.ollars per quart of 
53 
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1 meal and fifty cents for an ear of corn. At .Morris town oats cost 
thirty dollars per bushel and hay $300 per ton. The men were almost 
naked and bordered on starvation. 2 Writing to General Washington, Com-
missary General Nathanael Greene noted that the outlook for future sup-
plies was grim. Continental agents were out of money, and without cash, 
there was no way for them to fulfill their contracts, because the people 
3 would not part with provisions without payment. 
While Greene was convinced that there was no deficiency in the 
country's resources, he did not believe that requisitioning specific 
supplies from the states would bring those resources into public use. 
He complained that the system fell "far short of the general detail of 
the business" and warned that "the different agents as well as the dif-
ferent authorities from which they derive their appointments ... will 
introduce some jarring_ interests, many improper disputes as well as 
4 
dangerous delays." 
The citizens from whom necessary supplies for the Army were ac-
quired also complained loudly. One citizen of New Jersey declared: 
"Nothing can equal the Tyranny we are under. The Property of the People 
is at the Mercy of Commissaries and other Agents for Cortgress. They 
1oliver Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut, Jan. 14, 1780, 
LMC, Vol. V, p. 9. 
2Ebanezer Huntington to Andrew Huntington, Jan. 8, 1780, in Con-
necticut Historial Society, Collections, Vol. XX, Huntington Papers 
(Hartford, 1923), p. 437. 
3 Nathanael Greene to George Washington, Jan., 1780, 
Sparks, ed., Correspondence ~ the American Revolution: 
George Washington (Boston, 1853), Vol. II, pp. 371-372. 
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give us Certificates instead of money for our Goods." Moreover, the 
certificates could not even be used to pay taxes. So irate was this 
citizen that he demanded that "a Commission of Bankruptcy must go out 
against them. The Hour is at Hand--you see their Certificates are no 
5 
better than Blank Notes--worse than their Paper Money." 
For some members of Congress, however, the outlook, though dim, 
55 
seemed not impossible, and they remained optimistic. Oliver Ellsworth 
of Connecticut noted that the fall of the press had given Congress "a 
violent shock," but he hoped that it would ultimately prove beneficial. 
He observed that the states, at least those states whose legislatures 
had met, were responding well to the system of requisitioning specific 
supplies. More importantly, he declared: "Greater unanimity has at no 
time perhaps prevailed in,Congress than at present, or ever been more 
6 necessary. 11 William Ellery of Rhode Island also struck a r\.ote of 
optimism in a letter to Governor William Greene of Rhode Island. He 
asserted that some speculators were even beginning to fear that the cur-
rency was appreciating and that if taxation proceeded it was "improbable 
that the money should further depreciate." :l';ieanwhile, he noted that 
Congress was advancing in its attempts to finance and procure supplies 
7 for the Army. 
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To solve the immediate needs of the Army, President Samuel Hunt-
ington urged four states, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and Dela-
ware, to supply the Army as soon as possible, and promised those states 
8 that Congress would compensate them for their efforts. The supplies 
produced by this plan proved insufficient, forcing Congress to order an 
additional requisition of such supplies as Indian corn, flour, and wheat 
from those states in the vicinity of the Army. iongress, meanwhile, 
continued to work on establishing a new system of finance. 9 
Throughout the first three months of 1780 Congress worked dili-
gently on its financial program. Its goals were to reduce the civil 
staff of the Army, to fix the prices of provisions so that each state 
would be credited equally for the supplies it provided, and to estab-
lish a new currency based on taxes levied by the states specifically 
for that purpose so that the country would have a stable medium of ex-
10 
change. Congress' first act was to form a committee composed of 
Philip Schuyler, Timothy Pickering, and Thomas Mifflin, any two of 
which were empowered to investigate the expenses of the staff depart-
ment. The committee was ordered to proceed to headquarters and, in 
conjunction with the Commander-in-Chief, discharge supernumerary offi-
cers, abolish old or establish new posts as necessary, and reduce the 
8samuel Huntington to the Governor of Connecticut, Jan. 12, 1780, 
PCC, R23, Item 14, pp. 273-274. 
9JCC, Vol. XVI, p. 144. 
10John Armstrong to George Washington, Jan. 12, 1780, and Armstrong 
to Joseph Reed, Jan. 24, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 7-9, 13-14. 
11 number of horses and wagons maintained by the A:rmy. 
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The next step, that of fixing prices, was necessitated by the fail-
ure of the states themselves to reach an agreement outside of Congress, 
As late as October, 1779, five states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, Connecticut and New York, sent representatives to Hart-
ford 1 'Connecticut, to establish consistent economic policies. Among 
the conclusions reached at the convention were that prices in each state 
ought to be regulated to prevent further inflation and that another con-
vention of all the states southward through Virginia should meet in 
Philadelphia on the first Wednesday of 1780, for the sole purpose of 
fixing prices. Meanwhile, the representatives at Hartford recommended 
that Connecticut and New York immediately draft price legislation s:tmi-
· lar to that of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts or else 
the controls established by the latter group of states would be inef-
fective. The convention also recommended that Massachusetts, Rhode 
Illand, New Hampshire, and Connecticut repeal their laws against inland 
trada. 12 
The meeting was held in Philadelphia on January 6, 1780, as plan-
nod, but only New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania 
1ont official representatives. The convention noted that both New Jer-
11y And Maryland had passed price fixing legislation and that New York 
WAI curr•ntly considering it, The other states failed to appear, possi-
bly bocaua• they expected Congress to pass resolutions which would make 
11JCC, Vol. XVI, pp. 75-76; James Lovell to Horatio Gates, Jan, 22, 
1780; iii Elbridgo Gerry to James Warran, Jan. 25, 1780, LMC. Vol. v. 
PP• 12-13, 14-16, ----
12Minuta1 of th~ Hartford Convention, PCC, R40, Item 33, pp. 375-
382, -
the new convention unnecessary. Consequently, the meeting adjourned 
without accomplishing anything. 13 
Congress was indeed in the process of fixing prices even though 
some delegates were afraid that such regulations would do little good 
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either in supplying the treasury or in stemming inflation. They argued 
that the scarcity of some of the supplies in many states would drive 
. d d . . 1 1 . ·1 . . 14 prices upwar espite congressiona egis ation. Nevertheless, Con-
gress continued its consideration, pressured by the problems encountered 
by some states which had passed legislation is accordance with the rec-
onunendations of the Har.tford convention. General Greene found it impos-
sible to purchase provisions for the Army in New Jersey even though the 
prices he offered were in accordance with those set by the state. He 
observed: "Peopie will withhold their services in this State, as long 
as they receive a less compensation than their neighbors. They seem to 
claim it as a right, that they be allowed their usual prices until the 
h S d f f . 1 . 1115 ot er tates a opt measures or en arcing a regu ation. Observing 
the problems of other states, the Connecticut delegates in Congress 
reconunended that their legislature pass a price fixing law, but to 
suspend its operation until other states had also passed legislation. 16 
13 See Roger Sherman to Andrew Adams, Jan. 7, 1780, Ll1C, Vol. V, p. 
4; NJA, 2nd Ser. , Vol. IV, p. 17 3; and George Herbert Ryden, ed. , 
Let~s to and from Caesar Rodnei (New York, 1970), p. 355n. Herein-
after, LCR. 
14Ezra L'Honunedieu to the Governor of New York, Feb. 22, 1780, LMC, 
Vol. V, p. 45. 
15 
General Greene to Washington, Feb. 7, 1780, CA..~, Vol. II, pp. 
393-394. 
16connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut, Feb. 15~ 
1780, LMC, Vol. V, p. 36. 
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Responding to the demands of its citizens, the New Jersey legislature 
likewise chose to suspend its law until the states of New York, Penn-
1 d 1 d . ·1 1 . 17 sy vania, an De aware passe s1m1 ar regu at1ons. 
Congress finally completed its own price fixing laws along with 
its requisitions for the ensuing campaign on February 25, 1780. Each 
of the states except Georgia was apportioned a specific quota of such 
items as beef, rum, salt, hay, corn and tobacco. Prices that each 
state would be credited for were also fixed. For example, clean, well-
dried corn would be valued at three-fourths of a dollar per bushel, 
while grain fed beef would be counted at five and one-half dollars per 
net hundred.weight. To compensate those states which through miscalcu-
lation might contribute more than their fair share, Congress guaranteed 
that they would be paid six percent interest per year when the accounts 
between Congress and the states were finally settled. Conversely, 
those states which were laggard in meeting their quotas would be charged 
. . h . d f' . 18 six percent interest on t eir e ic1ts. 
In his letter transmitting the resolution to the states, President 
Huntington pointed out two other inducements for rapid compliance. 
First, once the states had collected and deposited their respective quo-
tas the legislatures could then suspend the purchase of supplies in 
their states by Continental commissaries and quartermasters. Second, 
the states had been excused from paying two-thirds of the money taxes 
required by the resolution of October 6, 1779. 19 Urging their 
17NJA, 2nd Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 236-237. 
lSJCC, Vol. XVI, pp. 196-200. 
19s. Huntington to the Several states, Feb. 26, 1780, PCC, R24, 
Item 14, pp. 51-52. 
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legislature to comply with the requisition, the North Carolina delegates 
observed that since the presses had caused inflation, the only sources 
left to Congress were either foreign loans or the contributions of the 
states. Though the delegates noted that Congress preferred cash, Con-
gress realized that the states' contributions must be in commodities. 
The delegates also informed the governor that the prices established 
were based on those of 1774 plus fifty percent to accommodate the cir-
20 
cumstances of war. 
While the requisition of specific supplies would aid in maintain-
ing the Army, Congress still needed money to pay salaries and the other 
expenses of government and the war effort. Congress first proposed to 
assess the states $63,000,000 in Continental currency for those pur-
21 
poses. But the fluctuations of the currency and its continued depre-
ciation forced Congress to consider some other method of obtaining taxes 
which would be based on some permanent value other than their own old 
bills of credit. Thus while Congress was busy apportioning quotas of 
provisions among the states, it was also attempting to find some way to 
call in the old Continental bills and to reestablish a new circulating 
medium based on specie and with interest payable upon redemption. In 
late February Congress decided to call in the old bills of credit and 
set quotas for each state to redeem the bills at some ratio in relation 
. 22 
to specie. 
ZOThe North Carolina Delegates to the Governor of North Carolina, 
Feb. 29, 1780, I.MC, Vol. V, pp. 55-58. 
21JCC, Vol. XVI, p. 45. 
22Ibid., pp. 206-207, 216-217. 
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Congress finally completed its plan on March 18, 1780. It request-
ed the states to continue to pay into the treasury their portions of the 
$15,000,000 monthly as assessed by the resolution of October 7, 1779, 
but provided that the quotas now could be paid at the rate of one Span-
ish milled dollar for forty dollars of the bills of credit then in cir-
culation. As the bills were paid in they would be destroyed, and once 
destroyed, new bills of credit would be issued and be redeemable in six 
years at five percent interest per year. The new bills, however, could 
be emitted only if the individual states established permanent funds to 
back them and only in sums "not to exceed, on any account," more than 
one-twentieth of the nominal sum of the old bills called in and de-
strayed. Finally, as the new bills were issued by the states, Congress 
resolved that six-tenths of them could be for the use of the state while 
23 
the other four-tenths should be reserved for the use of Congress. 
Many of the delegates were not enthusiastic about the new program 
because it obviously would injure many of the country's creditors. Nev-
ertheless, in creating the new program the delegates had acted as 
national legislators rather than as state ambassadors and, still ful-
filling that role, they urged their states to comply with the system. 
President Huntington observed that it was "the happiest Expedient that 
could be adopted to extricate these States from the Embarrassments of a 
fluctuating medium an~ at the same time in some measure afford the nec-
essary means for supporting the ensuing campaign. 1124 Explaining the 
23 rbid., pp. 262-267. 
48-51. 
See also Ferguson, Power of the ~urse, pp. 
24 s. Huntington to the Several States, Mar. 20, 1780, PCC, R24, 
Item 14~ pp. 318-319. 
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resolution to their state, the Connecticut deleg<J.tes asserteJ tlut i.t 
would introduce. a stable medium for trade and increase the '~''ui1t t-\- 's 
revenue. They also argued that the six-tenths retained by the statt' 
would permit it to purchase the specific supplies requisitioned by Con-
gress, while the four-tenths reserved for Congress would permit the 
25 
Continent to pay the Army. 
The delegates of Rhode Island blamed the states themselves for the 
situation which required the resolution. They noted that Congress had 
received so little help from the states in the past several months that 
its military preparations.threatened to come to a standstill. They as-
serted that Congress had "given frequent and faithful warnings to the 
several states" and had "exerted every power" on its part "to avert the 
impending mischief, but to little or no avail. 1126 It remained with 
James Madison, however, to express fully the frustration of many members 
of Congress who reluctantly had supported the resolution. Madison, as 
well as other delegates, was suspicious of centralized authority, but 
he recognized that without a stronger central government and closer 
state cooperation the war would be lost. Venting his despair and urging 
Virginia to comply, he wrote to Governor Thomas Jefferson: 
Among the various conjunctures of alarm and distress which have 
arisen in the course of the revolution, it is with pain I af-
firm to you Sir, that no one can be singled out more truly 
critical than the present. Our army threatened with an immed-
iate alternative of disbanding or living on free quarter; the 
public Treasury empty; public credit exhausted, nay the private 
credit of purchasing Agents employed, I am told, as far as it 
25 Roger Sherman and Ellsworth to Trumbull, Mar. 20, 1780, MRS, 
7th Ser., Vo. III, pp. 26-28. 
26 
Ellery and Collins to Gov.ernor Greene, May 21, 17 80, RICC, p. 288. 
will bear, Congress complaining of the extortion of the people, 
the people of the improvidence of Congress, and the army of 
both; our affairs requiring the most mature and systematic 
measure, and the urgency of occasions admitting only of tempo-
rizing expedients and those expedients generating new difficul-
ties. Congress from a defect of adequate Statesmen more likely 
to fall into wrong measures and of less weight to enforce right 
ones, recommending plans to the s:everal states for execution 
and the states separately rejudging the expediency of such 
plans, whereby the same distrust of concurrent exertions that 
has damped the ardor of patriotic individuals, must produce 
the same effect among the States themselves. An old system 
of finance discarded as incompetent to our necessities, an 
untried and precarious one submitted and a total stagnation in 
prospect between the end of the former and the operations of 
the latter; These are the outlines of the true picture of our 
public situation. I leave it to your own imagination to fill 
them up. Believe me Sir as things now stand, if the States 
do not vigorously proceed in collecting the old money and 
establishing funds for the credit of the new, that we are 
undone· 27 ,
Despite congressional efforts to establish both the requisition 
63 
system and the currency on a firm footing and despite the importunings 
of the delegates for their states to comply, the new financial program 
was doomed almost from its inception. Newspaper editors such as John 
Holt objected to the provision of the resolution of March 18 which 
equated one Spanish milled dollar with forty dollars of the old emis-
sion, since he believed that the circulation of gold and silver in the 
states should have been entirely suppressed. He also asserted that the 
resolution was so complicated that people could not understand it and 
claimed that they were rapidly advancing the prices of their products 
until the value of the old paper currency was sure to reach only 
27James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Mar. 27, 1780, in Julian P. 
Boyd°, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1760-1791 (Princeton, 1950-
1974), Vol. 3, pp. 335-336. Hereinafter, PTJ. 
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one-fortieth that of specie. 28 Some states also objected to Congress' 
resolution of March 18. Governor Caesar Rodney of Delaware,informed 
Congress that the assembly had adjourned without considering the resolu-
tion because the members beli.eved the money would "gain more credit by 
29 
being left to itself than by any act of the assembly." 
The requisitions of February 25 also irritated some of the dele-
gates. Nathaniel Peabody of New Hampshire, writing to President Neshech 
Weare, warned that the prices fixed under the resolution were founded 
neither on justice or equality. He noted that the quota for each state 
was set before the prices were fixed and in the scramble of delegates to 
get the best prices for the products of their particular states prices 
were fixed in such a way that New Hampshire would lose at least 
$50,000. 30 Though some states responded quickly and passed appropriate 
legislation to support the resolutions, President Huntington was unable 
to assure Pennsylvania that a majority of the states had complied until 
31 late August, 1780. 
28John Holt to George Clinton, Apr. 15, 1780, in The State of New 
York, The Public Papers of George Clinton, First Governor ~New York 
(Albany, 1901), Vol. 5, pp. 622-626. Hereinafter, PGC. Holt may have 
overstated his case. There is some evidence that the resolution actu-
ally may have overvalued the continental. The Connecticut delegates 
reported that by the time the resolution passed the rate of exchange 
had reached sixty for one in Philadelphia and perhaps forty or fifty 
to one in the southern states. See Sherman and Ellsworth to Trumbull, 
Mar. 20, 1780, MRS, 7th Ser., Vol. III, p. 26. 
29 Caesar Rodney to the President of Congress, Apr. 20, 1780, LCR, 
pp. 339-340. 
30Nathaniel Peabody to the President of New. Hampshire, Mar. 13, 
1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 67-70. 
31s. Huntington to the President of the Council of Pennsylvania, 
Aug. 22, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 15, p. 86. 
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The delay in responding was due in part to the internal financial 
difficulties of most of the states. In fact, some states, ~ather than 
being able to support the Continent's new financial program, were forced 
to beg money from Congress. The New Jersey legislature declared that, 
because of its close proximity to the enemy in New York for the past 
two years; "almost the whole supplies and Manufactures of the State, 
beyond a bare Subsistence for the inhabitants, have been necessarily 
purchased or taken for the United States." While the legislature wanted 
to collect its quota of taxes, it could not do so until Congress paid 
32 
the citizens of New Jersey what it owed them. 
The General Assembly of Massachusetts, asking its delegates to ap-
peal for money from Congress, pointed out that it had financed a disas-
trous expedition to Penobscot, Maine, in 1779. It argued that since 
this· expedition had been undertaken not only for the defense of the 
state but for the conunon cause as well, Congress should share the ex-
33 
penses. Congress eventually conceded by permitting the state to re-
tain a portion of its quota until the accounts for the expedition were 
prepared and submitted to Congress. It rejected, however, the state's 
proposal that the United States assume the expenses of state militia 
· 34 I when it was employed against the conunon enemy. Congress concession 
to Massachusetts elicited a similar demand from New Hampshire. 
32New Jersey Legislature to the United States in Congress Assembled, 
PCC, R82, Item 68, pp. 525-526. 
33 General Assembly to the Massachusetts Delegates, Feb. 2, 1780, 
PCC, R79, Item 65, Vol. I, pp. 448-450. 
34Report of the Committee on the Motion of the Delegates of Massa-
chusetts Bay, Apr. 5, 1780, passed Apr. 8, 1780, PCC, R29, Item 20, 
Vol. I, pp. 57-59. 
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President Weare asserted that his state had provided a $300,000 ship, 
which was lost at Penobscot and also $600,000 for clothing for the Con-
tinental Army. He demanded that New Hampshire receive the same consid-
. M h 35 eration as assac usetts. 
Connecticut also demanded money from Congress, in this case for 
the debts contracted in that state by the Commissary General for the 
purchase of beef. The state's delegates assured Governor Ttumbull that 
they would press Connecticut's claim, but warned him that "there have 
been many and urgent calls for money which it has been impossible for 
Congress, with a nearly exhausted treasury, to comply with." They 
added that "the same difficulties will remain so long as the several 
States are dilatory in collecting their quotas of money, or when col-
lected apply it to other purposes than the payment of continental war-
. 36 
rants." Despite the warning the state still found it necessary to 
. . . f bl. 37 issue a new emission o paper money to pay pu ic expenses. 
William Ellery, a delegate from Rhode Island, informed Governor 
Greene that Congress was being unjust to his state both in its demands 
for men and for money. He remarked that he had urged that both be re-
duced, but had only been successful in reducing Congress' new warrant 
on the state by $100,000. He was given the excuse that Congress was so 
pressed by its creditors that in order "to preserve, or rather recover 
35Meshech Weare to Nathaniel Folsom and Nathaniel Peabody, May 27, 
1780, PCC, R78, Item 64, p. 110. 
36sherman and Ellsworth to Trumbull, Mar~ 23, 1780, MHS, 7th Ser., 
Vol. III, p. 30. 
37 Sherman to Trumbull, and Sherman and Benjamin Huntington to 
Trumbull, Apr. 7, 1780, MHS, Vol. III, pp. 78-81. 
public credit," it found it expedient to issue warrants whenever it 
appeared they might be paid. 38 Such expedients aroused the anger of 
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those states which had to pay the warrants and contributed to the grow-
ing distrust of Congress. Ellery argued that Rhode Island was too often 
asked to do more than required of other states, and warned: "Our State 
h h . b d . . d . t lf 1139 at sometimes, y too great an ar or, inJure i se . 
Governor George Clinton of New York noted that the demands of Con-
gress on his state had been much less than on surrounding states, but 
that it was still difficult to obtain requisitions not only because of 
the necessity of defending the state's extended frontiers but also be-
cause of raids by the enemy. He observed that New York could not even 
. . . ·1· . 40 pay or provision its own mi itia. The inability to defend its fron-
tier caused the state's legislature to declare that it would raise men 
41 
for that purpose only if Congress would agree to pay and subsist them. 
Congress finally consented, authorizing New York to raise a body of 800 
men for defense of its frontiers and agreeing to permit these men Con-
1 
L· 2 
tinental pay and rations.' As for New York's quota of supplies, Clin-
ton informed Congress that because of previous requisitions the state 
was exhausted. He was "perswaded there is not more Grain & Heat left 
in the Possession of the· Farmer than a bare competency for the support 
38 
Ellery to Governor Greene, Apr. 18, 1780, RICC, p. 280. 
39Ellery to Governor Greene, Apr. 4, 1780, RICC_, p. 277. 
40 Clinton to S. Huntington, Mar. 9, 1780, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. 
II, pp .. 238-239. 
41c1· h N Y k D 1 Ma 25 1780 PGC V 1 5 inton tot e ew or e egates, r. , , __ , o . , 
pp. 550-551. 
42c . 1 R 1 . A 4 1780 PGC v 1 5 ~s4 ongressiona eso ution, pr. , · , __ , o . , p . .J • 
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of its inhabitants until the new Crops come in; .. " If any more 
supplies were needed besides those already acquired by public officers 
43 before the harvest they could not be acquired in New York. 
While the new financial plan faced an uncertain future in the 
northern states, it also soon became apparent that little aid would be 
forthcoming from the southern states. In December, 1779, General Henry 
Cl'inton sailed southward from New York, finally arriving in South Caro-
lina in February, 1780, and began his assault upon Charleston. The 
General Assembly of Virginia, certain that the design of the enemy was 
to capture the entire south, pleaded with Congress for aid. The Assem-
bly asserted that the state was exerting every effort to raise a body 
of militia but it was certain its efforts would not be enough. It ar-
gued that the militia was needed not only to combat the "general Attack 
by the Indians" on its western frontier but also to defend the state 
against the threat of British invasion from the coast. The Assembly 
insisted that Congress immediately send more Continental t~oops.and a 
supply of arms to North Carolina as "the Government of Virginia hath 
already furnished all it is able to spare. 1144 Congress replied that 
it would help as much as possible, but, because. of its own financial 
difficulties, it warned Virginia to rely more on its own preparations 
45 and arms. 
43clinton to Washington, Apr. 24, 1780, PGC, Vol. 5, pp. 650-651. 
44The Address of the Ge~eral Assembly of Virginia to the Delegates 
of the United States in Con~ress Assembled; ... , May 24, 1780, PCC, 
R85, Item 71, Vol. I, pp. 351-352~ 
45 
Report of the Committee on the Address of the· General Assembly of 
Virginia, June 7, 1780, PCC, R29, Item 20, Vol. II, pp. 242-243. 
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The result of difficulties of the states and of their slowness in 
complying with the new financial scheme was that the Continental trea-
sury remained empty. Requesting help from Connecticut in transporting 
supplies to the Army, General Greene noted that no help could be ex-
pected from Congress no matter how pressing the necessity. Therefore 
Connecticut must "interpose its good offices and prevent the fatal mis-
fortune." This state of affairs had been reached, he believed, because 
"Political bodies are often too tardy in their measures for the emergen-
cies of war. I wish we may not be precip~tated into some terrible mis-
fortune on this account. ,.46 James Madison also noted the confused state 
cif affairs because of the lack of money and because the states had not 
yet realized the changed conditions. He observed that while Congress 
"exercised the indefinite power of emitting money on the credit of 
their constituents they had the whole wealth and resources of the Con-
tinent within their Conunand and could go on with their affairs indepen-
dently and as they pleased." But since Congress had surrendered the 
power of emitting money he warned that it was now "as dependent on the 
States as the King of England is on Parliament." Furthermore he de-
clared: "Unless the legislatures are sufficiently attentive to this 
change of circumstances and act in conformity to it every thing must 
necessarily go wrong or rather must come to a total stop. 1147 
The financial situation of Congress became even more desperate when 
46 
General Greene to Trumbull, May 7, 1780, MHS, 7th Ser., Vol. III, 
pp. 36-37. 
47Madison to Jefferson, May 6, 1780, PTJ, Vol. 3, pp. 369-371. See 
also Madison to John Page (?),May 8, 1780:-in William T. Hutchinson and 
William E. Rachal, eds., The Papers ~James Madison, 1757-1787 
(Chicago, 1962-1975), Vol. 2, pp. 21-22. Hereinafter, PJM. 
70 
it was learned in May that a French squadron and a French Army of 6,000 
men under the conunand of the Comte de Rochambeau would shortly arrive 
to participate in joint Franco-American operations. Desiring to insure 
that these operations would be successful, Congress, on May 19, request-
ed the immediate payment of $10,000,000 in back taxes owed by the 
states. In the same resolution Congress also asked that the legisla-
tures of the several states grant their executive authorities the power 
to draw out the resources of the states during those times when the 
1 i l . . 48 eg s atures were not sitting. In explaining the necessity of the 
resolution, President Huntington observed: "Every State that reflects 
upon the Depreciation of the Currency and their own Deficiency in the 
Payment of their Taxes must necessarily conclude that the Treasury is 
exhausted. The military Departments are at a stand for the Want of 
money to put them in motion." Huntington also used this opportunity to 
inform the states that a committee had been appointed to headquarters 
to assist the Commander-in-Chief to call out the specific quotas of the 
49 states. 
Such a committee had been.under consideration since early April . 
. 
On the sixth of that month Congress appointed a committee to write in-
structions for another committee of three persons who were to proceed 
to headquarters and aid General Washington in reducing his regiments 
50 
and arranging the staff departments. 
48JCC, Vol. XVII, pp. 437-438. 
On the twelfth the ~nstructions 
I 
49 s. Huntington to the Several States, May 19, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 
15, pp. 1-3. Printed copy in PGC, Vol. 5, ·p. 723. 
SOJCC, Vol. XVI, pp. 332-333. 
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were reported and approved by Congress. Among the committee's duties 
were those of reporting the defects of the Quartermaster's department 
and of making the supplying of provisions more efficient by relying 
more heavily on the states. It was also instructed to reduce the num-
ber of regiments, discharge unnecessary officers, retrench expenses, 
and establish rules for managing ordinance and military stores. Con-
gress particularly authorized the committee "to exercise every power 
which may be required to effect a reformation of abuses and the general 
arrangement of those departments which are in any wise connected with 
51 matters connnitted to your charge, 11 The following day Philip Schuyler 
of New York, Nathaniel Peabody of New Hampshire, and John Mathews of 
South Carolina were elected and designated the Connnittee at Headquar-
52 
ters. 
Meanwhile, some states moved rapidly to try to discharge at least 
a part of their debts to the Continent. The Assembly of Virginia, in-
stead of relying on the slow process of taxation "recommended to the 
members of both houses of the General Assembly and to the gentlemen in 
the country and towns adjacent," for the purpose of complying with the 
resolution of May 19, 11to advance for the public use so much tobacco 
53 and sums of money.as they can possibly spare." Apparently the re-
quest was successful, enabling Governor Jefferson to report that he 
Slibid., pp. 354-355. 
52Ibid., p. 362. 
53Resolutions Calling Upon Citizens for Aid in a National Financial 
Crises, June 1, 1780, in Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers~ George 
Mason, 1725-1792 (Chapel Hill, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 627-629, 629n. 
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54 
hoped to be able to send the full amount to Philadelphia by June 20. 
Other states, however, found it not only difficult to respond to 
the resolution of May 19 but also to fulfill their quotas assigned in 
the resolution of February 25. The Assembly of Connecticut, hoping to 
procure its quota of provisions, passed several laws at its May session. 
Among these was one which placed an embargo.not only on all goods leav-
. 55 
ing the state but also from county to county inside the state. In 
addition, it empowered connnissaries, if they had no money, to impress 
any provisions they needed either for the United Stel.tes or for the 
state's militia. 56 Yet Connecticut still found it difficult to meet 
its quota and renewed its application that Congress quickly settle its 
accounts with the citizens of Connecticut, because without this compen-
sation those citizens could no longer contribute. 57 In Rhode Island the 
citizens demanded payment for the debts owed them, forcing the state to 
pay those debts before it answered Congress' requisition. Governor 
Greene informed William Ellery that "the Council of War have been under 
the disagreeable necessity of preventing some part of the Continental 
tax now paying from being placed in the Loan Offices, in order 
to settle sundry demands against them, , . .. 58 Attempting to alleviate 
54 Jefferson to S. Huntington, June 9, 1780, PTJ, Vol. 3, pp. 425-
426. 
55connecticut Session Laws, May, 1780, in American Antiquarian 
Society, Early American Imprints (Worcester, n.d., No. 16735, pp. 
547-557. Hereinafter, EAI. 
56Ibid. 
57Trumbull to the President of Congress, June 8, 1780, HHS, 7th 
Ser., Vol. 3, pp. 50-53. 
58Governor Greene to Ellery-, May 30, 1780, RICC, p. 294. 
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a part of the complaints of the states, Congress passed resolutions on 
May 26 and 27 permitting the states to collect certificates and notes 
issued to their citizens by Continental quartermasters and commissaries 
59 
and to apply them towards their quotas of taxes. 
The compliance of some states was made more difficult by the poli-
cies of surrounding states. On May 7 the President of Pennsylvania, 
Joseph Reed, complained that Delaware had lifted its embargo on provi-
sions. He argued that because of the proximity of Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania would be unable to prevent provisions from being shipped from 
. 60 
Pennsylvania and thus the state would not be.able to meets its quota. 
Congress responded on the second by urging Delaware to reinstate its 
embargo until such time as all states could lift their embargoes con-
61 sistent with public safety. Delaware did not respond, however, until 
a month later, and then only reinstated its embargo until October 20. 62 
The inability of the states to respond quickly to congressional 
requests mearit that the Army remained inadequately supplied. In a cir-
cular letter to the states, the Committee at Headquarters reported on 
May 25 that pay for the Army was five months in arrears, that it had no 
meat, that it was deficient in camp equipment, and that it was destitute 
of forage. It warned that because of the Army's needs many soldiers 
186. 
59s. Huntington, Circular, May 29, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 15, p. 8. 
60 
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passed, May 22, 1780, PCC, R29, Item 20, Vol. II, pp. 83-84. 
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threatened to become disaffected. 63 Supporting the Committee's observa-
tions, Ezekiel Cornell noted that two regiments from Connecticut threat-
ened to leave the field and march home. Blaming the states for these 
problems, he declared that "when I take a view of the civil policy of 
the several states in the Union, I almost despair of being able to make 
any vigorous exertions until there is a power vested in some men or 
number of men, obligatory and binding on all states in the Union as it 
will be impossible to convince the several legislatures of the necessi-
ty, until the happy moment is passed; . 1164 
Cornell's bewilderment and disgust was apparently shared by many 
members of Congress. Believing their own states had not been laggard 
in their duty and fulfilling their role as.state emissaries, they in-
sisted on knowing what all other states were doing and had done. Cori-
sequently, on June 17, Congress requested the United States from New 
Hampshire to South Carolina to inform Congress "with utmost expedition" 
what I11easures they had taken to fulfill certain resolutions. Enclosed 
with the letter was a list of resolutions passed by Congress since Janu-
ary 1, 1779, that had requested men, money, and provisions from the 
65 states. 
The response of the states to the congressional request for infor-
mation revealed much about the stresses of the union in mid-1780. 
Through these answers many states discussed their own unique problems 
63c · H d W h' M 25 1780 "I ommittee at ea quarters to as ington, ay , , ~CC, 
pp. 290-292. 
64 Cornell to Governor Greene, May 30, 1780, RICC, p, 293. 
65JcC, Vol, XVII, p. 525. 
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! 
and revealed their own particularism. They also demonstrated some 
states' increasing irritation with congressional insensitivity towards 
their peculiar circumstances, its lack of appreciation for the efforts 
of individual state governments, and its inability to coordinate effec-
tively its own efforts. In addition, they sometimes illustrated the 
problems of communications, dispersed authority, and intrastate politi-
cal divisions. In fact, the only state which could reply that it had 
fully complied with all the resolutions was Massachusetts. The General 
Assembly of that state declared that it had transmitted each of its acts 
to Congress as they were passed, but if Congress had lost them it would 
66 
send a complete new set. 
Governor William Livingston of New Jersey virtually dismissed Con-
gress' request that a list of acts be sent to Congress. He could not 
recall the acts since he had not "charged" his "memory" with them, and 
67 therefore he could not answer the questions contained in the request. 
Governor Abner Nash reported that North Carolina had met every money· 
requisition of Congress and had even advanced $1,250,000 to the Commis-
sary General for the Southern Army. Poor communications between his 
.state and Philadelphia, however, had caused an inordinate delay in re-
sponding to Congress' resolution of February 25. Nash noted that he had 
not even received the request until Hay 15, more than eleven weeks after 
it was passed. But since receiving it, he had called for a special ses-
sion of the legislature to answer the resolution. As for granting the 
66 . 
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executive special powers, he reported that he was already able to call 
out 8,000 militia and was empowered to print money, if necessary, for 
68 
its support. 
New York reminded Congress that because of the combined campaign 
of Major-General John Sullivan and Brigadier-General James Clinton a-
gainst Tories and Indians in the state during 1779, the legislature had 
been interrupted and unable to reconvene until October. Since that time 
New York had supplied more than its quota of men. Referring specifi-
cally to the urgent resolution of May 19, the state noted that it had 
tried to collect its share of the $10,000,000 but, because of the pover-
ty of the. state, had been able to collect only $50,000. The legislature 
notified Congress that the Continent could draw on the state for 
$300,000, but that much of that was state money and could only be spent 
in New York. 69 The Council of the State of Maryland declared that it 
responded fully to all troop requisitions. The money requisitions of 
the latter part of 1779, however, had been delayed because of a dispute 
. in the legislature. The House of Delegates did not believe that Mary-
land was capable of paying the taxes without selling British estate~, 
but the Senate disagreed. Because no agreement could be reached the 
legislature finally passed a property tax of £5 per hundred, and di-
rected that provisions be seized in exchange for certificates. The 
Council also noted that support of the resolution of March 18 had also 
68 
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been delayed because the original bill had contained a provision making 
the new bills legal tender., Since then the legislation had passed. 
Finally, the Council declared that even though Congress' requests had 
been far beyond Maryland's proper proportions, the state was still will-
. 1 h 'bl 70 1ng to comp y as muc as poss1 e. 
Governor Jefferson of Virginia reported that his state had tried 
to fulfill its quotas of troops required by the resolutions of March 9, 
1779, and of February 9 and May 20, 1780, by appointing recruiters in 
every county. Each received twelve and one-half dollars, specie value, 
for every soldier enlisted and each was authorized to offer sixty-two 
and one-half dollars, specie value, as soldiers' bounties, but the sys-
tem had not worked as well as expected. As for the resolution of March 
18, the Assembly had approved an act supporting the new bills of credit 
but had withheld implementation until it received proof that at least 
five other states had done likewise. Jefferson realized that Virginia 
had not always complied with Congress' requests for men and money, but 
he observed: "It will doubtless occur that some of these requisitions 
were difficult in their nature, that others were new in experiment, and 
all of them on as large a scale as the people think themselves equal 
to." In defense of Virginia he argued: "In states more compact exper-
iments, tho' new and difficult, are made with promptitude, their defects 
soon discovered and readily supplied." In states as large as Virginia, 
however, "they are carried into execution with less vigor and punctual-
ity, and the time for complying with a requisition expires frequently 
70Representation of . . . the State of Maryland . . . Agreeable to 
the Act of 17 June 1780, Aug. 11, 1780, PCC, R84, Item 70, pp. 419-425. 
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before it is discovered that the means provided were defective." Fi-
nally Jefferson observed: "The time necessary for convening the legis-
lature of such a state adds to the tardiness of the remedy, and the 
measure itself is so oppressive on the members as to discourage the 
. . b h 1 . 1171 attempting it ut on t e ast emergencies. 
Jefferson's complaints stenuned from social conditions which did 
not exist in the more settled areas of the New England states. Virgin-
ia's difficulties in recruiting soldiers was caused partly because it 
did not have as large an excess of unemployed young men as had New Eng-
land, and those already employed were unwilling to surrender their 
livelihoods for the uncertain rewards of military service. 72 Equally 
important was the factor of community force. The dispersed organization 
of the county in Virginia could not permit it to exercise the same kind 
of community pressure on its citizens as could the New England town. 73 
In addition, as Jefferson noted, the space over which government opera-
ted in Virginia both diffused and discredited authority. These condi-
tions were probably not unique to Virginia, but characteristics of the 
whole South and much of the interior North. 
72 Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783 (New York, 
1973), pp. 402, 414. 
73For an analysis of the factors which influenced the "densityof 
community life" in the Northern and Southern .sections and thus the force 
which these organizations could employ on their citizens, see H. James 
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and Virginia," Unpub. Paper, Read October 26, 1976, at the Ninth Annual 
Conference of Social-Political History, State University College, 
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The New England states, however, also experienced their own unique 
problems and frustrations. Governor Trumbull of Connecticut replied 
that his state had also complied as fully as possible with the requisi-
tions of Congress, but because of the burden created by such taxes, 
along with those assessed for the state, the Assembly had apportioned 
the Continental taxes in six parts, collectable at various times 
throughout the year. Trumbull noted that the first three portions had 
been collected, but that they had already been expended because of the 
necessity for inunediate defense. Consequently, the state had been 
obliged to emit its own bills amounting to £190,000 to obtain supplies 
for the Army. He also complained that on December 11, 1779, Congress 
had requested 8,000 barrels of flour from Connecticut even though "it 
is well known that this is not much of a wheat country." Nevertheless, 
he asserted that Connecticut had attempted to collect the flour but 
would fall far short of that required by Congress. Finally, he declared 
that he had never even received the Congressional resolution of May 
19.74 
Governor Greene of Rhode Island declared that his state had ful-
filled all the money requests of Congress except for the last one. This 
last had not been collected for a variety of reasons. First was the 
problem of raising and paying its quota of troops and of supplying the 
needs of the Conunissary Department. More importantly, much money was 
being used to provide for the arrival and the support of the French 
fleet. As for the resolution of March 18, Greene assured Congress that 
74 
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the le,gislature had been considering it but that its passage had been 
delayed while some means was sought to redeem the new bills. Finally, 
on supplying specific provisions of beef for the Army, he observed that 
the state had experienced a severe drought which made it difficult to 
75 
provide the beef as early as wanted. 
The most detailed and the most critical response, however, came 
from President Reed of Pennsylvania. Reed reported that Pennsylvania 
had always supplied its quota of troops, had kept them well provisioned, 
and had been complimented often by the Conunander-in-Chief for its exer-
tions. As for the recent demands for money by Congress, the state 
thought it advisable to reevaluate property in order that its assess• 
ment on the population would be equitable throughout the state. Natur-
ally the reevaluation had occasioned a delay in the state's compliance. 
But Reed noted that there were other problems which made payment dif f i-
cult. The state had been recently raided by the enemy, which meant 
that much money was needed for the defense of the state. He also noted 
that it was well known that a large portion of the population was dis-
affected and refused to pay taxes voluntarily. Therefore, legal com-
pulsion had to be used which caused further delays. He argued that 
inflation itself had hampered tax collections because the fines for 
non-acceptance of the office of tax collector and for non-compliance 
were so small that they were ineffective. He assured Congress, however, 
76 
that the Assembly had taken steps to remedy all of these problems. 
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R~ed then detailed what the state had done to comply with Congress' 
:t'il'lquisitions 0£ supplies. He explained that the Assembly had issued 
I!Wfiey tel buy the provisions but that its efforts had been made diff'icult 
by two f.i.ctot'$, First, the purchasing agents found that farmers were 
rgluctAfit to take the Assembly's money because of the shock already ex-
peri€lfiCed from the depreciation of paper currency. Second was the prob-
bm of poHtic9, particularly in the city of Philadelphia and the county 
of Lanca~t@r, which had been occasioned by differences over the form and 
the admitdstration of sovernment in the gitate. Nevertheless, Reed noted 
that th€! f§iUpplies were being collect~d and stor1111d at various poinu 
· vattia WtHa1d have m@t iti!I quota had it n.ot suddenly received a btte.r 
fr(:lifi th@ C<Jtfiifiittee at Headquarters which presented a plan that diHer~d 
t.mly t<J th~ Ability of thi!!i State, but to the Demands upon some of th~ 
@thli!r Stiitt:!s, thiit ii(H;hin.g lei!!s than the purest Zeal for the. common 
Gaus~ & dii!tefifiifi~d R@sGilutfon to strain every Nerve prevented our Ad= 
di'~s sittg C0n~rM s itfiifi~diately thereupan.. "77 
si@fis in Pefinsy1vania were so exorbitant that when the cost of ~a.ch it~m 
reHj_tiii'E!d w{ls G.akulated artd added to the pric:e of transportatit:rn, it Wa$ 
ll~- ·a · ···· .···'! I · ~ · Ibia,; pp. 462"'46.J; 1n additfofi to Congress requisitiGrt Of Feb= 
ri:iafy 2~ 1 the! Cotitiiiittee at Headquarters demanded that Pertrtsylvania de= 
liV§f iil.mtthly .5 5 000 barrels of flour, 166 ,8:35 pounds of beef or pork; 
~,14i b.ilrfeis Glf ~rain; and 250 hogsheads of rum. 1t also denuafidli!d that 
F@nfisyivania prEJv:lcle 30j000 pounds df bacdn diVided into three monthly 
pi:iym@fits, ~§()wagons and 1,500 horses. Conunittee at Headquarters; 
(}!reulat, June 2, 1780, FCCt R46, 1t:em 39, Vol. 1, pp. 66--71. 
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discovered that the money value totaled $802,092,800 or $602,092,800 
more than the whole amount of Continental currency ever issued. Reed 
noted that the state had apportioned these demands on the various coun-
ties, but observed that on one item, flour, the county which had been 
assessed the least amount per month was still supposed to provide "sixty 
barrels of flour more than the whole of a neighboring state [Delaware] 
tho' flour is the staple of each." He warned Congress that this com-
bined requisition was not only beyond the ability of the people of 
Pennsylvania but that it was also greatly resented because the people 
had not had a voice in its apportionment. "We are pursuaded it will 
not agree with the sentiments of the inhabitants of this state, who ha7e 
been taught to reason on the doctrine of Representation as essential to 
Taxation, and fully understand it as the constitutional Ground of this 
78 Contest." 
Reed then further detailed the problems his state encountered in 
procuring the supplies required by the Committee and by Congress. He 
argued that bacon could not be had in the state at all, as the citizens. 
themselves depended on that item being imported from surrounding states. 
The same problem also existed with the items of salt and rum; both re~ 
quired importation. As for wagons, Reed believed Pennsylvania would be 
gre~tly deficient in providing them, since the state had borne the brunt 
of that requisition throughout the war and observed that those now with 
the Army had been.drawn chiefly from Pennsylvania. To bolster his as-
sertion he noted that the county of Lancaster had registered 1700 wagons 




in 1777, but now could produce no more than 500. Horses at· the begin-
ning of the war could be bought for £25 but now sold from £50 to £60 
. 79 specie. 
Reed'closed his observations on the requisitions by making two 
suggestions. First, he believed that it was not equitable to hold 
states responsible for their requisitions unless all purchases were 
made by one individual. While he recognized the terrible difficulties 
under which Continental officers operated, he observed that "the Number 
of Purchases, the Variety of Money, & the occasional Intermixture of a 
little Specie occasions Competitions & Jealousies, of which the Seller 
does not fail to make his advantage at the publick Expense." Second, 
Reed criticized the lack of coordination between military officers and 
the state governments as destructive of system and equality. While he 
granted the right of military officers to impress provisions in the 
state in certain emergencies, he believed that when the officers acted 
Congress should expect that the state would no longer be responsible 
for that portion of supplies. As a case in point Reed declared that 
the Committee at Headquarters had demanded a large number of wagons 
from the state and that Pennsylvania, in response, had worked out an 
equitable assessment on each county. But a Continental officer since 
then had impressed two-thirds .of the state's entire quota of wagons 
. 1 th . BO in on y ree counties. 
In these responses to Congress' request for information, it was 
apparent that the majority of the states believed that their own 
79Ibid., p. 466. 
SOibid., pp. 466-467. 
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special problems had left them not only hard pressed to fulfill the 
requisitions of Congress bu.t also that each had contributed more tha'n 
its fair share to the conunon effort. Consequently, the sometimes 
brusque demands of Congress' Conunittee at Headquarters only increased 
the irritation of the state towards both the members of the Committee 
and Congress itself. Though many states such as Pennsylvania resented 
the Committee's requisitions, they still tried to meet its demands, 
sometimes at tremendous cost to themselves. By 1778 the war had become 
in essence a poor man's war, and a state's ability to recruit men de-
pended greatly on paying increasing bounties to the dwindling supply of 
available young men. These costs, added to the spiraling prices of 
provisions, caused inevitable distress. New Hampshire, for example, 
responded to the Committee's requisitions but was only able to do so 
with the greatest difficulty. Meshech Weare declared that the bounties 
required to get recruits for the Army and that the price of every item 
were so extravagant that it seemed "as if all the money in the State 
would not be Sufficient. 1181 
Other states simply said "no" to the Committee. Governor Greene 
of Rhode Island refused the Committee's request for supplies and care-
fully detailed his reasons. He pointed out that the French fleet was 
in the harbor and could not get out because of a British naval blockade. 
In addition, because of the French presence, the state was threatened 
with an imminent invasion by the British. For this reason Governor 
Greene had called out the militia for six ~onths to protect the state. 
81 
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Consequently, ·the supplies which would otherwise have been used for the 
Continental Army of necessity would be expended to support the state's 
militia. He further informed the Committee that if any supplies were 
left after provisioning the militia they could still not leave Rhode 
Island as the French Army and Navy had to procure most of their supplies 
82 
in the state. 
Throughout its early existence, however, the Corrnnittee at Head-
quarter~ quite naturally received the strong support of Congress. Con-
gress hoped the Corrunittee would be able to do that which Congress could 
not--spur the states to greater exertions on behalf of the Army. In a 
circular letter, President Huntington pressed the states to cooperate 
with -the Committee's requisitions. Convinced that the resources of the 
country could easily remedy the Army's difficulties if speedily applied, 
he urged the states not to sacrifice the happiness of millions for the 
sake of present ease and comfort. Justifying the appointment of the 
Committee, Huntington argued.that a common council. involved the "Fower 
of Direction" and that Congress' measures should not be checked or con-
trolled by "partial views & Interests of separate Communities, while 
they profess to be of one Body. 1183 
Unfortunately for Congress the Committee itself helped to generate 
these "partial views" by_its unremitting demands on the states and by 
its constant conflicts with .the executive authorities of the states. 
One source of these conflicts was the attitude of the members of the 
82Governor Greene to the Committee of Coop~ration of Congress, 
August 22, 1780, RICC, pp. 308-309. 
83 s. Huntington, Circular, June 15, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 15, pp. 
34-36. 
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ComHue, especially that of John Mathews. Writing to another member 
of th~ Committee, Mathews commented upon a charge that the Conunittee 
wantil!d to be mada "Lords and Protectors," declaring: "If I thought I 
em!ld hav~ influence enough, to ma.ke any honest set of men the real 
~rot~~tors of this greviously injured people, I would harangue the mul-
titud~, night and day! 1184 Such attitudes inevitably offended many 
"1H;i_~iah who w@re forced to deal with the Committee. 
Th~ most s~rious conflict which the Committee initiated with stat~ 
~uthoriti~~ involved Joseph Reed and the Council of Pennsylvania. Di~-
~ylviania, th~ Cotfifii.ittee made the mistakfi\ of upbraiding the Penn~ylvania 
Comu~H, d~~iarin.g: 11W@ should stand folly justified by our Cons ti tu= 
Stiiitti! IJf F~nnsylvania, on the subject of our mission; as H hilta not ~ven 
il85 11dkfiowlti!.d~ii!d l!h~ r~~lllipt or any of th€! letters we ha vii! addreliiliied,. • • 
§~HJ ean exempt .iJ.i? .. from -unmerited Reproach." B.e acknowledged that he 
had n~t y@t answet'ed the Cditiiilittee 1 s letters but argued that thh'l wiis 
~4Hathews t© Peabody, Oct. 3, 1780; !J{c, VGl. v, pp. 400=401. 
- ~~fl,_.,.-•;="'"'' .. ;. H-·< "'r1--- -·t -"'"'""'":b"'"'ee a ..... ea1,1'i.uar --ers to Reed, july lJ, 1780, PS:~; RBJ; 
It€m e~ 5 V©i, tf, pp. ~54=255. 
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ability and had therefore requested the information from the various 
counties. He then reminded Congress that the state was so large that 
the three weeks which had elapsed since the receipt of the Conunittee's 
requisition simply was not enough time to have received accurate an-
swers. He asserted that Pennsylvania had struggled to overcome the 
obstacles of party strife and the difficulties of supplying its fron-
tiers and that the Council had devoted itself incessantly to public 
business. Consequently, "it is very hard & not a little discouraging 
to be held out to the Army as we have Reason to think we have been, & 
as we hereafter may be to the World, as the Author or at least the 
Causes of Misfortunes which it is impossible for us to prevent. 1186 
In a second letter Reed reported that prior to the Conunittee's 
letter the members had been in town and had conversed with one of the 
state's delegates and with Reed himself. Since they did not request 
further information at that time, the Council automatically assumed that 
either the Committee had decided to await more accurate information or 
were satisfied with that which they had ·already received. Shortly 
thereafter, however, the Council had received the offensive letter. 
But even after this, one of the Conunittee's members had been in town 
wit_hdut seeking any further information. The Council could put no 
other construction on this turn of events than "that the Committee was 
satisfied, or that they sought an Opp[ortunity] to represent the State 
87 unfavorably to Congress & the Army." 
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Congress referred Reed's first letter ·to a committee, and upon 
examination the committee declared that during the present critical 
juncture of affairs Pennsylvania had "manifested her usual zeal and ac-
tivity, and that the letter from the Committee at Camp of the 13th day 
of July contains sentiments improper to be addressed to the supreme 
. 88 
executive authority of any of the United States." For this and other 
injudicious offenses toward state executives, and even toward Congress 
itself, the Connnittee at Headquarters was dismissed on August 11, and 
89 
ordered to report its proceedings to Congress. 
During its existence the Committee's job had been to obtain com-
pliance for congressional requisitions of supplies. The problem of pro-
curing money from the states, however, remained with Congress, and it 
continued to press the states for payment of their back taxes. The 
magnitude of the failure of the states to pay their quotas of money be-
came apparent when the Board of Treasury revealed in late June that 
from January 1, 1778 to February 1, 1780, the states were in arrears by. 
over $45,000,000, ranging from Delaware's $120,000 to Virginia's 
90 
$8,343,589.19. Moreover, the states still had not complied with the 
urgent request of May 19 for $10,000,000. Thus Congress wrote yet 
another circular letter requesting immediate compliance. It also noted 
that it was sending special_messengers to each of the states and inform-
ed the states that Congress had alr~ady been forced to draw warrants 
88 JGC, Vol. XVII., p. 669. 
89 rbid., p. 720. 
golbid., pp. 563-564. 
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against the states' treasuries for those funds. 91 
Delegates also continued to press their states for compliance with 
both the resolution of February 25 and the resolution of March 18. 
Ezekiel Cornell pointed out that New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, New York, New Jersey and Maryland had adopted legislation for is-
suing the new bills of credit and he hoped that Rhode Island would soon 
comply. He also noted that both New York and New Jersey had furnished 
supplies beyond those required by the resolution of February 25 but 
that they could do so no longer and thus urged his state to comply as 
. 'bl 92 soon as poss1 e. 
At the same time Cornell held little hope that such measures would 
be effective. He complained that there seemed to be little planning in 
Congress about the forthcoming campaign and asserted: "There doth not 
appear the most distant wish for more powers, but rather on the con-
trary, a wish to see their States without control (as the term is) free 
sovereign, and independent." If Cqngress encountered the least diffi-
culty in rezard to supply, its automatic response was to declare that 
the states must exert themselves or suffer the consequences. For his 
part he was "exceedingly disappointed" in his expectations of Congress 
and was still unable to discover its motives and views. He observed: 
"There appears to be a langour that attends all our conduct·, want of de-
cision and spirited measures. The greatest part of our time is taken 
91 rbid., pp. 576-577. 
92 Cornell to Governor Greene, June 30, 1780, RICC, pp. 300-301. 
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up iri disputes about diction, commas, colons, consonants, vowels, 
etc. .. 93 
Other members of Congress were more charitable than Cornell but 
also recognized congressional ineffectiveness. Writing to General 
Washington Joseph Jones expressed views similar to those of James Madi-
son, his colleague from Virginia. While noting that the new bills were 
finally coming into use, he observed that Congress had been "gradually 
surrendering or throwing upon the several States the exercise of powers 
they should have retained . . • until at. length they have scarce a 
power left • II As for the Army, Jones believed that Congress was .. . . 
"little more than the medium through which the wants of the Army are 
conveyed to the States." Furthermore, he asserted that Congress "never 
had or at least in few instances have exercised powers adequate to the 
purposes of war and such as they had have been from embarrassment and 
difficulty frittered away to the states and it will be found, I fear, 
94 
difficult to recover them." 
Thus by early summer, 1780, Congress had still not been able 
either to establish the nation's finances on a firm footing or to do 
more than barely subsist the Army. The difficulties of its constituents 
multiplied, leaving the states unable and unwilling to meet fully con-
gressional requisitions. Without resources of its own and with little 
forthcoming from the states, the ability of Congress to guide effec-
tively the war effort rapidly dimfnished. During the next few months, 
93cornell .to Governor Greene, July 21, 1780, LMC, Vol .. V, pp. 
280-281. 
94Joseph Jones to Washington, June 19, 1780, CAR, Vol. II, pp. 
476-478. 
as British military pressures mounted in the south, the states would 
experience increasing tensions between one another, reducing further 
the cooperation so necessary to congressional authority and power. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CRISIS AND DESPAIR 
During the last six months of 1780 the nation experienced several 
major demoralizing shocks which threatened to destroy its ability to 
prosecute the war. In early summer news reached Philadelphia that 
Charleston, South Carolina, had fallen to the British on May 12 with 
the surrender of Major-General Benjamin Lincoln and the entire Southern 
Army. Struggling to oppose the marauding British Army, Congress sue-
ceeded in recruiting a new Southern Army under the command of Major-
General Horatio Gates, only to see it badly routed at Camden, South 
Carolina, in August. In September the nation learned of the treachery 
of Major-General Benedict Arnold. This disastrous series of events 
culminated on January 1, 1781, when the Pennsylvania Line mutinied be-
cause of a lack of pay and provisions to be followed soon by a similar 
mutiny in parts of the New Jersey Line. 
These crises augmented and complicated the stres.ses in the Union. 
As the military situation deteriorated, Congress became even more insis-
tent that its resolutions be carried out. The states tried to respond 
but discovered that their inhabitants were increasingly reluctant to 
do so. In defense of their citizens the states complained further of 
their poverty and of congressional injustice, thus creating more ten-
sion, not only between Congress and the states but among the states as 













hopefully in February and March and so dependent upon the cooperation 
of the states, had all but collapsed. Its near failure and the inabil-
ity of Congress to solve the military crisis led many persons to ques-
tion the effectiveness of Republican government, and to a growing 
movement to increase the powers of Congress. 
Summing up the situation at mid-year 1780, Thomas Paine gloomily 
reported that the Continent was all but exhausted. One of the main ene-
mies he believed had been depreciation which had so impoverished the 
country that "the whole currency in circulation is scarcely equal to a 
year's expenses of the war, and could all the Taxes be instantly col-
lected they would not at the present prices purchase the supplies" 
needed for the Army. He asserted that inflation had seriously "weakened 
the hands not only of Congress but of every government in America." 
Noting that Charleston had undoubtedly fallen, he urged the merchants 
of Philadelphia to lead the way to a new "spirit of ardor" by offering 
bounties to raise 400 or 500 men to aid the country's faltering de-
1 
fense. 
Charleston had indeed fallen, even as Paine was writing. But be-
fore the official news reached Philadelphia, the delegates had already 
agreed that there was little hope either for Charleston or for the 
Southern Army. Some of the delegates expressed their frustration and 
despair in recriminations towards the southern states. Ezekiel Cornell, 
who held a commission in the Army and who was normally a staunch advo-
cate of increased national authority, informed Governor Greene of the 
1 Thomas Paine to Blair McCenaghari (?) , May, 17 80 (?), in Philip S. 
Foner, ed.,~ Complete Writings of Thomas Paine (New York, 1945), 
. Vol. II, pp. 1184-1185. 
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probable fall of the whole of South Carolina and declared: "In a word, 
we have but little to expect south of Maryland. The once patriotic 
state of Virginia weighs but little at present, in the scale of defense 
or the furnishing of men and supplies. Her whole attention is engrossed 
in making sale of her lands. II Angry and bitter, he declared that 
Rhode Island had "loaned more money to the Continent than every state 
south".of Pennsylvania, and as a friend to and a citizen of Rhode Island 
he urged the state to pay "no more money on Continental account than is 
2 
absolutely necessary for the salvation of the country." 
James Warren of Massachusetts accused South Carolina of being "a 
Country, which had not public Spirit enough in the midst of plenty to 
supply provisions for those that would fight or Courage to fight them-
selves." His personal reaction to the calamity, however, differed mark-
edly from that of Cornell. While he observed that the news had created 
some dejection in Congress, he believed that "it had done more good than 
hurt." He declared that the fall of Charleston had "roused every Man 
to Action" and asserted that "we shall now have a fine Army, and they 
'11 b l' d 113 w1 e supp ie . . . . 
Warren's optimism proved ill founded. The worsening problems of 
individual states continued to thwart congressional efforts to supply 
men and provisions for the Army, and Congress' requisitions for specific 
supplies and money remained unfulfilled. Responding to the resolution 
of May 19, for example, Governor Thomas Sim Lee noted that he had sent 
z 
Cornell to Governor Greene, June 18, 1780, RICC, p. 295. 
3 . ' ·. . . 
James Warren to John Adams, July 11, 1780, in Massachusetts 
Historical Society, The Warren-Adams Letters (New York, 1972), Vol. II, 
pp. 134,-136. Hereinafter, WAL. 
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$200,000 to Philadelphia on July 8, but warned: "It is with the utmost 
regret we inform Congress of our Inability to comply with their earnest 
and pressing Application; " He realized that without the support 
of the states the next campaign might come to nothing but argued that 
Maryland's failure would .not be due to lack of effort. Instead, he 
asserted that it would be because of "the want of Time to execute the 
Laws and in some Measure to the Scarcity of Money to answer the various 
Demands incessantly made on the. People to support Government and to 
4 
provide Men, Money and Provisions for the Army of the States." 
Farther north, Meshech Weare of New Hampshire informed Congress 
that his state had passed a law to comply with its portion of the 
$10,000,000 and to fulfill its requisitions of men and supplies but 
that they were very difficult to collect. He cited as reasons that 
there had been a sudden scarcity of specie in the state and that one 
whole county had attached itself to Vermont and refused to pay any taxes 
at all. The state, therefore, had to set.its own priorities on what it 
had collected. Its decision to supply men and provisions had emptied 
5 
the treasury of the money intended for the use of Congress. 
Governor Greene wrote to Congress insisting that the demands for 
money from Rhode Island cease. He argued that the state had made every 
exertion to fulfill the requests of the staff department and of the 
Quartermasters, but: "The necessity for large expenditures are daily 
more urgent from the variety of circumstances attendant upon the fleet 
4Thornas Sim Lee to S. Huntington, July 24, 1780, PCC, R84, Item 
70' pp. 399-401. 
5 Weare to S. Huntington, July 25, 1780, PCC, R78, Item 64, pp. 
118-119. 
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and army of his most Christian Majesty. This State being the place of 
their present residence, is in some measure considered as possessing 
the treasury of America." Greene then warned: "In a short time, if 
the demands for money shall be continued we shall be totally unable to 
6 
answer them." 
The New York Legislature, writing to the state's delegates in Con-
gress, noted that by the resolution of February 25 Congress had relin-
quished its right to purchase and had begun to pass requisitions on the 
several states which were then to procure supplies upon their individual 
credits. But, the legislature declared, New York had no credit. Its 
treasury was destitute; its militia was unpaid; and its civil list and 
the contingencies of government had been unpaid for a year. Consequent-
ly, the legislature believed that it had no choice but to return the 
burden of purchasing supplies to Congress by procuring provisions on 
the credit of Congress rather than on the non-existent credit of the 
7 
state. 
Despite their difficulties, the states did attempt to implement 
Congress' financial program. Many of them, however, discovered that 
their citizens, weary of the war, distressed by the spiraling inflation, 
and now leery of seemingly empty congressional and state promises, were 
r.eluctant to surrender any more of their possessions. Consequently, 
they had to resort to confiscating the provisions. But in doing so 
they tried to walk a fine line between the feelings of their citizens 
6 
Governor Greene to Cornell, July 22, 1780, PGC, R78, Item 64, 
p. 478. 
7 . 
Letter from the New York Legislature to the Delegates of that 
State, July 4, 1780, PCC, RSl, Item 67, Vol. II, pp. 278-280. 
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and congressional resolutions. 
In Delaware, Governor Rodney ordered William Millen of New Castle 
County to procure horses for the Army and, if people would not sell, to 
seize them. The authorization which he issued, however, was limited, 
with hopes, perhaps, that it would be more acceptable to Delaware's in-
habitants. Millen was specifically ordered to enlist "any sufficient 
Numbers of Persons" to aid him in impressing "all Horses, Mares, and 
Geldings within your County that may be in Keeping for Racing, or at a 
Race-Ground for the purpose of Running. "8 The Council of Penn-
sylvania, likewise, instructed the wagon masters in the counties to en-
list the aid of militia, if necessary, to procure teams for the Army. 
But to partly protect its loyal citizens, it cautioned the wagon masters 
to distinguish first "between such as have taken the oath or affirmation 
of Allegiance, and those who have not, and saving always to every plan-
tation at least two working Horses. 119 
New York also faced considerable citizen resistance which greatly 
inhibited its ability to comply with congressional requisitions. In 
Westchester County, just upriver from New York City, the citizens re-
fused to accept anything but gold and silver for their cattle, forcing 
Samuel Townsend, the purchasing agent for the county, to impress cattle 
10 
for the Army without authorization from the state. Westchester Coun-
ty, however, was not the only problem area. Udny Hay, the Deputy 
8 
Rodney to Millen, June 23, 1780, LCR, pp. 348-349. 
9Extract from the Minutes of the Council of Pennsylvania, June 21, 
1780, PCC, R83, Item 69, Vol. II, pp. 227-228. 
10samuel Townsend to Clinton, Aug. 29, 1780, PGC, Vol. 6, pp. 
148-149. 
98 
Corrunissary General for the state, reported that the people were extreme-
ly reluctant to part with their goods, their minds having been "sourd" 
against the state because they believed they were being offered lower 
prices than those in surrounding states for their cattle and flour. In 
addition, many persons had certificates given them by the state, some 
of them issued months, others years earlier, and these people had be-
come convinced that they would never be redeemed. Consequently, New 
York's citizens were more than willing to accept higher prices, much of 
it in specie, from persons calling themselves "purchasing agents" who 
were taking substantial numbers of cattle into the New Hampshire Grants 
11 
and into the Eastern states and even into the hands of engrossers. 
With these difficulties becoming more important, the legislature 
of New York was finally forced to notify Congress that it could not 
meet the quota of beef required by the resolution of February 25 and 
requested that New York be permitted to substitute flour for beef. 12 
Congress granted the request, but even then New York experienced a dis-
aster which precluded their delivering the flour. In November, the 
enemy raided Tyron County, destroying 150,000 to 200,000 bushels of 
wheat and a similar amount of forage. As the state depended heavily 
upon the produce of that county·to meet its Continental quota, Governor 
Clinton warned: "I conceive it therefore my Duty to inform Congress of 
this: lest by too great a Reliance on this State, they may be 
11udny Hay to Clinton, Sept. 18, 1780, PGC, Vol. 6, pp. 240-241. 
12The New York Legislature to the Delegates of New York, Sept. 21, 
1780, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. 2, pp. 310-311. 
disappointed and the Army suffer from want of due supplies. 1113 Con-
gress, then, had no choice but to request the already hard pressed 
states of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Mayland to send their quotas of 
provisions as quickly as possible. 14 
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The states also tried to comply with the resolution of March 18 by 
passing legislation in support of the new bills and by imploring their 
citizens to pay the taxes necessary to back the new money. But many of 
their inhabitants refused. The Maryland General Assembly sent an open 
letter to its constituents urging that people promptly pay their taxes 
since promptness was the only way to insure both the establislunent of 
the new bills and the restoration of public credit. 15 The people of 
Maryland, however, often rejected the new bills, even when the Assembly 
was able to issue them. Thomas Richardson of Georgetown reported to 
Governor Lee that he would be able to buy provisions quickly if he had 
proper cash, '~ut the people hold back from an apprehention that they 
are to be paid off in the new money at 40 for one, which they seem gen-
erally adverse apprehending they will not be able to pay off their for.,.. 
mer contracts with it at the same rate. 1116 Richard Smith of Moncay 
asserted that good beef for the Army could be acquired, "but not at the 
13clinton to S. Huntington, Nov. 6, 1780, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. 
2, pp. 328-329. 
14s. Huntington to the First Executive Officers in Pennsylvania, 
Delaware & Maryland, Nov. 16, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 15, pp. 158-159. 
15 . 
Address of the General Assembly to the People of Maryland, July 
7, 1780, in H. Niles, ed., Revolution in America (Baltimore, 1822), 
pp. 208-209. 
16thomas Richardson to T. S. Lee, Aug. 30, 1780, in Maryland, 
Maryland Archives, Vol. XLV, p. 65. Hereinafter, MA. 
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price you desired me to Engage it for, nor neither will the people take 
the New money that is now coming out at the Exchange of forty for one 
without I will Oblige myself to make the one as Good as Forty, . 
.. 17 
As late as January, 1781, William McBridge of Somerset reported: "I 
cannot Purchase any Provisions at all, without I have money of the Old 
Emission, People hear will not Have the new on any Terms, 
In New Jersey the people were also strongly urged to support the 
state legislature's Act of June 9 which had been passed in compliance 
. 19 
with Congress' resolution of March 18. But primarily because of con-
tinued inflation, the people of New Jersey were unwilling to accept the 
new bills as were the people of Maryland, perhaps with good reason. 
Despite congressional efforts the old currency continued to depreciate. 
In Philadelphia the rate had officially climbed only to 75 to one be-
cause the merchants of the city had met and agreed to fix prices. But 
even there, no advantage had been gained because the specie price on all 
goods immediately advanced. 20 Ezekiel Cornell noted that a gentlemen 
had arrived recently from Massachusetts bearing new bills issued by his 
21 
state and could not exchange them at any rate. Thomas McKean reported 
that depreciation advanced so rapidly that all the old money requested 
17Richard Smith to Thomas Richardson, Sept. 7, 1780, MA, Vol.· XLV, 
p. 86. 
18william McBridge to T. S. Lee, Jan. 15, 1781, MA, Vol. XLVII, p. 
17. 
19To the Worthy Citizens of New Jersey, Aug. 23, 1780, NJA, 2nd 
Ser., Vol. IV, pp. 595-596. 
20 
Wolcott to Trumbull, Dec. 18, 1780, tIBS, 7th Ser., Vol. III, pp. 
167-169. 
21cornell to the Governor of Rhode Island, Sept. 2, 1780, LMC, Vol. 
v, pp. 353-355. 
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from the states had already been used up, inflation making it worth only 
one-third of the original requisition. He noted that the new money was 
the only resource left and, if it devalued Congress would be at wit's 
22 
end. The New Jersey legislature, responding to economic reality and 
to the demands of its constituents, was compelled to repeal the forty 
to one provision of its June 9 act and ordered the Governor and the 
Privy Council to ascertain the true value of the old money and to peri-
d . 11 bl" h h . f" d" 23 o ica y pu is t eir in ings. 
The British campaign in the south after the fall of Charleston only 
increased the distress of the states. As the war intensified in the re-
gion, North Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland were hard pressed not only 
to supply a new Southern Army but also to provide for their own defense. 
Thus little help was forthcoming from these states to aid Washington 
and the Northern Army. North Carolina almost immediately became a bat- ) 
tleground. By October Governor Nash reported to Congress that the state ( 
could no longer provide either men or supplies, because most of them had ; 
( 
been expended in the previous campaign. He also observed that the 
danger of enemy movements within the state precluded any attempt at 
gathering further provisions from fear that they would fall into enemy 
24 
hands. 
Farther north, the state of Virginia also experienced enormous fi-
nancial difficulties because of the extra burdens created by the British 
102. 
22Thomas McKean to Reed, Aug. 29, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, p. 346. 
23Acts 5th General Assembly of New Jersey, EAI, No. 17259, pp. 4-5. 
24Nash to S. Huntington, Oct. 6, 1780, PCC, R86, Item 72, pp. 101-
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invasion. David Jameson, a member of Virginia's Council of State, 
noted that the legislature had been forced to issue $2,000,000 in state 
currency to cover the emergency, but that most of it had been paid out. 
He did not believe that what was left would carry the state through 
August. Asserting that most of the money spent had gone for Continental 
purposes, he despaired: "What we are to do when this is gone I really 
do not know. I think we shall be in a miserable situation for I believe 
most of the tax to be collected in the next month, will be paid off by 
Certificates given for Wagons, Horses, prov. Rum, Salt & C & C & C im-
25 
pressed and seized." The state emission itself was not well received 
by Virginians. Jameson reported that "the people do not like the New 
Money (the 2 Millions). many have already refused to take it, princi-
pally because it will pay no tax but that laid for its redemption. 1126 
The cost of enlisting troops in Virginiawas enormous. By Septem-
her Edmund Pendleton declared that militia cost an average of £5,000 
27 
besides the bounty of a hogshead of tobacco. By December recruiting 
had become so difficult that the legislature was considering a bill to 
offer a bounty of a Negro not younger than ten nor older than forty 
years to men who would enlist in the Continental Army for the war. 
These Negroes were to be received from anyone in the state who owned 
28 
more than twenty. 
25n "d J Md" A 6 1780 1 2 59 avi ameson to a ison, ug. , , PJH, Vo . , p. . 
26Jameson to Madison, Sept. 20, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, p. 94. 
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Edmund Pendleton to Madison, Sept. 25, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, pp. 
99-101. 
28J. Jones to Madison, Nov. 18, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, pp. 182-183. 
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In Maryland the situation was also desperate. Destitute of money 
to support either its requisitions or its own defense, the state repeat-
edly appealed to Congress for aid only to be told that Congress' own 
financial problems and its plans for joint Franco-American operations 
precluded any aid from that quarter. In July Deputy Commissary General 
Henry Hollingsworth informed Governor Lee that the men employed at his 
post at the Head of Elk were three to six months arrears for pay. He 
had appealed to the Board of War for aid, but as he had received none 
from the Continent, he was now appealing to the Maryland Council. He 
asserted that. he had been using his own pr.ivate credit, but that was 
now exhausted and the state owed him El2,000 and the United States 
nearly E50,000. In addition, Congress owed the post itself more than 
£50,000. Unless money was soon sent the operations of his post would 
cease and his men would quit. 29 In Cambridge John C. Harrison noted 
that the credit of the state was very low and the people had refused to 
sell him wheat unless he could provide prompt payment. He particularly 
blamed his inability "to the failure of payments by Continental Pur-
30 
chasers." 
The demands of Congress made Maryland's distress even greater. 
Responding to Congress' request that the French be permitted to purchase 
flour from the state to·support their activities in the West Indies, 
Governor Lee stated that the French could do so but warned that such 
purchases would make it more difficult for Maryland to procure that 
29 
Henry Hollingsworth to T. S. Lee, July 5, 1780, MA, Vol. XLV, 
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30 Jno. C. Harrison to T. S. Lee, Sept. 11, 1780, MA, Vol. XLV, 
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31 item for the Army. Yet when Maryland requested assistance from Con-
gress little was forthcoming. Pleading for aid to help protect the 
state's commerce in the Chesapeake on July 28, Governor Lee learned that 
only four Continental vessels ha.d been outfitted for the season, and 
32 
they were committed to the Conunander-in-Chief and the French. Thus 
it was not in the power of Congress to comply with the Governor's re-
quest "by sending any Ships of Force in to the Chesapeake for the Pro-
tection of the Navigation there at this critical Juncture. 1133 
Similarly, when Governor Lee requested clothes for the Maryland troops, 
Richard Peters at the Board of War informed him that the Continent had 
none and that there was little probability that it would have any in 
the future. Therefore, Peters urged Maryland to find some way to pro-
1 h . 34 cure c ot ing. 
Experiencing increasing pressures from the British invasion, many 
southerners were becoming irritated with Congress' inability to ease 
the crisis and with the lack of aid from the northern states. Joseph 
Jones, attending Virginia's Assembly, demanded to know what the northern 
and middle states were doing; He believed: "The States never were 
blessed with greater plenty or had it more in their power to lay up 
ample Stores of provisions for the Army than at present .. " He 
urged that "if the people will not lend them to the public and wait for 
31T. S. Lee to S. Huntington, July 7, 1780, PCC, R84, Item 70, pp. 
403-404. 
32 JCC, Vol. XVII, p. 702. 
33s. Huntington to T. S. Lee, Aug. 10, 1780, MA, Vol. XLV, p. 45. 







future payment they must be taken, . . . " He did argue, however, that 
if the supplies were impressed they should be taken in such a way "as 
to occasion as little disgust as possible," which he believed could be 
most easily accomplished by a "regular apportionment of specific arti-
cles. 1135 
Meanwhile, the situation of the states north of Maryland were also 
deteriorating. As the British developed their campaign in the southern 
36 
states they were also maneuvering threateningly in the Jerseys. Cort-
sequently, the northern states had to continue to supply Washington's 
command. But the resources of the states were rapidly becoming exhaust-
ed. In Pennsylvania the scarcity of money hampered the state's efforts. 
James Bayly, writing from Lancaster County, noted that he was proceed-
ing as directed to impress wagons and teams for the Army. But his job 
was difficult because he had no money to pay either the militia which 
had helped in the impressment or the teamsters to deliver the wagons. 
Money was essential because both classes of men depended wholly upon 
37 
each day's pay. The lack of money also caused President Reed to re-
quest aid from. Congress. He asserted that the legislature had passed 
several laws enabling the Council to supply its Line of the Army with 
pay and clothes and to furnish the state's quota of supplies. He noted 
that recent requests for additional provisions for the Continent would 
cost the state another $2,000,000, and the treasury was now empty. 
202. 
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Since all the money had been expended for Continental purposes, he re-
quested that Congress loan Pennsylvania £1,000 sterling so that the 
state could fulfill its obligation to its own soldiers. 38 
Reed also argued that Congress and the Army relied much too heavily 
upon Pennsylvania for supplies. He believed that many of their requests 
were unreasonable and was becoming irritated by congressional ignorance 
39 
of Pennsylvania's resources. One example Reed cited was the demands 
made on Pennsylvania for animal flesh. As he had on previous occasions, 
he detailed the reasons why the state could not comply. He argued that 
what beef there was in the state had to be used to supply the various 
posts guarding the state's extensive frontiers and that bacon could not 
be had in the state since it had to be imported from Maryland and New 
Jersey even in peacetime. He concluded by declaring: "You would be 
wrong therefore in depending on this State for the supply demanded, and 
that for the best Reasons in the World because it is not to be had. 1140 
Farther to the east, Delaware also experienced increasing difficul-
ties, in part because of a scarcity of money and, perhaps also in part, 
because of a reluctance within the commercial community to sacrifice 
their goods to the cause. The state's treasury was so empty that Gov-
ernor Rodney suggested to Colonel John Jones, who had requested the 
flints and lead necessary to defend the state against enemy raids, that 
38 
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he apply to some "wealthy gentlemen in the neighborhood. 1141 Possessing 
no money, the state had to issue certificates for supplies. The people, 
however, generally disliked the certificates, and thus the state was 
1 . . h . . . f c 42 s ow in meeting t e requisitions o ongress. William Millen informed 
Rodney that little could be done to procure the flour required by the 
Army. There was very little in the mills, and if he attempted to con-
fiscate it, the mi~lers threatened to quit milling. Wheat was also 
difficult to acquire, Millen observed, because the last crop had been 
bad and farmers had only enough left for their own seed and bread. He 
was particularly angry with the assembly, who were all property owners 
themselves, for not taking into account the condition of their constit-
43 
uents. 
There were others, however, who argued that the reason there was 
no flour was the embargo. One effect of the embargo, Thomas Rodney de-
clared, was that millers refused to grind wheat. With the scarcity of 
money in the state and outside markets cut off by the embargo, Rodney 
asserted that millers had no money and recently had to turn down over 
8,000 bushels of wheat. He also declared that many millers, to avoid 
receiving certificates for their product, were smuggling great quanti-
ties of flour down the river. 44 Whether Millen or Rodney was correct 
about the cause for the shortage of flour really made little difference 
for, whatever the reason, the state found it difficult to acquire that 
41 
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item; Both men agreed that there was a dearth of money in the state, 
and the lack of money may explain why the legislature permitted the 
state's act enforcing the embargo to expire in October without rein-
stating it. 
The· failure of Delaware to reenact the embargo, as it had done 
earlier in the year, created immediate friction with Pennsylvania. 
President Reed once again angrily informed Congress that Delaware had 
lifted its embargo and asserted that as a consequence supplies already 
paid for by his state and designated for the Army had been diverted for 
foreign sales through Delaware's ports. Warning that under these con-
ditions Pennsylvania could not raise one barrel of flour, Reed threat-
ened that unless Delaware reenacted its embargo Pennsylvania would 
45 
repeal its own. The expiration of the embargo also· injured Delaware's 
ability to meet its requisitions. In a letter to Governor Rodney, Com-
missary General of Purchases Ephraim Blaine pointed out the obvious: 
little of Delaware's supplies for the last year had been received. As 
a primary cause he noted that the legislature had adjourned until Janu-
ary, 1781, without reenacting the embargo. Consequently, the citizens 
of Delaware had been given full liberty to export flour which prevented 
46 
the state meeting its quotas. 
Delaware's actions not only angered Congress but also placed that 
body in a constitutional quandary. Even under the proposed Articles of 
Confederation Congress had not been given coercive powers with which to 
45 
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force states to comply with its resolutions. Its embargoes, as with 
all its other resolutions, were little more than recommendations made 
with expectations that the states would pass and enforce laws complying 
with the wishes of the common council. But in this case something more 
had to be done. Besides the remonstrartces from Reed and Blaine, Con-
gress had also received complaints from General Washington and from 
Maryland. The latter had agreed to maintain its embargo only so long 
as Delaware Bay remained closed. If Congress did not act, it faced the 
real possibility that the provisions so desperated needed to support the 
Army would disappear into foreign markets. 
Congress referred the remonstrances to a committee.which reported 
on November 21. Falling back on European precedents, the committee ar-
gued that embargoes were an essential adjunct to the powers of war. It 
reasoned that, given the nature of the American Confederation, especi-
ally the factors of distance and communications, the power to impose 
those embargoes ought to belong exclusively to Congress. It also noted 
that most members of the confederacy had agreed to the efficacy of this 
assumption of power because they had permitted Congress to place an em-
bargo on specifically enumerated provisions as early as June 8, 1778, 
and had at various times since then renewed it. Therefore, the commit-
tee recommended that Congress earnestly request Delaware immediately to 
enforce its embargo. Meanwhile, the conunittee urged Congress to use 
force against the citizens of a state by directing the Board of Admir-
alty .to seize all vessels in the Delaware River which were loaded with 
the proscribed provisions and to bring these vessels. into Philadelphia 
to be proceeded against according to 
C' 
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As mentioned above, many of the states had either emitted money on 
their own credit or issued certificates for the provisions they im-
pressed. The emissions naturally added to the problem of inflation and 
further weakened the possibility that Congress' financial program would 
be effective. Congress recognized the necessity of occasional state 
issues, but tried to salvage its own program by implementing the pro-
visions of Article IX of the proposed Confederation which granted Con-
gress the power to regulate the value of money. It requested the states 
not to issue any more currency than such as would equal their respective 
quotas of the new bills provided by the resolution of March 18. Con-
gress also asked the states not to issue currency unless it could be 
redeemed at par value with specie. If the states complied with these 
conditions then they could consider their issues as the part of the 
six-tenths of the new bills reserved to them by the resolution. 48 
By Novemb·er, however> James Madison noted that he could not learn 
that any state had taken actions against the evils of certificates and 
emissions. He asserted that when he had suggested that the states dis-
continue the practice, his suggestion had been greeted coolly in Con-
49 
gress. Moreover, Madison himself was chagrined to discover that his 
own state, because of an empty treasury and because it needed cash im-
mediately to recruit men and oppose the invasion of the enemy, had 
-·~(;1 - . 
\~JGC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1075-1078. 
report, however, is unclear. 
48 . 
JGC, Vol. XVII, p. 784. 
The action of Congress on this 
49Madison to J. Jones, Nov. 14, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, p. 173. 
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determined on "the making a further emission. 1150 Nevertheless, as in-
flation became worse and the difficulties caused by infl'1.tion mounted, 
Congress was finally forced to agree with Madison. In December it went 
beyond its power to regulate the value of state money by requesting the 
legislatures to call out of circulation all state emissions as soon as 
possible and not to issue any more at all "but by advise and consent of 
51 
Congress." 
The results of the inability of the states to fulfill their quotas 
inevitably led to distress for the Army, and throughout the year the 
Army remained hard pressed to maintain itself, let alone carry on an 
active campaign. Conunissary Ephraim Blaine reported in early August 
that the Continental supp~ies were completely exhausted and the exis-
tence of the Army depended totally upon the states' rapidly complying 
with the requisitions of Congress. He observed that the Army was now 
being fed from hand.to mouth, depending solely on one day's receipt of 
supplies for the next day's rations. He asserted that the Anny was 
issuing 25,000 rations daily and most of those to men not "enured to the 
hardships of the field." He feared that a failure of two days' supplies 
would lead to consequences which the Commander-in-Chief might not be 
able to prevent. Thus Blaine implored the states to comply with their 
52 
requisitions punctually. 
Less than two weeks later General Washington shocked not only 
SOJ. Jones to Madison, Nov. 10, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, p. 168. 
SlJCC, Vol. XVIII, p. 1159. 
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Con~~ress but the states as well when he announced that the Army had been 
without meat from August 21 through 26 and had but one day's supply of 
flour left. Having nowhere else to turn, he informed Congress that he 
had stripped the country-side of all available provisions. But he also 
asserted: "Military coercion is no longer of any avail, as nothing can 
possibly be collected from the Country in which we are obliged to take 
a position, without depriving the inhabitants of the last morsel." 
Even if such methods would work, he warned "that during the few days 
which we have been obliged to send out stnall parties to procure provi-
sions for themselves, the most enormous excesses have been conunitted." 
He advised: "It has been no inconsiderable support of our cause to 
have had in our power to contrast the conduct of our Army with that of 
the enemy, and to convince the inhabitants that while their rights were 
wantonly violated by the British troops by ours they were respected." 
He warned, however: "This distinction must unhappily now ce2.se and we 
must assume the odious character of the plunderers instead of the pro-
tectors of the people, 1153 
Upon receipt of this message Congress was filled with despair. 
Ezekiel Cornell, writing to Governor Greene, declared that Congress no 
longer talked of offensive operations but only of how to keep the Army 
together. Reporting the sense of the delegates, he declared: "The 
Army now lives principally by plunder, both for meat and forage, and 
will, if they keep together I fear, soon become free-boaters. And I 
53 . 7 Circular Letter to the States, Aug. 27, 1780, PCC, Rl J, Item 
152, Vol. IX, pp. 143-145. Printed copy in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 
The Writings £i_ George Washington (Washington,'1931-1934), Vol. 19, 
pp. 449-451. Hereinafter, WW 
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think every man must feel for the inhabitants where the army marches." 
Finally reacting to the distress of the Army, Congress, on September 15 
requisitioned a total of 1,000 head of cattle per week from three New 
Ertgland ~t<".l.tes. New Hampshire was required to deliver 76 head, Massa-
chusetts 386, and Connecticut 539. In addition, three states were re-
quested to deliver 2056 head immediately, New Jersey 275, Pennsylvania 
55 
1,251, and Delaware 530. In his letter transmitting the resolves to 
the states concerned, President Huntington noted that it had been neces-
sitated because the Army had gone entirely without meat at different 
times for several days at a time. If the states failed, he declared, 
"it is more than probable the Army must disband, or supply themselves 
at the point of the Bayonet and the most fatal consequences must ensue. 
We have no other resource left. 1156 
As with the other requisitions of Congress, however, the quotas of 
beef would not be fully supplied, mainly because the states themselves 
found it impossible to do so. Rather angrily, Governor Trumbull of 
Connecticut complained that Congress had passed its requisition so late 
that the state could not meet its quota, though it would try. He in-
structed Congress that most of the pork and beef had already gone to 
market. Therefore they could not be acquired unless the state bought 
them from engrossers. Pointing out that no salted provisions could be 
purchased because the season for them had passed as well, Trumbull 
54 Cornell to Governor Greene, Sept. 10, 1780, RICC, p. 312. 
55JcC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 828-829. 
56s. Huntington to Trumbull, Sept. 15, 1780, PCC, R24, Item 15, 
pp. 103-104. 
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heatedly asked, "is it impossible for Congrss to ~ake their Estimate 
of Requisitions on this Head in the proper season?--if it is not--I 
57 think the Neglect is almost unpardonable." 
By October, 1780, the condition of the Army and of the several 
states was perhaps more desperate than it had been at the beginning of 
the year. Summing up the situation in a letter to President Huntington, 
Commissary Blaine declared: 
Your Magazines are now destitute of Flour, Bread, Beef, 
Pork, Fish, Salt, Rum and none upon the continent to my know-
ledge can furnish one days Supply. The States of New Hamp-
shire and Massachusetts bay are our principal dependence for 
Beef, the French being stationed at Rhode Island has deprived 
the Agent of that State from giving any Assistance; indeed he 
is hard put to it, to find the continental troops on that 
station & the State officers of Connecticut told his Excel-
lency Genl. Washington at Hartford that lit[tle] could be 
expected from that State. I have no relief from the State 
of New York for the main [army] they have not been able to 
furnish their frontier [posts] with beef. I have had fre-
quent applications for supplies and they have actually had 
two or three hundred head of Cattle from the Com[ittee] of 
Massachusetts bay. Jersey can furnish but little Beef and 
not a large quantity of flour. their quota of supplies must 
be furnished between this and the first of J[anuary?] I 
believe there is not above one quarter of the[ir supply] of 
meat due. Pennsylvania as yet have delivered very little 
flour, no salt nor do I know of their having any Cattle. 
• . • All the Garrisons and posts in the middle department 
are destitute of provisions, and no means in my power of 
relieving them.58 
By late sunnner many of the states themselves recognized that better 
interstate cooperation outside Congress had to be established if the 
Revolution was not to fail. Their solution was that which they had 
employed in 1779--a convention.of states to discuss specific mutual 
57 Trumbull to S. Huntington, Nov. 27, 1780, PCC, R80, Item 66, Vol. 
II, pp. 119-120. 
58Blaine to S. Huntington, Oct. 17, 1780, MA, Vol. XLV, pp. 150-151. 
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problems. The first of these meetings, held at Boston in early August, 
was attended by delegates from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con-
necticut. The specific purpose of the convention was to discuss how 
the states could comply more fully with the requisitions of Congress. 
Among the proposals the members of the convention presented to their 
respective legislatures were that purchasers of supplies in each state 
should coordinate their efforts at least once a month; that Congress 
and the states.should give military officers the power to prevent pro-
fiteering; that the states discontinue the embargoes between states; 
that states inunediately support the new bills of credit; and that the 
states refrain from printing any more paper currency. The convention 
also voted to send copies of its proceedings to New York and Rhode Is-
land and to call for another meeting to be held in Hartford, Connecti-
cut, in November. 59 
As previously discussed, however, by the time this second conven-
tion met the country appeared more than ever on the brink.of ruin, 
having suffered a triple blow: the defeat of Gates at Camden, the near 
collapse of the requisition system and Arnold's defection. Thus the 
suggestions of the Hartford convention were much more pointed. Attended 
by the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, and New York, the convention first tried to stir the states to 
raise the quota of troops required by Congress and the Conunander-in-
Chief as soon as possible. It urged the states to comply punctually 
with the requisitions of Congress for money and provisions and 
59 . 
Proceedings of Convention of Committees ... At Boston, Aug. 3, 
1780, PCC, R80, Item 66, Vol. 2, pp. 79-89. 
116 
requested that Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut impress enough 
teams and wagons to deliver a supply of clothing to the Army which had 
been stored at Springfield. It also demanded that all the states pres-
ent comply immediately with the resolution of March 18. The convention 
then suggested two things which would make congressional administration 
effective. First, the states should authorize Congress to tax imports #I 
for the sole purpose of paying the public debt. Second, all states 
should be required to make returns to Congress of their populations 
whether white or black so that Congress could apportion taxes among the 
60 
states more equitably. But the recommendation of the convention ;fl- ;2- -¥;· 
which attracted the most immediate attention was one which declared: 
"That the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the United States be Author-
ized and Impowered to take such measures as he may deem proper and the 
public s.ervice may render necessary to induce the several States to a 
punctual Compliance with the Requisitions which have been or may be 
made by Congress for Supplies for the years 1780 and 1781. 1161 
This suggestion, though offensive to Republican principles, had 
long been considered under the surface of public affairs. In some quar-
ters a belief persisted throughout the Revolution that Republican gov-
ernment was not energetic enough to prosecute effectively a large scale 
war of long duration. In theory such a government could only survive 
if it raised a Republican dictator who would coordinate the war effort 
and then retire after the crisis had passed. Under the pressure of the 
60rroceedings of the Convention of Committees at Hartford, Nov. 11, 
1780, Read Dec. 12, 1780, PCC, R40, Item 33, pp. 391-408. Printed copy 
in PTJ, Vol. 4, pp. 138-14~ 
61 rbid. , p. 405. 
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events of 1780 these beliefs reemerged to be debated openly in the 
public councils. 
As early as June, 1780, Ezekiel Cornell had noted: "The different 
policy of the several states, and too many of them turning all their 
views to their own advantage without consulting the common good, cause 
some able politicians to think that our political salvation depends in 
good measure, on a controlling power over the whole being lodged in 
some person or persons." He believed that Congress would consider the 
iden soon "as the Union is too much dissolved in some of our sister 
62 
states." By August 1 Cornell wrote: "The necessity of appointing 
Gen. Washington sole dictator of America is again talked of, as the 
only means, under God by which we can be saved from destruction." The 
reasoning advanced by those who made such suggestions, he asserted, 
had been the "peqple will not work for the Continent without money, nor 
trust her for any articles wanted for the army. Therefore they must be 
supported by the force of military law, or disband until the new bills 
are put into circulation, ,,63 
One of those who supported such a position was Josiah Quincy, a 
wealthy -8oston merchant. He believed that Congress had erred from the 
onset of the war by printing paper money and by separating the civil 
and military branches. Writing to General Washington, he declared that 
the only way to salvage the country was to reverse almost every public 
policy initiated since the onset of the war. "Instead of a C-----s 
became despicable, for want of power sufficient ..!:£..do right, or odious 
62 
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by exercising an assumed power beyond right, had both the civil and 
military department been united in one and the same person during the 
64 
war," it was more than probable that the war would already have ended. 
The suggestion of the Hartford convetion that Washington be given 
dictatorial powers therefore came as no surprise to the delegates of 
Congress. Nevertheless, many delegates refused to belie'Je that Republi-
can government was so fragile, and their reaction to the proposal was 
inrrnediate and generally adverse. Referring to the movement, James 
LovPll reported: "We must have money at all adventures. Nothing else 
is wanting to raise us again into Reputation and prevent stupid plans 
of creating absolute Dictators to get supplies without paying for 
them. 1165 James Wa;rren, discussing the Hartford convention in a letter 
to Samuel Adams, argued that the reconnnendation to give the military 
power to furnish money and supplies for the Army "at the point of a 
Bayonet" must have been done without observing history. "General Wash-
ingt:on is a good and a Great Man. I love and Reverence him. But he 
is only a Man and therefore should not be vested with such powers" pri-
marily because "we do not know that his successors will be either Great 
or Cood. · much less can we tell what Influence this precedent may have 
66 
half a Century hence." John Witherspoon reported the resolution to 
Governor Livingston of New Jersey underlining the word "induce." While 
he had a high opinion of General Washington, he refused to grant him 
641 · h Q · u h" N 27 1780 CAR V 1 I osia uincy to was ington, ov. , , ~·-•, o . I I, pp. 
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65 James Lovell to Samuel Holten, Sept. 15, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 
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such power unless specifically authorized by New Jersey to do so but 
67 
warned, "perhaps not ~then." 
119 
Other delegates, though perhaps disapproving of dictatorship, saw 
the need for increasing the powers of Congress. John Sullivan, writing 
to President Weare of New Hampshire, observed that the Confederation 
was not in force and argued that even if it were completed it "would be 
found weak and perhaps far from answering the Designs." Among the na-
tion's problems he noted the empty treasury, the Continent's low credit, 
the deranged financial situation, and the reluctance of the people to 
accPpt any of Congress' money. Pinpointing the cause, he declared that 
"particular States and even among those who have acceded to the Confed-
erat:ion will comply with or Reject the Requisitions of Congress as their 
own opinion or Interest seem to Direct. Congress of Course become a 
Body without power and the States the Several Component parts of a 
Monster with Thirteen heads." He saw only one way to solve the problems 
and that was to call a convention of all the states and have them "De-
clare what powers Congress is to possess and to vest them with authority 
to use Coercive measures with those States which Refuse to Comply with 
bl . . . ,,68 reasona e requisitions. 
Unlike Sullivan, several other delegates believed that strengthen-
ing congressional authority had to be preceded by ratification of the 
ArtLcles of Confederation. As early as May, James Duane of New York 
was making another attempt to achieve ratification, since he believed 
67 h · h G f 16 1780 Jo n Wit erspoon to overnor o New Jersey, Dec. , , LMC, 
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that the completion of the Union would compensate for "the temporary 
Loss of any City on the Continent. 1169 Maryland, however, remained un-
convinced thus leading the members of the convention at Boston to rec-
onmwnd in August that the Confederation should be formed nbw "with the 
states who want to join in order to set the government on a firm foot-
ing. 1170 By September, anticipating his state's resolution, Duane was 
pleased to inform General Washington "that the Legislature of New York 
have fallen in with the view of the eastern Convention, and particularly 
to strengthen the hands of Congress, and enable them to enforce their 
dec:Lsions. 1171 The resolution of the state legislature soon followed. 
It voted unanimously, that the New York delegates should declare in 
Congress "that it is the earnest wish of this State that Congress should 
durLng the war, or until a perpetual Confederation shall be completed, 
exercise every power which they may deem necessary for an effectual 
72 
prosecution of the war." 
Other states and individuals also began to make suggestions to 
strengthen congressional authority. Many of their ideas presaged not 
only the controversies that would become prominent during the war but 
throughout the Confederation period as well. James Bowdoin, President 
of the Massachusetts Council, made three recommendations. First, the 
Confederation should be completed and the powers of Congress increased. 
69 
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Second, Congress should urge the states to enlist men for the war or 
for three years. Finally, as experience had shown "that by calling on 
the several States whose Assemblies are composed of a great number of 
Persons who must deliberate upon every measure & consequently must be 
very slow in their final Determination for the Specific Articles that 
are wanted," Bowdoin argued that the states should greatly simplify 
matters by permitting Congress to require the states to give money and 
h h . . 73 men rat er t an provisions. 
Colonel Tench Tilghman, an aide-de-camp to General Washington, 
writing to Robert Morris argued for the establishment of a permanent 
well paid Army. He believed that the people had grown tired of the war 
because it had lasted longer than they were led to expect. The length 
of the war, he believed, had been extended because when money was readi-
ly available, it had been lavished upon temporary enlistees whose entire 
terms of service had been spent "in marching to and from the army, and 
in their way devouring like locusts all before them." He argued that 
the enemy had taken advantage of this fact and in the last year had 
left "a puny Garrison in New York," made themselves "master of two 
Southern States" and returned before the levies were in the field. He 
declared that only two things would save the country: "A sufficient 
74 permanent army and a foreign loan in aid of our revenues." 
J~mes Duane believed that the situation could be salvaged, but he 
was not sure whether the population had "spirit to apply it." He 
73 
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asserted that the "opulent" should surrender a part of their plate and 
the farmer should "break in upon his capital." He argued that these 
"resources are in the power of every Legislature: and I shall think 
them inexcusable, if seeing the necessity to be so urgent they shrink 
from the burden." He also noted that Congress would ask for a duty on 
imports and prizes and, if the states would only comply, such a tax 
would produce a considerable revenue. 75 
Jesse Root of Connecticut asserted that Congress must have coer-
cive power if the states were to be saved. He observed: "The system 
of government over these States as at present exercised is extremely 
deficient. The sovereign power of war & peace, having no permanent 
funds in its possession, nor the means for establishing any, must feel 
itself very weak. . . . " Frustrated because any single state could 
defeat the most important measure, he lectured that the union of the 
thirteen states "constitutes a republic of States or political persons, 
of which great republic each State constitutes one member or s.ubject 
over which Congress is .appointed to preside, and it is necessary that 
Congress should exercise the power of coercion over the particular 
States for the general purpose of the Confederacy, . II But he also 
asserted that "this power is so far from infringing upon the rights or 
sovereignty of the particular States that it is as necessary for the 
preservation of these as the Union itself. ,,7 6 
Despite the rhetoric and the suggestions, Congress in the last 
75Duane to Washington, Dec. 9, 1780, CAR, Vol. III, pp; 169-173. 
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months of 1780 still faced an almost insoluble financial problem. 
Finding a solution was complicated by an apparently growing belief that 
the country could be salvaged through foreign loans. Congress tried to 
disabuse its constituents of this unreasonable and dangerous dependence. 
Writing to Governor Trumbull, the Connecticut delegates argued that the 
current expenses of the war did not exceed by much the nation's annual 
ex.ports in time of peace. Consequently the resources of the country, 
if managed properly, could 11be so applied as to prevent an inormous 
national debt to foreigners, who may hereafter claim the honor and merit 
of our whole salvation as due to them and surprize us with unexpected 
77 demands." In November, President Huntington was more direct: "An 
opinion seems to prevail, that foreign loans can be obtained; and we 
perceive with regret that some are disposed to place too great a reli-
ance on this resource." He noted that every effort was being made to 
obtain a loan "but without sufficient success to justify a relaxation 
f . . ,,78 o our own most vigorous exertions. 
Meanwhile, having abandoned the plans for a campaign in 1780, Con-
gress sought some way to support one for the following year. Its de·-
cision was finally reached on November 11. Under the resolution of that 
date, Congress apportioned quotas amongst the states amounting to 
$6,000,000, which could be paid in silver and gold or in the bills of 
credit issued under the resolution of March 18, and in the specific 
77The Connecticut Delegates to the Governor of Connecticut, Aug. 22, 
1780, LMC, Vol. V, p. 341. 
l 8c' 1 L . th S N 19 17 80 JCC V 1 XVII ircu ar etter to e tates, ov. , , __ , o . I, 
pp. 1038-1040. 
124 
articles enumerated by the resolution. 79 James Madison, commenting 
upon the plan, declared that it would work if the states lived up to 
thejr obligations and also if they would discontinue issuing their own 
currency. From past experience, however, he did not believe it would 
be effective because: "The collection & transportation of specific 
supp[lies] must necessarily be tedious & subject to casualties; & the 
proceedings of 13 separate popular bodies, must add greatly to the un-
certainty & delay." Complaining of Congress' lack of money he declared: 
"What other States affect by Money, we are Obliged to pursue by dila-
tory & undigested expedients, which benumb all our operations and expose 
our troops to numberless distresses. 1180 
The solutions for supplying the Army did not work, and the condi-
tion of the soldiery became worse. This became alarmingly apparent as 
the year 1780 closed, and the new year of 1781 opened. On January 5, 
1781, General Washington wrote to several states of an event of which 
Congress had been aware for three days. To the states of Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire the General announced: 
"It is with extreme anxiety and pain of mind, I find myself constrained 
to Lnform you~ Excellency, that the event, I have long apprehended would 
be the consequences of the complicated distress of the Army has at 
length taken place. On the night of the 1st instant a mutiny was ex-
cited by the non Connn[issioned] officers and privates of the Pennsylvan-
ia Line which soon became so universal as to defy all opposition in 
attempting to quell this tumult." He then described its causes as the 
79JCC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1011-1018. 
80Madison to Pendleton, Nov. 7, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, p. 166. 
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results of the soldiers suffering from want of provisions and from lack 
of pay for nearly twelve months and declared that he needed immediately 
enough money to give the rest of the soldiers at least three months 
back pay and adequate clothing for each line. 81 
Thus the year 1780 closed much more inauspiciously than it had 
begun. Congress' second attempt to establish the country's finances 
had all but failed. Increasing inflation and British military opera-
tions multiplied the difficulties of each state, which were reflected 
by the inability of the states to comply with congressional requisitions 
and by a growing irritation among the states not only with Congress but 
with each other as well. Militarily the year was a disastrous tale of 
r:: 
def(~at, defection, desertion, rout, and finally, mutiny. Washington 
and his troops hung on, under-supplied, under-clothed, and under-paid. 
Unable to organize acampaign for 1780, Congress also hung on. But by 
the end of the year its authority and consequent ability to direct the 
nation's war effort had been thoroughly tested and found wanting. Thus 
a movement was slowly generating, both inside and outside of Congress, 
to :>trengthen congressional authority by removing it in some measure 
from its dependence upon the consent of state governments. Much of the 
story of the remaining. war years would involve these attempts and their 
ultimate failure. 
81circular to the Governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachu-
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ATTEMPTING REFORM, 1781 
The news which reached Congress concerning the revolt of the Penn-
sylvania Line in January, 1781, merely punctuated the failure of Con-
gress' financial program of the previous year. Believing that the near 
coLLapse of the war effort in late 1780 had been caused in part by the 
weakening lines of authority between Congress and the states, the dele-
gates of Congress worked furiously in the first few months of 1781, 
attempting to reestablish both central control and financial stability. 
Slowly plans matured to complete the Confederation and to design a new 
financial program. The new fiscal structure included several important 
innovations. First, Congress tried to gain an independent income by 
asking the states to permit it to collect an impost on imports and prize 
goods. Second, Congress established the office of Superintendent of 
Finance in order to centralize and coordinate the states' financial 
efforts and appointed Robert Morris to the post. Third, Congress at-
tempted to continue to implement its resolution of March 18, 1780, and 
to call in the old Continental bills of credit. Finally, Congress 
tried once again to end all state emissions of currency. 
As in 1780, the congressional efforts of 1781 would fail. The 
states were reluctant to grant Congress additional powers for a variety 
of Leasons. Most of these reasons hinged upon fears within the states 
of a national power which would impinge upon their own sovereignties. 
126 
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Conunercial states also objected to the impost because they believed 
that they would bear the burden of taxes for the entire nation. In 
addition, two events in 1781 insured that the other facts of Congress' 
program would also fail. The first was the final.collapse of the old 
Continental bills of credit in May, 1781. The second was the invasion 
of Virginia by the British forces under the command of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Earl Charles Cornwallis. 
As 1781 opened, however, the innnediate goal of Congress was to 
solve the problems that had led the Pennsylvania Line to mutiny. Upon 
being informed of the revolt, President Reed of Pennsylvania immediately 
dispatched a committee to negotiate with the mutineers, to investigate 
their complaints, and to suggest remedies. 1 The revolt particularly 
frightened Congress because the mutineers marched to Princeton, New .Jer-
sey, and Congress was not sure if the line intended to march en masse 
inside British lines. Consequently, Congress also sent its own commit-
tee to Princeton. In its final report the congressional committee sum-
marLzed the negotiations which had occurred between President. Reed and 
the mutineers. In defense of the soldiers the committee noted that 
both President Reed and the inhabitants of Princeton had been treated 
with respect. It also observed that the mutineers had declared that if 
the British attempted to take advantage of the situation the Line would 
join with the New Jersey militia in repulsing them and that the muti-
neers had even surrendered two British emissaries, who had come among 
them, to President Reed. The conunittee argued that the soldiers had 
1For.the details of Pennsylvania's negotiations with the mutineers 
see "Diary of the Mutiny," PA, 2nd Ser., Vol. XI, pp. 631-674. 
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mutinied because of a lack of pay and provisions and because of unclear 
terms of enlistment. It urged "that Every State in the Union should be 
requested to pay the strictest attention to supplying the wants of the 
2 Army." 
Meanwhile, even before the committee's final report, Congress moved 
to satisfy the complaints of the soldiers. On January 15 President 
Huntington sent a circular letter to seven northern states requesting 
$879,342 to pay those states' lines of the Army. It requested that half 
this amount, in specie value, be sent immediately and the other half 
paid by April 1. 3 In addition, disseminating letters it had received 
from Ephraim Blaine, the Commissary General of Purchases, Congress urged 
the states to ease the distress of the Army by immediately complying 
witl1 the previous requisitions of Congress for provisions. 4 
There were some who believed that the mutiny might prove beneficial 
to the nation. Writing to General Washington, Philip Schuyler of New 
York declared: "It was an awful lesson to the States." But he ob-
served that "the event would be happy to America" if the states were 
aroused to greater exertions and if the states would surrender so much 
of their sovereignty "as would enable the governing power to draw forth 
the strength and resources of the country, ... " He warned, however, 
that if the means were not found to subsist the Army adequately in the 
2JCC, Vol. XIX, pp. 79-83. 
3s. Huntington, Circular, Jan. 15, 1781, FCC, R24, Item 15, pp. 
214-217; and JCC, Vol. XIX, pp. 58-61. 
4Ephraim Blaine to S. Huntington, Jan. 19; 1781, enclosed in S. 
Huntington to Clinton, PGC, Vol. 6, pp. 599-600. 
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5 future, the cause would be lost. James Duane, also writing to General 
Washington, observed: "The day has at last arrived when dangers and 
distress have opened the Eyes of the People and they perceive the Want 
of a common head to draw forth in some Just proportions the Resources 
of the several Branches of the federal Union." Noting that the past 
penchant of the states to put their needs before those of Congress 
"must terminate in the connnon Ruin," he asserted that "the Legislatures, 
however reluctantly, must resign a portion of their Authority to the 
national Representatives, or cease to be Legislatures. 116 
While the mutiny itself generated no new plans in Congress, it did 
give its measures a greater urgency. The two most important actions 
performed by Congress in February and March, 1781, had origins in the 
frustrating year of 1780. These efforts included both the completion 
of the Confederation and attempts to institute still another system of 
finance based on amending that document. As noted previously, the 
reason the Confederation had remained incomplete was that Maryland ob-
jected to Virginia's maintaining its claims to the western territories. 
On .January 2, however, the Virginia Assembly removed this block by re-
linquishing its claims to the territory northwest of the Ohio River if 
Congress would meet certain conditions. 7 Responding to Virginia's ces-
1 
sion and to pressures by Count Luzerne, the French minister, Maryland, 
5 
Schuyler to Washington, Jan. 21, 1781, CAR, Vol. III, pp. 212-
213. 
6 
Duane to Washington, Jan. 29, 1781, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 551-553. 
7Resolution of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
for a Cession of Western Territory, Jan. 2, 1781, FCC, R88, Item 75, 
pp. 355-358. 
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on February 12, agreed to ratify the Articles of Confederation. 8 
The final ratification of the Articles on March 1, 1781, engendered 
inunediate hopes that the war effort would be revitalized. Theodorick 
Bland of Virginia commented: "Congress seems at this time more Unani-
mous, and less torn by factions than (from the best Information I can 
obtain from the Oldest Members) it has ever been since its first meet-
ing.119 John Mathews noted that the ratification had suspended for a 
time the functioning of Congress while it adjusted itself to its "new 
gears," but that now it was again entered on business. He hoped that 
the new constitution would introduce "a more clear and perfect urtder-
standing between Congress and the States," and observed: "The want 
hitherto of a proper line to be drawn between Congress and the states 
has been the cause of numberless embarrassments, My .expectations 
are highly flattered ••. and anticip~te, in my own mind, the most 
happy consequences resulting from it." Thomas Rodney likewise noted 
that in the past the system of government as it operated under Congress 
had led to delay and to the adoption of one expedient after another. 
He believed, however, that "now that the respective powers of Congress 
and the States are prescribed and worked out," improvements would soon 
b . 11 eg.Ln. 
Although some delegates recognized that the powers of Congress 
8~, Vol. I, pp. 428-431. 
9Theodorick Bland to Richard Henry Lee, Mar. 5, 1781, LMC, Vol. 
VI, p. 7. 
10 Mathews to the Governor of New Jersey, Mar. 6 (?), 1781, LMC, 
Vol. VI, p. 15. 
11 Thomas Rodney, Diary, Mar. 10, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 21. 
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under the Confederation were limited, they believed that once ratified 
the powers of government either could be expanded within the framework 
of the Articles, or better still, under the temporary unity which rati-
fication produced, the Articles could be strengthened through amend-
ments. John Mathews declared: "Though the powers of the Confederation 
are very inadequate to vigorous prosecution of the present war, yet we 
must endeavor to make the most of them we can; and it is better to have 
some authority to regulate us, then (as for some time past has been the 
12 case) have none." James Duane vowed: "We shall not fail of taking 
advantage of the favorable Temper of the States and recommending for 
ratification such additional Articles as will give vigour and authority 
13 
to Covernment." 
The high hopes of the optimists, however, were almost immediately 
dashed as Congress struggled to adjust itself to the new mode of con-
ducting business and as those who recognized the inadequacies of the 
ArtLcles moved, perhaps too soon, to strengthen them. Prior to ratifi-
catlon Congress had overlooked some of the requirements for conducting 
congressional business. With the Articles now binding, Congress was 
forc:ed to implement these provisions which .made the conduct of congres-
sional business more difficult. For example, anticipating the ratifi-
cation, James Varnum of Rhode Island and John Sullivan of New Hampshire 
had written their respective states in January requesting that addi-· 
tional representatives be sent to Congress, because under the Confeder-
ation each state was required to have at least two members present in 
12Mathews to Washington, Jan. 30, 1781, CAR, Vol. III, p. 219. 
13nuane to Washington, Jan. 29, 1781, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 551-553. 
132 
14 
order for the state to be represented. Their states did not respond, 
and thus the two men petitioned Congress to appoint a Conunittee of the 
States to conduct business until such time as their states were fully 
represented. Congress denied their request but voted to permit the 
members from the two states to sit in Congress, serve on committees, 
15 and participate in debate, but not to vote. The difficulty of main-
taining a two-man delegation from each state would lead to increasing 
delays in congressional business in the future. The Articles also de-
clared that delegates could serve only three years of every six. As 
some of the members had served in Congress since the onset of the Revo-
lution, there was some debate as to whether they could continue to do 
so. On this issue Congress decided that the terms of service for its 
16 members began upon ratification and not before. 
A much more serious conflict arose over the questions of how many 
states now constituted a quorum for doing business and how many states 
were necessary to make decisions. Oliver Wolcott, James Madison, James 
Lovell, Jesse Root, John Witherspoon, and Thomas HcKean argued that 
since it took nine states to set certain policies, then nine states 
must constitute a quorum. Therefore only the votes of five states were 
necessary to make other decisions. Their assertions were strenuously 
opposed by Thomas Rodney and Thomas Burke. Rodney observed that "much 
fine reasoning and Sophistry 11 were used by the proponents of the motion 
14sullivan to the Governor of New Hampshire, Jan. 29, 1781; and 
James M. Varnum to the Governor of Rhode Island, Jan. 29, 1781, LMC, 
Vol. V, p. 549. 
15Thomas Rodney, Diary, Mar. 2-3, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 3-4. 
16 Ibid. 
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and he ''was sorry to see such a Keen Struggle to increase the power of 
Congress beyond what the States Intended so early as but the third day 
aftL~r Completing the Confederation." Burke agreed with Rodney and ar-
gued that if Congress attempted "so early to Claim powers that were not 
expressly given by that Charter or began to pervert it to increas[e] 
their power they would give a dreadful alarm to the Constituents who are 
jealous of their liberty." Rodney and Burke, in essence, won the debate 
since on March 6 Congress decided that nine states constituted a quorum 
17 
but that no measure could be passed unless agreed to by seven states. 
Some members also believed congressional business could be conduct-
ed more efficiently and effectively if Congress could discipline its 
members by compelling the attendance of delegates and by enforcing rules 
of secrecy. Consequently, James Varnum of Rhode Island urged Congress 
to appoint a committee "to Draw up a Code of Laws giving Congress full 
power to punish all their own officers." vfuile this motion was opposed 
at first, Congress finally agreed to appoint such a committee and to 
reserve debate until it reported. 18 
The specious arguments used by those who wanted to increase con-
gressional authority, especially the arguments over quorums and votes, 
natur?lly alerted the suspicions of those, like Rodney and Burke, who 
were more jealous of their states' sovereignties. Perhaps this was one 
reason why more reasonable requests for expanding congressional authori-
ty were de.nied. One such rejected suggestion, made by both Governor 
George Clinton of New York and the Virginia delegates, was to give 
17Thomas Rodney, Diary, Mar. 5-6, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 8-9. 
181bid. 
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Congress some method to coerce the states into complying with congres-
sional resolutions. Their attempts appear clumsy in the light of more 
modern, sophisticated standards of governmental coercion, but with no 
direct relationship between Congress and the people, the only way to 
use force consistent with the relationships established by the Articles 
was to apply it directly to the recalcitrant states. 
Within this context, Governor Clinton wrote to Congress in February 
and enclosed a long history of New York's problems throughout the war. 
Believing that his state had done much more than any other, he demanded 
that Congress exercise a supreme coercive power to force other states to 
1 . h . 1 1 . ' 19 comp y wit congressiona reso utions. Likewise, James Madison was 
operating within this relationship when he argued that the Articles 
carried an implied power to enforce congressional decisions upon the 
states, but that no specific provision had been made to enforce the 
ArtLcles. Therefore, he offered an amendment, which he believed would 
"cement & invigorate the federal Union." This amendment, to be added 
to Article Thirteen, declared that if any of the states refused to com-
ply with acts of Congress it would be "fully authorized to employ the 
I 
I 
force of the United States as well as by sea as by land to compel such 
State or States to fulfill their engagements .. " The manner in 
which the force was to be implemented was to employ both a land and sea 
blockade upon recalcitrant states until "full compensation or compli-
ance be obtained with respect to all Requisitions made by the United 
19clinton to S. Huntington, Feb. 5, 1781, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. 
II, pp. 344-361. 
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States in Congress assembled. 
( ' 
. "~~/ 
Justifying the amendment to Governor Jefferson, Madison asserted 
that he was motivated by "the shameful deficiency of some of the States 
which are most capable of yielding their apportioned supplies, and the 
military exactions to which others already exhausted by the enemy and 
our own troops are in consequence exposed. ·Without such powers too in 
the general government, the whole confederacy may be insulted and the 
most salutary measures frustrated by the most inconsiderable States in 
the Union." Using Delaware as the example, he asserted: "At a time 
when all the other States were submitting to the loss and inconveniency 
of·an embargo on their exports, Delaware absolutely declined coming into 
the measure, and not only defeated the general object of it, but en-
riched herself at the expense of those who did their duty. 1121 Madison's 
colleague, Joseph Jones, added that the amendment should be passed 
"while the Temper of the States from recent experience of the want of 
competen,t Powers of Congress for the purposes of War disposes them to 
do so. 1122 
The only amendment on which Congress would agree, however, related 
"'' to finances and was passed by Congress and submitted to the states even 
before the Articles themselves were ratified. In 1780 Congress had re-
lied solely upon the states' implementing taxes to support its resolu-
tion of March 18 and to supply requisitions. The money and provisions 
20 . 
Proposed Amendment of Articles of Confederation, Mar. 12, 1781, 
PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 17-19. 
() 
21 . 
Madison to Jefferson, Apr. 16, 1781, PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 71-72. 
22 





derived from that dependence had obviously been inadequate as the mutiny 
in .lanuary, 1781, had proved. One of the reasons for the failure had 
been that states were slow in passing necessary legislation; Delaware 
did not even comply with the resolution of Harch 18 until February, 
1781. 23 Atnong those states which did adopt the resolution, many had set 
rates of exchange which differed markedly from state to state, creating 
further confusion. For example, Oliver Wolcott notified Governor Trum-
bull that Pennsylvania had recently set its ratio at 75 to one while 
Maryland, which had originally set its ratio at 33 1/3 to one, had only 
24 
adjusted its ratio to forty to one. Wolcott and his colleague, Jesse 
Root, argued that the only way order could be restored would be to give 
Congress a superintending power over the nation's finances. Failing 
that, Congress at least should be given a permanent source of income to 
supplement the taxes of the states. 25 
Methods for supplying Congress with a permanent fund, as previously 
mentioned, had been discussed throughout the latter months of 1780. The 
one which finally gained ascendency had been that of an impost. On Feb-
ruary 3, 1780, Congress reached its decision requesting the states to 
permit Congress to collect a duty of five percent on all imports and a 
tax o~ five percent on all prize goods brought into American ports for 
sale.~ As this was considered an amend:ment rather than a revenue 
23c. Rodney to S. Huntington, Feb. 15, 1781, LCR, p. 397. 
24 Wolcott to Trumbull, Jan. 9, 1781, MRS, 7th Ser., Vol. III, 
pp. 184-185. 
25wolcott to Root to Trumbu1'1, Jan. 16, 1781, MHS, 7th Ser., Vol. 
III, pp. 187-188. 
,.,.--) 
~cc, Vol. XIX, pp. 112-113. 
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measure and thus required ratification by all thirteen states, Congress 
was placed in a new constitutional quandary. Because of Britain's in-
vasion of the Southern states many of the legislatures could not meet 
and therefore could not ratify the impost. But desperately needing the 
revenues, Congress ignored the amendment provisions of the Articles and 
on the seventh voted that the impost would go into effect when all the 
state legislatures which could meet had agreed to the resolution. For 
those states whose legislatures could not meet, Congress guaranteed 
that all revenue derived from the impost would be used to discharge the 
pubJic debts in their states as well. 27 
Proceeding further with its program, on March 16, 1781, Congress 
acted upon another recommendation of late 1780 by passing a new tax on 
the states, but for money only. The amount of this tax was $6,000,000 
to be paid in at the rate of $1,500,000 quarterly. The first payment 
was to be made by June 1. In addition, hoping to salvage a part of its 
financial program of 1780, Congress provided that this new tax could be 
paicl in the bills of credit issued pursuant to the resolution of March 
18, 1780. 28 A week later Congress apportioned the tax among the states 
and assured those states who believed they were being assessed more 
than their fair shares that they would be paid six percent interest per 
year on the excess at the final adjustment of accounts or credited with 
29 
that amount on a future tax. 
A third important element of Congress' new financial program was 
27 rbid., pp. 124-125. 
28rbid., p. 267. 
29 rbid., p. 299. 
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to centralize the nation's finances. Many delegates believed that what-. 
ever plan was decided upon, it stood little chance of success unless 
the number of boards and agencies authorized to disburse money were 
made responsible to one agency, preferably with a single head. In 
addition, such an agency could also better coordinate the efforts of 
the states, Consequently on February 7 Congress established the office 
f ' ' d f F. 30 o Superinten ent o inances. 
To forestall the possible reliance of some states upon foreign 
loans and thus pave the way for the acceptance of Congress' plan, the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Robert R. Livingston, wrote a circular 
letter to the states commenting upon the possibilities of foreign aid. 
He noted that while Britain had not triumphed over its European foes 
during the last campaign, neither had it been materially weakened. 
Thus the states should expect Britain to continue its efforts as strong-
ly as it had in the last campaign. He observed that the only enemy of 
Britain that was actually allied with the United States, and from whom 
~ 
the states might expect aid, was France. But, he asserted: "France 
assures us, that it is not in her Power to make us further grants of 
Money, Her Ministers repeat this to us in every Letter, in a tone that 
persuades us of their determination on that point; 11 The only so-
lutLon then, according to Livingston, was to rely solely upon the re-
sources of the several states. Therefore, he declared: "Every motive, 
then, national Honor, national interest, public Oeconomy, private ease, 
and that love of freedom which pervades every Legislature on the Conti-
nent, call loudly, not only for a compliance with the requisitions of 
301b1"d., 126 p. . 
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Congress, but for so early a compliance as to render it effectual. 1131 
This new plan of finances, however, was greeted as unenthusiasti-
cally as had been the plan of 1780. Writing to General Washington, 
John :Mathews observed that Congress had asked for $6,000,000 from the 
states and for a large foreign loan from France, bu.t he asserted that 
little could be expected from either quarter especially since the states 
were already $6,400,000 in specie in arrears to the Continent. He also 
argued that little reliance could be placed on the new money, for the 
three southern. states could not emit any of their quota, New York could 
do very little, and Pennsylvania was emitting state money instead of 
the new bills. Consequently, Congress could depend on no more than 
$2,000,000 from that source "and that comes in so slowly that it is of 
little use. 1132 He also gloomily predicted to Governor William Living-
ston of New Jersey that even if the states accepted the duty on imports 
and prizes, it would only bring in from $600,000 to $700,000 specie per 
year, while the interest on the nation's debts alone amounted to more 
33 than $2,000,0000 annually. 
Math~ws mentioned that Pennsylvania was issuing its own currency, 
but so too were other states, despite the resolution of Congress of the 
previous November which had requested them not to do so. New York in-
formed Congress in late March that it had no choice but to issue new 
31 Robert R. Livingston, Circular, Feb. 28, 1781, PGC, Vol. 6, pp. 
661-667. 
32 Mathews to Washington, Apr. 16, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 55-57. 
33 Mathews to the Governor of New Jersey, Jan. 29, 1781, LMC, Vol. 
v, pp. 550-551. 
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state bills. 34 New Jersey also continued to print paper money causing 
sotn('. of its citizens to complain in the New Jersey Gazette of "the mis-
chiefs produced by having two kinds of bills of credit [the state's 
issue and the old Continentals], of the same nominal but different cur-
rent values circulating among us at the same time. In the nature of 
things they must prejudice each other. 1135 Consequently, Congress was 
once again forced to resolve that all states repeal their legal tender 
laws for paper money of all kinds and to issue no more bills of credit 
upon their separate accounts. In addition, Congress urged the states 
to call out of circulation all the paper which they had issued as soon 
"bl 36 as possi e. 
Congress' financial program also faced serious difficulties in the 
states. The attempts in 1780 by some state governments to meet congres-
sional requisitions through coercion left some of their citizens. in a 
rebellious mood. Early in 1781 the New York legislature warned that 
little more could be expected from that state because 11for three years 
past almost the whole of the spare produce and labour of the State has 
been applied to the general Purposes of the Confederacy, and for which 
the Inhabitants have received inconsiderable Compensation except Certif-
icates intended originally to operate only as vouchers, • II Never-
theless the legislature had continued its exertions on behalf of the 
Continent, but "By our exertion, by a series of compulsory Laws and by 
34clinton to S. Huntington, Mar. 28, 1781, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. 
II, pp. 372-376. 
35NJA, 2nd Ser. , Vol. V, pp. 211-212. 
36JcC, Vol. XX, p. 501. 
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the use of the most rigorous Means to execute them, our Inhabitants 
feel themselves so aggrieved, that Prudence forbids any farther at-
tempts on their Patience, . 1137 Likewise, President Reed reported 
in May that his state could not even supply the requisitions of the pre-
vious November. The Assembly, reacting to the demands of its citizens, 
had left the Council with only two methods for obtaining provisions, 
neither of them very effective. He noted also that the laws through 
which the Council could requisition provisions by force had expired and 
38 
that the Assembly refused to renew them. 
Most states also experienced difficulty in meeting their quotas 
because of their own inefficient administrative organization. For 
example, President Reed reported in July, 1781, that, if Pennsylvania 
was to contribute further, it would probably take much internal reorga-
nization of the state to do so. He argued that Pennsylvania's backward-
ness in cash payments stemmed from two sources. First, the counties 
were too large for efficient administration. Second, the office of tax 
collector was elective rather than appointive. That this last was a 
problem, he declared, was apparent from the latest public accounts which 
demonstrated that "the Firmness & Vigour is wanting which the Nature of 
the Service demands." He charged that this was so because the people 
37New York Legislature to the New York Delegates, Jan. 17, 1781, 
PGC, Vol. VI, pp. 580-583. 
38The first of the methods left to the Council was to require the 
shippers of wheat to deliver at least a third of their flour to the state 
at the current market price. But the shippers could get specie instead 
of paper by exporting their flour through the 'ports of Delaware. The 
second was to issue paper money, but by May, 1781 people were generally 
refusing paper money. Reed to S. Huntington, May 22, 1781, PCC, R83, 
Item 69, Vol. II, pp. 385-386. --
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elected "Commissioners, Assessors, & c. whose principle Recommendation 
has been an Easiness, perhaps an Indolence of Disposition ... which 
gratifies itself at the Expense of the publick. 1139 
Such srowing internal resistance also made other states reluctant 
to comply with the impost. These states wanted to reserve such taxes 
for their own use, but more importantly, they believed the impost would 
weigh more heavily upon the commercial states than on those not so 
involved in trade. Jeremiah Powell, President of the Massachusetts 
Senate, wrote President Huntington that the legislature would not meet 
untU April, but he did not believe that the people would approve pass-
ing the resolution even then. He argued that the citizens of Massachu-
setts already believed that they were required to give out of proportion 
to what they actually owed to the Continent and that they were convinced 
the impost would cost them more as a commercial state than other states 
in the union. Consequently, he predicted that when the leGislature met 
it would not approve the resolution unless Congress consented to credit 
the duties to the Continental accounts of the states from which they 
40 were collected. 
Some non-commercial states apparently agreed with Powell's analy-
sis. In early April, 1781, Meshech Weare of New Hampshire transmitted 
to Congress an act complying with the request for the impost. At the 
same time he warned that New Hampshire probably would not be able to 
39 Reed to Morris, July 27, 1781, PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, pp. 310-
313. 
40Jeremiah Powell to S. Huntington, Mar. 10, 1781, PCC, R79, Item 
65, Vol. I, pp. 521-522. 
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pay its line of the Army. A week later he noted that he had received 
Congress' money request of March but observed that even if the legisla-
turc had been in session it could not have provided the money. He de-
clared that "People say it is not in their power to do it, if they were 
to sell their Lands, there would not be purchasers for them." He hoped 
that "the Several States will Authorize Congress to lay the duty Recom-
mended" as it would provide funds on which money might be borrowed. 
Otherwise, he declared, "it appears impracticable to carry on the war 
much Longer by the present mode of taxing. 1142 Obviously if the people 
of New Hampshire could not pay state taxes they could not pay a five 
percent tax on imports either. Thus, Weare, in essence, was attempting 
to shift New Hampshire's tax burden to the conunercial states. 
Nevertheless, Congress referred Powell's letter to a committee of 
three consisting of James Duane, Oliver Wolcott, and Samuel Adams. His 
objections were serious enough that Congress published the conunittee's 
repurt in the Journals, perhaps to forestall similar objections from 
other commercial states. The report began by explaining to Massachu-
setts that the impost had been passed out of necessity. It noted that 
previously taxes were to be apportioned according to the number of in-
habitants in each state, but despite congressional requests the states 
had failed to submit returns of population to Congress. The Articles of 
Confederation had also provided a means by which the states could be 
taxPd according to the amount of improved lands in each, but that method 
was impractical as long as the war continued. Therefore Congress had 
41 
Weare to S. Huntington, Apr. 10, 1781, PCC, R78, Item 64, p. 184. 
42 
Weare to S. Huntington, Apr. 17, 1781, PCC, R78, Item 64, p. 188. 
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resorted to the only method it could, and that had been apportionments 
based on estimated populations. If the people of Massachusetts believed 
that their state had paid more than their fair share of taxes, they 
should be made aware that in its money and provision requisitions Con-
gress had promised to make adjustments when the accounts were finally 
settled between Massachusetts and the United States. 
As for the commercial states bearing the burden of the proposed 
impost, the report noted: "When this duty was debated, it was taken for 
granted, on the general maxim, that it would ultimately be borne by the 
consumer." While it might appear at first that the tax rested most 
heavily upon the merchants, the report argued that the tax would be 
added to the price of the merchandise and thus would be actually paid 
by those who bought the products no matter where they resided. The 
final objection, that of crediting the states with the duties collected, 
the report declared to be patently unjust. The committee argued: "Sev-
era1 States, and in every part of the continent, import for their 
neighbors. It is reasonable that the duties on goods which the latter 
consume, should be applied to the exclusive benefit of the State which 
h h d th d t f h . . ?"43 as a e a van age o t e importation. Congress' arguments, how-
ever, were apparently not effective for Massachusetts delayed passage 
of the impost until 1782. 
Other states were also reluctant to surrender this source of reve-
nue to Congress. Consequently many delegates again assumed the role of 
national legislators by attempting to persuade their states to comply 
43Report of the Committee on the Representation of Massachusetts 
., Apr. 19, 1781, PCC, R29, Item 20, Vol. I, pp. 65-74; and JGC, 
Vol. XIX, pp. 421-427 .-
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with a program which the delegates believed would benefit the nation 
as a whole. For example, writing to Governor Trumbull, Jesse Root up-
braided his state for limiting its compliance with the impost to three 
years. He argued that the debt of the Continent was very large, and 
were the states to follow Connecticut's example, the combined revenue 
derived from the impost and the other aids the states were able to give 
would not be nearly sufficient to discharge that debt in so short a 
time. Asserting that "Congress have no resources for supplies or funds 
on which to obtain a credit but from the States," he asked, "can the 
~l 
States furnish us with either in so easy and equitable a way as by 
duties and imposts? 1144 Congress also joined the appeal, requesting on 
March 22 that Connecticut redraft its legislation and make it conform-
able to the resolution of February 3. Not to do so, Congress argued, 
would endanger public credit because creditors could not count on event-
11 b . 'd 45 ua y elllg pa1 • The Connecticut legislature responded to the pleas 
of its delegates and to those of Congress by redrafting its act on 
June 18 so that it conformed to the congressional resolution. 46 
Farther south, in Virginia, Edmund Pendleton presented two consti-
tutional objections to the proposed impost. First, he argued that the 
law was perpetual and was therefore a dangerous policy especially "in 
the Infancy of States, and upon an Opening trade, when no just estimate 
can be made of what it probably may amount to when it reaches maturity." 
44 
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Second, the law stated that the tax should be levied and collected as 
directed by Congress. Pendleton asked, "how can Congress direct and 
inforce the Collection of this money, without Judiciary & Executive 
Powers, which may Interfere with the internal Government reserved to 
each State by the confederation[?] 1147 
James Madison responded to Pendleton's objections by first arguing 
that if more money was collected than anticipated it would only mean 
that the debts would be paid sooner. In addition, he observed that the 
states had been asked to grant Congress more power than "many may think 
consistent with republican jealousies," but he argued that those powers 
were necessary if the country was to be able to borrow from either 
Europe or its own people. Madison also reviewed a portion of the con-
gressional debates on the resolution. One side argued that the states 
should be asked for no more than that they appoint officers to collect 
the duty, who would then surrender the funds to national agents. The 
other side, however, asserted that since "Congress would be held respon-
sible for the public debts it was necessary & would be expected; that 
the fund granted fo[r] discharging them should be exclusively & inde-
pende[nt]ly in their hands, that if the Collectors were under the con-
troul of the States, the urgency of their wants would be constantly 
d . . h f · d · · ,AB iverting t e revenue rom its proper estination, ... 
The delegates from Rhode Island also urged their state to comply 
with the impost. Writing to Governor Greene, they declared: "It must 
47 
Edmund Pendleton to Madison, May 2, 1781, PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 127-
128. 
48Madison to Pendleton, May 29, 1781, PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 140-141. 
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be obvious that, unless we can call forth the resources of the respec-
tive states equally, it will be impossible to execute any great object 
49 
while the states who do most will be the greatest sufferers." A 
month later the delegates again requested to know what the legislature 
had done to comply. They asserted: "Had the states readily adopted 
that measure, we should before this Time, have derived more than a 
hundred thousand dollars Specie .• II As evidence they pointed to 
the recent arrival of one cargo in Philadelphia "which would have paid 
upwards of seven Thousand Pounds this Currency." Finally, arguing for 
the necessity of a permanent fund for Congress, they declared that "not 
a Farthing of money has been paid into the General Treasury from any of 
the states, excepting Pennsylvania, for more than a Year Since, . . . 1150 
Despite the importunings of Congress, however, several states, including 
Rhode Island, remained reluctant to grant Congress the impost and would 
remain so throughout the rest of the year. 
The states were not only slow to grant the impost but also objected 
to the creation of the office of Superintendent of Finance and the ap-
pointment of Robert Morris to that office. A rich Philadelphia merchant 
and a past member of Congress, Morris had often aided Congress with 
both his talents and his money. 51 One such example occurred during the 
financial crisis of 1780. In June of that year Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts, urged Morris to create an association of merchants who 
49 . 
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would then use their influence to get the citizens to exchange their 
52 
old currency for the new bills and to obtain aid for the Army. Short-
ly thereafter the Board of War notified Congress that a number of citi-
zens desired to form a bank in Pennsylvania and were requesting not 
only the approval of Congress but its aid as well. 53 The following day 
Congress approved establishing the bank in order to supply and transport 
rations and rum for the Army. In addition, the Board of Treasury was 
ordered to deposit bills of exchange not exceeding £150,000 on American 
ministers to support the credit of the bank and to compensate the bank-
54 
ers for their losses and expenses. 
Thus when Congress finally decided to establish the office of 
Superintendent of Finance, Morris seemed the logical choice, and on 
February 20, 1781, he was unanimously elected by Congress to hold that 
ff . 55 o ice. Morris, however, hesitated to accept, insisting that Congress 
meet a number of demands, the most important of which was to grant him 
the authority not only to hire all officials concerned with finances but 
to dismiss them as well. Congress eventually agreed, and Morris offic-
56 
ially assumed the office in July. Meanwhile his demands and actions 
52Elbridge Gerry to Robert Morris, June 11, 1780, LHC, Vol. V, 
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53JcC, Vol. XVII, p. 542. 
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elicited much controversy concerning both Morris and the congressional 
plan to centralize the nation's finances under one head. 
In a real sense Morris' appointment was a testament to the erosion 
of congressional authority. Unable to extend Congress' credit any far-
ther, many members hoped that the nation's financial credibility could 
be reestablished by resting it partly on Morris' financial ability and 
on his extensive private credit. The New Jersey delegate, William 
Churchill Houston, defended the congressional plan: "This Economy 
never will indeed never can be introduced by a Body constituted as Con-
gress is; . • . They seem to know Nothing about either Money or saving 
it. These things must if they are ever done well, be the Work of one 
M. <l 1157 in • Edmund Pendleton believed that Congress had taken "the most 
promising method" to effect a reform of the nation's finances "by ap-
pointing this important subject to the sole consideration of one man, 
whose mind shall be kept free from the distraction of Various Objects; 
and from the general Character of Mr. Morris the choice of him Appears 
Judicious. 1158 James Varnum writing to Governor Greene of Rhode Island 
on Morris' appointment declared: "His personal credit here, as well as 
in Europe, is very extensive, and no other man could effect as much as 
Mr . Morr is. 115 9 
On the opposite side Varnum noted that one of the obstacles to the 
"energy and vigor" necessary to the United States was that an "extreme, 
57William Churchill Houston to McKean, Mar. 31, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, 
pp. 41-42. 
58 Pendleton to Madison, May 28, 1781, PJM, Vol. 2, p. 136. 
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though perhaps well-meant jealousy in many members of Congress, espec-
ially those of long standing, seems to frustrate every attempt to intro-
duce a more efficacious system." He used as his example the delay 
caused by the debates in Congress over Morris' insistence that he be 
permitted to remove all persons who handled the public's money. 60 One 
such delegate was Thomas McKean, who observed: "There are some amongst 
us, who are so fond of having a great and powerful Han to look up to, 
that tho' they may not like the name of king, seem anxious to confer 
kin~ly powers, under the titles of Dictator, Superintendent of Finance, 
or some such. . 
,,61 
Morris did not ease the apprehensions of those who feared central-
ization as he immediately began to bombard the states with letters urg-
ing them to comply with congressional requisitions, sometimes in so 
insistent a manner as to cause friction with those with whom he dealt. 
On July 6 he informed the states that he had been empowered by Congress 
on June 28 to press the states for compliance with Congress' r~solu-
tions. He informed the governors of the states that he had written .to 
the Treasury Board, the Commissary General, and Quartermaster General 
to determine the various balances due from the states. Once these re-
. h ld . . 62 turns were in e wou write again. He also requested information 
from the states themselves on what they had done to comply with the 
requisitions of Congress since the resolution of March 18, 1780. He 
asserted that there was a prevalent belief that the accounts between 
60 
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the separate states and the United States were not to be adjusted, to 
which he declared: "Those who inculcate Maxims which tend to relax 
their efforts most certainly injure the common cause, whatever the mo-
. .wh. h . . h . d 1163 tives ic inspire t eir con uct. 
Morris was also explicit in informing the states what they owed to 
the Continent. On July to he notified President Reed that Pennsylvania 
owed $38,565,995 30/90 old emission and $1,789,289 60/90 of the new, ex-
elusive of the four-tenths due the Continent under the resolution of 
64 
March 18, 1780. Dismayed and rather irked, Reed replied on the twen-
ty-seventh:· "We scarcely know what to say to those large Ballances due 
from this & other states to Congress." He argued that "it seems reason-
able that when a State by its Exertions in Time of Necessity & Danger 
has advnaced Cloathing, Provisions, Anununition, Militia, & other Neces-
saries, at the Instance of Congress & more especially of those Articles 
which do not come under the Description of specifick Supplies, that it 
65 
should have a credit, -so as to lessen the Ballance, . . . " 
Other states also answered Morris' demands with claims that their 
states had been so overburdened by the exactions of Congress that Con-
gress should be paying them money rather than asking for more. Governor 
Greene of Rhode Island detailed the exertions of his state to show that 
Rhode Island had complied fully with every requisition of Congress. In 
fact, he argued that Rhode Island stood at least £60,000 in advance. 
Noting that the state's accounts were being forwarded, he declared: 
63M . orris to Clinton, July 25, 1781, PGC; Vol. 8, pp. 121-125. 
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"By those accounts, you will at one view see that we have not only 
fully complied with the requisitions of Congress, but are greatly in 
advance; and I doubt not but we shall be relieved from our perplexed 
and distressed situation, by making us such grants towards discharging 
the balance due unto us, as will make us at all times in future exert 
ourselves upon pressing occasions more than our real abilities will 
admit. 1166 
The Maryland Council did not respond to Morris' inquiries until 
December, explaining that its delay had been because the state had been 
unable to collect the necessary accounts. The Council was sure that 
Morris would find that Maryland had exerted much, and observed: "it may 
not be amiss to remind you, that besides every Effort to furnish the 
whole specific Supplies demanded of us, we have been exposed to very 
heavy Expenses in a great Measure unknown to the other States, particu-
larly in Articles of all kinds of Transportation of Troops and Provi-
sions and Maintenance of Prisoners." The Council also asserted: "We 
have also paid very considerable Draughts of the conunanding Generals of 
67 the Southern Army, made upon us under Reconunendation of Congress." 
Because of the belief among the several states that they had 
exerted themselves beyond their capacity and that their people could 
now do little more, Morris' efforts to implement Congress' financial 
system of 1781 proved ineffective. In fact, both his insistence and 
the nature of his office may even have increased the reluctance of the 
66Governor Greene to Morris, Oct., 1781, Rhode Island, Records of 
Rhode Island, Vol. IX, pp. 485-487. 
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states to comply. Nevertheless, another portion of the congressional 
plan was doomed to fail because of the pressures of other events in mid-
1781. The first of these was the almost complete collapse of the old 
Continental bills of credit. This affected Congress' ,finances because 
a part of the new fiscal plan rested on the plans of 1780. Particular--
ly, Congress continued to insist that the states comply with its reso-
lution of March 18, 1780. The key to that resolution had been the 
maintenance of the old Continental bills of credit at a ratio of forty 
to one in specie. 
Signs of the impending crisis came as early as February when the 
editor of the New Jersey Gazette warned his readers to exchange as 
quickly as possible any Maryland bills of credit they held. He an-
nounced that in November, 1780, the Maryland legislature had passed a 
law stipulating that after April 1, 1781, no bills of credit issued 
either by Congress or by acts of the Maryland Assembly would be received 
68 
by agencies of the Maryland goverrunent or be redeemed in the future. 
By late March the Connecticut delegates informed Governor Trumbull that 
the rate of exchange had reached 130 to one in Philadelphia. "This oc-
casions vast quantitys to be sent on to the eastward; and indeed the 
people from thence are here buying the old money, as the exchange is so 
much lower here than there. 1169 
Many states naturally moved to protect their economies. As 
previously mentioned, in November, 1780, the New Jersey Legislature 
68NJA, 2nd Ser., Vol. V, p. 192. 
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authorized the Governor and Privy Council to alter the rate of exchange 
in the state. Implementing this act on April 8, Governor William Liv-
70 ingston declared the rate of exchange in New Jersey to be 150 to one. 
New Jersey was quickly followed by other states. In its May session 
the legislature of Rhode Island set its ratio at 160 to one to go into 
effect on May 30. 71 In early May the Pennsylvania Council set the rate 
72 
in that state at 175 to one. The immediate result was a precipitate 
fall in the value of Continental currency. The Virginia delegates re-
ported on May 5 that during the first few days of May the rate of ex-
change had gone "from 200 to 7 8 and even 900 for one." 73 The rapid 
depreciation naturally injured some people terribly. John Witherspoon 
reported that when his son-in-law left Virginia he had sold all his fur-
niture on credit and had been paid in paper currency. His brother had 
brought several thousand pounds of that money in Continental bills of 
credit to Philadelphia only to have it perish in his hands in less than 
a week so that he could not even travel fifty miles. 74 
In Philadelphia the collapse of the Continental currency led to 
major civil disorders. James Lovell noted: "Sailors with Clubs parade 
the Streets instead of working for Paper." Referring to the money of 
70 NJA, 2nd Ser., Vol. V, p. 242. 
ston raised the rate to 175 to one. 
On June 6, 1781, Governor Living-
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Massachusetts he asserted: "That of our State is not counted money 
here. The old continental is dying by Yards not Inches •• 
Samuel Johnston of Maryland noted that all the states east of Maryland 
and New Jersey were without a vote in Congress. 76 Commenting upon the 
scene, Edmund Pendleton believed that the turmoil in Philadelphia had 
been caused because "people in those parts have more to heart the 
making of fortunes, than promoting the glorious Cause we are concern'd 
in; ••. " While he recognized that the nation's finances lacked both 
stability and system, he blamed the problem on the states, observing 
that "different States will adopt various modes of complying with the 
requisitions of Congress, and Individuals in each will pertinaciously 
pursue their Openings, so as to carry at one Session what they have 
been over ruled at a former, & hence arises that mutability, so destruc-
tive of every Political measure. I fear this mischief hath its Origins 
in human Nature, & that a change will be difficult; ..• 1177 
At the height of the crises, discovering itself without money, Con-
gress had to inform the states that they would now be required not only 
to provide immediately the supplies requested in the act of November 4, 
1780, but to pay for their transportation as well. President Hunting-
ton pointedly declared that if the states had complied with the resolu-
tion of March 18, 1780» and with the money requisition of August 26, 
1780, Congress would have had the money to transport the supplies. 78 
75 Lovell to Holten, May 8, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 83. 
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Huntington also warned the states that Congress had been forced to draw 
warrants against them for the quotas assigned on August 26 and would 
continue to do so. Therefore the states should quickly take measures 
to insure that their treasurers would be able to pay the warrants. 79 
By July, 1781, Robert Morris had begun implementing his reforms, and 
the new President of Congress, Thomas McKean, optimistically reporting 
that some order had been restored, declared: "Public and private credit 
and confidence are returning fast, and the trade and commerce of. 
[Philadelphia] really flourish. In short, affairs wear a promising 
80 
aspect." Perhaps this was true for Pennsylvania but certainly not 
for the southern states. 
By mid-summer, 1781, the British campaign in the south, which in-
valved mainly an invasion of Virginia, was in full swing. The states 
of Maryland and Virginia, being closest to the scene, naturally bore 
much of the burden not only for supplying the Southern Army and the 
troops of the Marquis de Lafayette, who had been sent south in early 
spring, but also for providing for their own internal defenses. North 
Carolina could provide little aid, as Governor Jefferson noted in a let-
ter to Governor Lee, because: "A State in the midst of which are sever-
al different Armies of Foes and Friends as destructive from necessity 
as Foes, which has been consumed by their ravages near a twelvemonth, 
. . c d. . . b . 1181 is not in a on ition to give ut to expect assistance. 
The British, under the command of General Cornwallis, began their 
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invasion of Virginia in late May. Their march was swift and devastat-
ing. Lafayette, greatly undermanned, could do little more than keep 
himself and what few forces he commanded from being captured. The Vir-
ginia Assembly hurriedly convened at Charlottesville only to have its 
meeting disrupted, some of its members captured and the rest scattered 
by a surprise raid of the British. The state was also without an exec-
utive because Thomas Jefferson had resigned a few days before and the 
82 
assembly had not yet chosen his replacement. 
As noted previously, community ties, and thus community force, were 
not very concentrated in Virginia. In the past these conditions had 
made organizing the state's war effort very difficult. Without an exec-
utive authority, it proved nearly impossible. Richard Henry Lee re-
fleeted this condition as he desperately sought aid from Congress. He 
despondently reported that the state was '~ithout either executive or 
Legislative authority, every thing in the greatest possible confusi.on, 
the enemy far superior in force to that with the Marquis, and practising 
everything that force and fraud can contrive." While he noted that the 
number of men in Virginia far outnumbered the enemy, he argued that 
"their dispersed, unarmed, and unadvised condition; without government, 
and without system of any kind, renders them an easy prey to the com-
bined force and concerted system of our enemies." He insisted that 
General Washington be sent immediately southward and be granted dicta-
torial powers to seize provisions and to impress men until the Assembly 
82For the activities of both Lafayette and Cornwallis in the early 
part of the Virginia campaign see Henry P. Johnston, The Yorktown 
Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781 (New York, 1971), pp. 
29-51. 
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Ld . 83 cou meet again. 
In the ensuing days and weeks both Maryland and Virginia pleaded 
for aid. The Maryland Council asserted: "The extraordinary Exertions 
by this State on every occasion in complying with the Demands of Con-
gress, the Marquis' Detachment the southern Army, our Militia and other 
Expenditures have altogether exhausted our Treasury and Stores of arms 
and Cloathing .... 11 The Council argued that it could not even supply 
its own militia and therefore requested its delegates in Congress to 
"make known our wants to Congress in the most Earnest Manner .. 
DavLd Jameson, now Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, warned that "unless 
we have aid from Congress" the state must stop all contributions for the 
war south of it "or our own Army disband." He asserted: "We have 
borne the burthen of four States for almost two years and can struggle 
no Longer under it. 1185 
Congress, however, did not respond as fully as the southern states 
expected, and by mid-August many citizens of Virginia were becoming very 
angry. Expressing his fellow citizens' frustrations with the northern 
states, David Jameson declared: "Repeated representations have been 
made of our condition for the past eighteen Months .. II He under-
stood why Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina had not been able 
to help much but he also asserted that "very little [aid] has been sent 
by the middle and none by the Eastern States--on Virginia therefore has 
83 
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the burthen laid. no less than thirty five Millions of pounds has been 
Emitted from her Treasury since the first of October last, four fifths 
of which enourmous sum has been appropriated to Continental purposes." 
In addition, Virginia had also contributed large supplies of provisions 
and transportation, most of which had been taken through impressment. 
This last was particularly "hateful" to the people, Jameson declared: 
"And when they reflect that their bretheren to the North & East of them 
have a free & open trade, free from invasion and living in ease, & af-
fluence--and will afford them no assistance their sufferings become more 
grevious." Arguing that earlier in the·war Virginia had contributed 
freely to the northern states during their times of crisis, Jameson 
asked: "Why is she left not only to struggle for her self under many 
difficulties, but required to bear the burthen of the whole Southern 
W ?"86 ar. 
Jameson's charges were obviously distorted, as the northern states 
experienced their own stresses and were in little better financial shape 
than Virginia. But his rhetoric reflected the attitudes of many offic-
ials of the states throughout the Revolution. Like Jameson, they were 
more concerned with the problems of their own states than with those of 
others. They could see the distresses of their "countries" and of their 
citizens. But, partly because of poor communications and partly because 
of tunnel vision they could not fully comprehend the particular dis-
tresses of surrounding states. Such charges also reflected a part of 
the role state officials were expected to play: to protect their own 
state's interests. Thus, Jameson's assertions were in part to justify 
86Jameson to Madison, Aug. 15, 1781, PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 227-228. 
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the unwillingness of Virginia's citizens to do more. 
Though the campaign ended victoriously for America when a com-
bined force of French and Continentals under the conunand of General 
Washington captured Cornwallis and his entire Army at Yorktown, the 
victory really belonged more to Robert Morris than to Congress. Using 
his own private credit and French loans, Morris almost single-handedly 
financed the successful Franco-American operation. 87 But the victory 
came too late to salvage Virginia's finances. The invasion had left 
the state exhausted, so much so that in December the Assembly passed a 
law calling in all its paper emissions at a ratio of 1,000 to one. In 
addition, the state suspended its compliance with the impost because 
other states had not acceded to it. The Assembly did, however, give 
the Governor the right to implement it once he received proof that a 
majority of the states had agreed. 88 Thus the British campaign in the 
south further assured that Congress' financial plan would not succeed, 
as Lt had left the southern states incapable of complying. 
By the end of the year the new congressional plan had failed as 
badly as had the plan of 1780. The states remained reluctant to grant 
Congress the power to lay an impost, and the manner in which Morris im-
portuned the states to comply could not help but to increase that reluc-
tance. At the beginning of 1782, writing to the governors of three 
states which had not granted the impost, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Maryland, Morris asserted that both he and Congress had done their 
duty and declared: "It only remains for me to bear Testimony against 
87 
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those who oppose that Compliance and to declare that they and they only 
must be responsible for the Consequences, They are answerable to the 
other States, to their fellow citizens to the public Creditors and to 
the whole world." Speaking even more plainly he insisted: "He . 
who opposes the Grant of such revenue not only opposes himself to the 
Dictates of Justice, but he labours to continue the war and of Conse-
quence to shed more Blood, to produce more Devastation, and to extend 
and prolong the miseries of mankind. 1189 
The collapse of the Continental assured that the new bills would 
not come into use in an effective way. The British campaign guaranteed 
that the southern states would not be able either to meet their cash 
contributions or to suspend the printing of paper money. Hoping at 
least to finance the campaign for the next year, Congress passed a new 
requisition for money on October 30, 1781, and apportioned quotas among 
90 
the several states on November 2. But in the euphoria which followed 
Yorktown many states turned inward, attempting to bring order to their 
own financial chaos. Thus in 1781, Congress had not been able to rees-
tablish its lines of financial authority and ended the year much as it 
had begun by pleading with the states to comply with congressional 
requisitions and by asking: "To whom . . . rather than Yourselves who 
are called to the guardianship & sovereignty of your country can these 
considerations be addressed? . We possess no funds which do not 
originate with you, we can conunand no levies, which are not raised under 
89Morris to Massachusetts, Rhode Island, ~nd Maryland, Jan. 2, 1782, 
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your own Acts. 1191 
The inability of Congress to establish its authority in finances 
had been due in part to the fear of the states of centralized authority, 
but it was also due in part to the increasing irritations of the states 
toward one another. Most believed that they were doing more than their 
share to prosecute the war and were angered because each did not be-
lieve that the other states were exerting themselves as strenuously. 
The ratification of the Articles of Confederation did not help ease 
these tensions at all since the delegates conflicted further over futile 
attempts to strengthen congressional authority through amending that 
document. 
These were not, however, the only sources of friction. Thoughout 
the war, and especially in the years 1780 through 1783, the states 
participated in several disputes over territorial claims. These con-
flicts, the subject of the ne~t chapter, not only increased the suspic-
ions of the states towards Congress and towards one another, but 
illustrated the inability of Congress to judge interstate disputes. 
Combined with the financial and military pressures of those years, 
these disputes would assure that Congress would never recover the 
states' cooperation so necessary to its prestige and authority. 
91The United States in Congress Assembled to the Legislatures of New 
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CHAPTER VI 
TERRITORIAL TENSIONS 
The financial difficulties of 1780 and 1781 were not the only prob-
lems that caused friction among the states both inside and outside Con-
gress. Another important irritation came from conflicts over boundaries 
and the claims of some states to vast sections of western territory. 
The most prominent border dispute involved New York, New Hampshire, and 
Massachusetts--all of whom had claims to the so-called New Hampshire 
Grants (roughly present-day Vermont). This conflict raised serious 
questions regarding the power of Congress under the Confederation. 
Could Congress deal directly with the people in territories claimed by 
states? And, could Congress create an independent state out of that 
disputed territory and then admit it into the union? The problem of 
the trans-Appalachian West was even more complex because of the over-
lapping claims of several states and of private land companies as well. 
This conflict, as it developed, raised fundamental questions about the 
relationships which the Articles of Confederation established among 
Congress, the states, and the people. 
The struggle over these constitutional questions as well as the 
search for pragmatic solutions to the disputes themselves carried seri-
. ous implications for congressional authority. As the conflicts deepened 
and lengthened over time, the irritations of those states grew, until 
the disputes over the New Hampshire Grants and western claims 
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intertwined not only with one another but with other congressional 
questions as well. The inability of Congress to find either quick or 
decisive solutions to these problems naturally increased the irritation 
of the states. Just as important, the conflicts also revealed that 
some men, such as James Madison, Joseph Jones, and James Duane, tradi-
tionally viewed as nationalists, could be equally as ardent in opposing 
the extension of congressional power when the interests of their partic-
ular states were involved. Conversely, many of the supposed states' 
rightists argued for an extension of congressional authority when such 
extensions would benefit their own states. Once again, as with the con-
flicts over finances, the various disputes over territorial claims 
measurably diminished the cooperation between the states so necessary 
for effective congressional power. 
The conflict among New York, New Hampshire and Massachusetts over 
the New Hampshire Grants involved the territory which lay roughly be-
tween the Connecticut River and a line running approximately north and 
south from Lake Champlain, parallel to and twenty miles east of the 
Hudson River. The area is divided by the Green Mountains into two 
natural goegraphic regions, and the whole is bounded on the south by 
the northern border of Massachusetts. The disputes had their origins 
in overlapping colonial charters and grants. Both New York and New 
Hampshire claimed the entire region, while Massachusetts was content to 
claim only the southernmost portion of the region. While Massachusetts 
had granted some lands in the area, it had never prosecuted its claim 
very vigorously. Consequently the dispute developed mainly between 
New York and New Hampshire. 
The conflict began shortly after Benning Wentworth became Governor 
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of New Hampshire in 1741, and began to make land grants in the area. 
By 1750 the grants had created a legal dispute over territorial rights 
between New York and New Hampshire and had been referred to London for 
settlement. Meanwhile, Wentworth continued to issue many new grants on 
both sides of the mountains but principally in the Connecticut River 
Valley. On July 20, 1764, however, the King in Council determined that 
all the land west of the River properly belonged to the colony of New 
York. 
Over the next several years, New York began to grant its own char-
ters in the region and tried without success to eject those persons who 
had occupied the lands granted by New Hampshire. Embittered by the 
actions of New York, the settlers of the region seized upon the growing 
conflict between Britain and its American colonies and appealed to Con-
gress for protection from New York's authority. 1 Congress responded by 
requesting the inhabitants of the Grants to submit to the jurisdiction 
of New York for the duration of the war and guaranteed them that "when 
the present Troubles are at an End the final Determination of their 
Right may be mutually referr'd to proper judges. 112 The citizens of the 
Grants rejected the congressional request, and on January 15, 1777, rep-
resentatives from several towns met at Westminster. After listing their 
grievances against New York, the delegates asked that their district "be 
ranked" by Congress "among the Free and Independent States, and 
1Allen Nevins, The American States During and After the Revolution, 
177~-1789 (New York, 1969), pp. 579-580. 
2JCC, Vol. IV, pp. 334-335, 405. 
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3 delegates then admitted to seats in the Grand Continental Congress." 
In June, 1777, Congress considered the petition along with sundry other 
papers received from New York concerning the Grants, but was unable to 
d . . 4 come to a eterm1nat1on. 
Meanwhile, the controversy temporarily subsided as the attention 
of all the parties was absorbed by the British invasion led by Major-
General John Burgoyne from Canada. Now calling their district the State 
of Vermont, the citizens of the Grants were directly in the path of the 
invading army and appealed for aid from New Hampshire for the common 
defense. The combined force led to the American victory at Bennington, 
5 Vermont, in .August, 1777. In turn, this battle seriously weakened 
Burgoyne's forces and was a major factor in Burgoyne's ultimate surren-
6 der at Saratoga in October. Perhaps because of the patriotic efforts 
of Vermont and New Hampshire during the crisis, New York softened its 
attitude. In early 1778, while not surrendering its claim of jurisdic-
tion over the Grants, the New York Legislature at least offered to per-
mit those persons who had occupied lands granted by New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts to retain their lands. 7 
The temporary peace was shattered in early summer, 1778, when the 
3neclaration and Petition of the Inhabitants of the New Hampshire 
Grants to Congrews, Jan. 15, 1777, New Hampshire, Provincial and State 
Papers of ~ Hampshire, Vol. X, pp. 242-246. Hereinafter, NHPS. 
4 :!££,Vol. VIII, pp. 491, 497, 507. 
5rra .Allen to Connnittee of Safety of New Hampshire, July 15, 1777, 
and Weare to .Allen, July 19, 1777, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 253-254, 255. 
6.Alden, The American Revolution, pp. 141-142. 
7Proclama.tion of Governor George Clinton of New York, Feb. 23, 
1778, ~, Vol. X, pp. 256-259. 
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Vermont legislature granted the petition of sixteen towns in the valley 
but east of the Connecticut River, which were clearly a part of New 
' 8 h Hampshire, to annex themselves to the State of Vermont. T e request 
of these towns was natural in that the Valley formed a distinct geo-
graphical and economic region, and the inhabitants on both sides of 
the River identified more closely with the interests of the Valley than 
with either New York or New Hampshire. Meshech Weare, the President of 
New Hampshire, was understandably disturbed by this defection and de-
manded that the state's delegates in Congress "Endeavor to obtain the 
aid of Congress, if you think they can with propriety take up the mat-
ter." Weare warned: "Indeed unless Congress interfere (whose admoni-
tions only will be obeyed) I know not what consequences will follow; 
very possibly the sword will decide it, • .. 9 Three days later, Weare 
also wrote a similar letter of protest to Governor Thomas Chittenden of 
10 Vermont. After receiving Weare's letter, Chittenden dispatched Ethan 
Allen to Philadelphia to test the temper of Congress. Allen reported 
that Congress was not unfavorable to the State of Vermont itself but 
that unless "this State recede from such union [annexation], immediate-
ly, the whole power of the Confederacy of the United States of America, 
will join to annihilate the State of Vermont, and to vindicate the 
8 Resolution of the General Assembly of Vermont, June 11, 1778, 
~,Vol. X, pp. 276-277. 
9 Weare to New Hampshire Delegates, Aug. 18, 1778, NHPS, Vol. X, 
pp. 278-279. 
10weare to Thomas Chittenden, Aug. 22, 1778, ~. Vol. X, pp. 
279-281. 
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rights of New Hampshire •••• 1111 Acting upon Allen's information, on 
October 21, 1778, the Vermont Assembly withdrew its offer of union to 
the sixteen towns, but did so in such a way as to leave open the ques-
tion of whether or not the attempt would be made again at some future 
12 date. Consequently the inhabitants of the Grants east of the river, 
who loathed to see the Valley split by two different authorities, con-
tinued to work for annexation to Vermont and, under those conditions, 
f i 1 • • f V I • d d 13 or congress ona recognition o ennont s in epen ence. 
The agitation of the inhabitants of the Grants forced Congress to 
consider the problem once again, and on May 22, 1779, Congress debated 
several resolves. These resolves included one which declared that none 
of the thirteen states should be deprived of property unless consistent 
with the method described in Article IX of the Confederation. It was 
also proposed that no district be permitted to separate itself from a 
state without the state's consent and recommendation that the inhabi-
tants of Vermont return to their former jurisdictions in New York and 
New Hampshire. A decision, however, was not reached at this time. 14 
On June 1 Congress finally determined to appoint a connnittee of five 
persons to repair to the Grants and to inquire why the inhabitants were 
not willing to remain with their respective states. The resolution 
11 Ethan Allen to Chittenden, Oct. 10, 1778, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 282-
284. 
12 Resolved of the General Assembly af Vermont, Oct. 21, 1778; 
Chittenden to Weare, Oct. 23, 1778; and Weare to Chittenden, Nov. 5, 
1778, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 284, 287, 294-295. 
13 
Joseph Marsh to Henry Laurens, Oct. 23, 1778, ~' Vol. X, pp. 
289-290. 
14JCC, Vol. XIV, pp. 631-633. 
169 
asserted that "Congress are in duty bound on the one hand to preserve 
inviolate the rights of the Several States, so on the other, they will 
always be careful to provide that the Justice due to the States does 
not interfere with the Justice which may be due Individuals. 1115 In 
this declaration, however, Congress had accidently violated the straight 
line relationships of the Confederation by offering to deal directly 
with the citizens of particular states and by implying that it would 
even interpose itself between the governments of New York and New 
Hampshire and their citizens in the Grants. Consequently, on the six-
teenth Congress clarified its resolutions of the first by unanimously 
resolving "That it was not the intention of Congress . . . to hold up 
principles subversive of, or unfavorable to the internal polity of any 
or either of the United States, 1116 
Although a majority of the committee failed to assemble in the 
Grants, by September, 1779, the situation there was becoming critical, 
so Congress had to proceed without the direct evidence from its conunit-
tee. On September 24 Congress came to several resolutions, hoping to 
solve the problem of the Grants once and for all. Resorting to the 
method called for by Article IX of the Confederation, Congress requested 
the states of New Hampshire, New York, and Massachusetts to pass laws 
expressly granting Congress the authority to hear and determine their 
boundary disputes and assigned February l, 1780 as the day for settle-
ment. On that day Congress would judge the disputes, disallowing any 
of the three states concerned to "vote on any question relative to the 
15Ibid., pp. 674-675. 
16Ibid., p. 741. 
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decision thereof." It requested that, in the meantime, none of the 
states attempt to exercise authority in the disputed region and warned 
that no more towns could join with those in the disputed district. Con-
gress also authorized the Connnander-in-Chief to keep the peace in the 
G 'l c h d d . . 17 rants unti ongress reac e a ec1s1on. 
One passage in the resolution, however, had to be modified. The 
original resolution had provided that the states should "authorize Con-
gress to proceed to hear and determine all disputes subsisting between 
the grantees of the several states aforesaid, with one another or with 
either of' the said states , , • to be heard and determined in the mode 
prescribed for such cases by the Articles of Confederation. . II It 
was pointed out that the Articles contained no provision whereby Con-
gress could hear and determine "disputes between any State and the 
grantees of any other State" but only between states. Therefore, on 
October 2, Congress modified its resolution to read that the disputes 
would be "determined by 'commissioners or judges,' to be appointed in 
h d b d h 1 f h . 1118 t e mo e prescri e by t e ninth artic e o t e confederation .... 
During 1780 the disputes remained unsolved. Congress was unable 
to hold hearings on February 2 for a number of reasons. The New York 
delegates reported that Congress simply had not had enough time to con-
sider the conflict because it was almost totally involved in the problem 
f f . 19 o inances. In addition, nine disinterested states were seldom 
17JCC, Vol. XV, pp. 1095-1099. 
18rbid., p. 1135. 
19Ezra L'Hommidieu to the Governor of New York, Mar. 15, 1780, ~. 
Vol. V, p. 75. 
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present, so that a decision could not be reached. 20 Meanwhile, the 
citizens of the Grants would not let the controversy rest. Writing to 
Governor Clinton in April, 1780, Samuel Minott, the chairman of a com-
mittee of loyal New Yorkers in the Grants, asserted that the Vermont 
Legislature had determined that the New Yorkers would submit to its 
jurisdiction and had "come to a Resolution to inforce their cruel Laws 
upon us." Minott warned that in the past the New Yorkers in the Grants 
had been willing to risk their all to remain loyal: "But as we begin 
to believe that Congress (with whom the matter now solely rests) will 
not do any thing effectual for our Relief, we do not think it our Duty 
any longer to put our all at Stake." While the New Yorkers wanted to 
live under New York's jurisdiction, they would soon attach themselves 
to Vermont as they could no "longer risque so much for a Government 
which is either unable, or unwilling, to protect us; • II Minott 
threatened that "unless Congress shall have settled this Controversy by 
the first of June next, the Subjects of New York in this County, must, 
for their own Safety, connect themselves with some Power able to afford 
21 them Security." 
In early May Minott again wrote Governor Clinton asserting that 
Vermont had begun enforcing its laws on the New Yorkers, which included 
drafting them into the Vermont militia and making grants of land in 
areas already granted by New York, Those who opposed were subject to 
public whippings. He asserted: "From this Dilemma, Congress and 
20 
~, Vol. XVI, p. 273; and The New York Delegates to the Governor 
of New York, May 21, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 159-160. 
21 Samuel Minott to Clinton, Apr. 11, 1780, PGC, Vol. 5, pp. 605-
608. 
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Congress alone~ can relieve us: ... if they have not wholly lost that 
glorious Spirit which has, heretofore, in so eminent a manner distin-
guished them: . • . we are persuaded they must put an End to our Miser-
ies by speedily determining of which of the 13 States we belong." He 
urged Congress to act swiftly because Vermont was gaining friends daily 
by confiscating estates and appropriating land "And at the same time, 
they are instilling into the minds of their Subjects and Friends, the 
Doctrine that Congress have no right to adjudge whether the Grants shall 
be a State, because they have not submitted it to their arbitration."22 
Acting upon this information, John Morin Scott, one of the New York 
delegates, proposed in late May that when Congress finally determined 
the question of the Grants it should declare null and void any grants of 
land in the district made since the congressional resolution of Septem-
ber 24, 1779. In addition, he also demanded that when a sufficient 
number of disinterested states were present in Congress the question of 
the Grants be made the order of the day and that Congress "proceed with-
out delay to hear, examine and finally decide the same .. II The 
23 
discussion of the Grants, however, was once again postponed. The 
problem was discussed again on May 30 and June 1 without decision. 24 
On June .2, Congress once again resolved to consider the problem 
of the Grants as soon as nine disinterested states were present. It 
also warned those citizens who claimed allegiance to Vermont not to 
execcise either civil or military authority over those citizens who 
22Minott to Clinton, May 2, 1780, PGC, Vol. 5, pp. 671-675. 
23JcC, Vol. XVII, pp. 448-451. 
24Ibid., pp. 47., 481. 
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claimed.allegiance to one of the states in the dispute. 25 Enough 
states were present on June 9, but the proceedings were once again post-
poned until September because the agents for New Hampshire were not 
26 
present. 
After further delays because of a lack of congressional representa-
tion, Congress finally began its hearings on September 19, more than 
seven months after it was.supposed to·have settled the controversy. On 
this and the following day, the New delegates, acting as that state's 
agents, presented evidence that the Grants had been under the jurisdic-
tion of New York since 1764 and that New Hampshire had agreed to that 
jurisdiction. In addition, the agents argued that the inhabitants of 
the Grants west of the Connecticut River had been "duly represented in 
and submitted to the authority, jurisdiction and government of Congress 
and the convention of the said State [New York] till late in the year 
1777. On the twenty-seventh New Hampshire presented its claim, 
while "The gentlemen appearing in behalf o-'.: sundry inhabitants of the 
said Grants having nothing to add, and pressing Congress to come to a 
determination, withdrew, 1128 These agents, Peter Olcott and Bezaleel 
Woodward, had already informed Congress that if the Grants were not per-
mitted to become the independent state of Vermont they would prefer 
being under the jurisdiction of New Hampshire. Their only request was 
that Congress at ·least "evidence a tender concern" by asking the 
25 Ibid., pp. 282-284. 
26 Ibid., p. 489. 
27JCC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 819, 840-841, 843. 
28Ibid., p. 868. 
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inhabitants of the Grants which state they preferred to be aligned 
. l 29 wit i, 
The view of the inhabitants of the Grants apparently led Congress 
to favor the claim of New Hampshire. To follow up this advantage, John 
Sullivan informed President Weare that he and his fellow delegate, 
Nathaniel Folsom, had decided upon two courses of action. First they 
would argue against the constitutionality of New York's plan, which was 
to have Congress declare against the Grants being.an independent state, 
and then have commissioners appointed to determine whether the Grants 
belonged to New York or New Hampshire. Instead, the New Hampshire dele-
gates would declare that Congress did not have the power to determine 
independence in the first place and must appoint commissioners according 
to the Articles of Confederation to determine that question. Their sec-
ond ploy would be to contrast New Hampshire's willingness to abide by 
the decision of Congress with the attitude of New York's agents, who had 
been "breathing out nothing but Death & Slaughter." Their tactics ap-
parently were effective, because Sullivan reported: "The members [of 
Congress] begin to see, that if the lands are adjudged to New York, the 
Continent must be involved in a war to enforce the Determination of Con-
gress, which can only be avoided by adjudging in favor of New Hamp-
shir:-e.1130 The delegates from New York also recognized the direction in 
which Congress was leaning. In late October, Ezekiel Cornell of Rhode 
Island noted: "The affairs of Vermont have slept for sometime and 
29 
Bezaleel Woodward to the President of Congress, Aug. 31, 1780, 
NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 374-375. 
30John Sullivan to Weare, Sept. 16, 1780, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 375-
377. 
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nothing is determined. I believe when it was last debated the gentle-
men from New York did not like very well the sentiments of a majority 
of the members on the subject and will let the affair rest ·until a 
change in members should take place, that will better suit their pur-
poses." 
The controversy began to disturb other large states, especially 
Virginia. With large landholdings and many of their citizens far re-
moved from their capital, the Virginians feared that if Congress ac-
quiesced to Vermont's demands for independence and statehood, Virginia 
would lose much of its territory through a similar process. The warning 
had already been sounded as early as August, 1780, when Congress re-
ceived two petitions from the region of Kentucky requesting independence 
from Virginia. The delegates from Virginia had moved unsuccessfully to 
have those petitions turned over to the governor of Virginia. Conse-
quently, when Congress began considering the problem of tbe New Hamp-
shice Grants, both Joseph Jones and James Madison, who desired to 
increase ·congressional power in the economy, opposed granting Congress 
the power to decide the issue in favor of Vermont. 32 
On September 30, 1780, Madison proposed a series of resolves which 
were designed to keep the problem confined within the powers expressly 
granted to Congress under the Articles of Confederation. He urged Con-
gress to declare that the Grants lay within one or more of the United 
States, and "That every attempt by force to set up a separate and inde-
pendent jurisdiction within the limits of any one of the United States, 
31 . 4 Cornell to Governor Greene, Oct. 2 , 1780, RICC, p. 317. 
32 
JGC, Vol. XVII, pp. 760, 763-764. 
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is a direct violation of the rights of such State, and subversive of 
the union of the whole, under the superintending authority of Congress." 
He also demanded that Vennont desist in its efforts to organize the 
Grants and that Congress immediately appoint commissioners to settle the 
dispute. Finally, to ease the conflict, he urged that all the states in 
the controversy confirm the titles of individuals to the lands they oc-
. d 33 cupie . 
Writing to Madison after he had left Congress to attend the Assem-
bly of Virginia, Joseph_ Jones argued that Congress could not delay its 
ded sion on Vermont and observed: "Had the Territorial claims of N. Y. 
& N. Hampshire been settled in the first instance the State of Vermont 
would not at this Day have been known--delay has given them a name and 
made them formidable. such excrescencies should be taken off on their 
first appearance as then the work is easy and less Dangerous than when 
they have grown to a head." Possibly thinking of Virginia's own prob.-
lems with Kentucky, Jones declared: "We know not what may be the con-
sequences if Congress shall countenance by precedent the dismembering 
of States because the people blown up into discontents by designing am-
bitious Men shall ask or demand it." He closed with an injunction: 
"fix the boundaries of these States and let the people who live within 
their respective limits know they· are Citizens and must submit to their 
34 Governments." A week later, writing in a similar vein, Jones assert-
ed: This affair ought to be a warning to Congress how to act in similar 
situations in future--to be remiss and indecisive upon such pretensions 
33JcC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 832-833. 
34J. Jones to Madison, Oct. 2, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, pp. 105-106. 
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as these serves not only to support and not discourage the claimants. 
it Joes more[,] it shews the weakness or wickedness of Government and 
must ultimately produce dishonor and contempt."35 
The hardening attitudes of New York and Virginia delayed rather 
than expedited a congressional decision, but that decision was also de-
layed because during the next several months congressional representa-
tion was seldom full enough to muster the necessary nine disinterested 
36 
states. Meanwhile, the activities of Vermont and of many towns east 
of the Connecticut River caused increasing confusion and hardship in 
both New York and New Hampshire. On June 20, 1781, President \\Teare 
wrote to New Hampshire's delegates pleading for Congress to act. Weare 
pointed out that he believed the controversy over the Grants should have 
been settled long ago and was disturbed by "the amazing unexpected 
delay" of Congress, as that delay had been "attended with great mis-
chief" to both the United States and New Hampshire. He asserted that 
many of the disaffected persons in the Grants were even negotiating 
with the enemy and declared: "In short, New Hampshire is brought into 
such a dilenuna and the Government thrown into such confusion by the 
delay in Congress, that it is impossible for her to comply with the 
requisitions of Congress, to any great degree, while the dispute remains 
unsettled; and it is in vain for them to expect it of her, as no sup-
plies of men, money or provisions can be collected at present from more 
than 2/3rds even of the State which lies east of the Connecticut River, 
II He warned the delegates that "unless Congress brings matters to 
35J. Jones ·to Madison, Oct. 9, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, pp. 119-120. 
36 
Sullivan to Weare, July 10, 1781, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 402-403. 
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an inunediate issue, we cannot tell how far the contagion may run, but 
very much fear that the State will be very soon ruined in a great mea-
sure, and not able to contribute further towards the war. 1137 
Answering Weare's letter, John Sullivan noted that Weare's conununi-
cation had been referred to a conunittee, but that he and his colleague 
Samuel Livermore were uncertain how to proceed. Sullivan believed that 
if independence were denied to the Grants the only state that would ben-
efit would be New York, but he had still decided to oppose. He charged 
that "the present members would make desperate struggles for indepen-
dence" because Vermont had made "enormous Grants to men of Influence in 
several States, & even to members of Congress." He argued that the only 
"plausible argument in favor of determining the Question of Indepen-
dency" would be that the dispute was not between New York and New Hamp-
shire but between them and the people claiming to be independent of 
both. He and Livermore would argue, however, that the two states had 
always been contiguous and therefore no independent state could exist 
between them. He would also argue that if Vermont was declared indepen-
dent it would be outside the jurisdiction of Congress as Congress had 
nothing to do with more than thirteen states. Finally, he declared: 
"The safest ground therefore for New Hampshire, is to insist that there 
is no intermediate spot between New York and New Hampshire; & that as 
Congress have Included Vermont within the limits of the Thirteen United 
States it must belong to some of them and therefore Congress ought to 
Determine to which, --agreeable to the rules Laid Down in the 
37 
Weare to the New Hampshire Delegates, June 20, 1781, NHPS. Vol. 
X, pp. 1+01-402. 
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Confederation. 1138 
Urged on by New Hampshire, Congress began to act upon Weare's let-
ter of June 20, and a month later the conunittee to which Weare's letter 
was referred finally reported. But once again Congress postponed de-
39 bate. The report was considered again on August 2, but was delayed, 
in part because Congress was involved in the early stages of the York-
town campaign. 40 Meanwhile, James Duane and Ezra L'Hommedieu, the 
delegates from New York, also demanded that Congress come to some sort 
of determination. They argued that congressional delay had led Vermont 
to extend its boundaries even farther west and "that these high handed 
incroachments have greatly interrupted the raising of levies and sup-
plies within the State of New York for the support of the war and must 
be productive of further weakness and disorder and render the said state 
already greatly exhausted and desolated altogether unable to contribute 
41 to the common cuase." 
Four days later, on August 7, 1781, Congress finally acted. It 
resolved that since Congress had already heard the claims of New Hamp-
shire and New York to the disputed region it now wished to appoint a 
committee of five to confer with persons appointed by the district in 
conflict respecting their claims and "on what terms it may be proper to 
admit them into the federal union of these states in case the United 
38 Sullivan to Wear.e, July 10, 1781, NHPS, Vol. X, pp. 402-403. 
39JCC, Vol. XX, pp. 770-772. 
4oJCC, Vol. XXI, pp. 824-825. 
41 New York Delegates Memorial on Vermont, Aug. 3, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, 
pp. 164-167. 
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States in Congress assembled shall determine to recognize their inde-
pendence, 1142 On the following day it appointed Elias Boudinot of 
New Jersey; Nicholas Van Dyke of Delaware, Daniel Carroll of Maryland, 
Joseph Montgomery of Pennsylvania, and Edmund Randolph of Virginia as 
h . 43 t e committee. After conferring with a committee from Vermont already 
in Philadelphia consisting of Jonas Fry, Ira Allen, and Bezaleel Wood-
d h d f . cl h . h 44 war , t e committee reporte its in ings to Congress on t e twentiet . 
Whereupon, Congress declared that as "an indispensible preliminary to 
the recognition of the independence of the people inhabiting the terri-
tory called Vermont that they explicitly relinquish all demands of land 
or jurisdictions the east side of the west bank of Connecticut river." 
The boundaries on the north, south, and west insisted on by Congress 
also closely corresponded to the modern boundaries of the state of Ver-
45 
mont. While no grant of independence was offered by the resolution, 
clearly if Vermont accepted the boundaries required by Congress, it 
would have taken the first important step in that direction. 
Though the large states, except New York, consented to this propo-
sition, most did so from expedience rather than from any conviction that 
it was wise. Edmund Pendleton, writing from Virginia, noted: "The sep-
aration & Independence of the people of Vermont is a very serious and 
unlucky affair, which I wish there have not been Occasion for Congress 
to decide on." While he recognized that the inhabitants of the Grants 
42JCC, Vol. XXI, pp. 836-839. 
43rbid., pp. 841-842. 
44 rbid., pp. 875-876. 
45rbid., pp. 886-888. 
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had no other prospect for relief "yet to divide a state at the request 
of some members of it, against the will of the Majority or indeed ad-
mitting a Power in Congress to divide at all, will establish a precedent 
that may prove the Source of much Mischief at some further period." He 
observed: "This business . . . will probably be pleasing to the small 
States and disgusting to the large, & so produce dissentions amongst 
Us ... A case like this may never happen again, yet Precedents, of 
Power especially, are of such a ductile nature as to be extended to any 
j . l 11 . h 1146 purpose a ma or1ty s1a w1s . 
The New York Legislature also vigorously protested the congres-
sional decision. On November 24, 1781, after reciting a history of the 
affair, the legislature declared that it was greatly alarmed that Con-
gress had acted from political expediency by passing the acts of August 
7 and 20 which had authorized the creation of an independent state out 
of territory "belonging most unquestionably to this State" especially 
since these resolves of Congress violated the Articles of Confederation. 
Resolving that Congress had no power either to create an independent l 
state or to add any other colony to the union except Canada, the Legis-
lature also resolved: "That in case of any attempt by Congress, to 
carry into Execution· their said Acts this Legislature, with all 
due Deference to Congress, are bound to declare the same an As-
sumption of Power in the Face of the said Act of Submission of this 
State [which permitted Congress to judge the dispute], and against the 
clear Letter and Spirit of the.2d, 3d, 9th and 11th Articles of the 
46Pendleton to Madison, Aug. 27, 1781, PJM, 'Vol. 3, pp. 234-235. -- : 
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Confederation and a Manifest Infraction of the same: . . 
Meanwhile, the Legislature of Vermont rejected the congressional 
offer on October 17 and 18, 1781. It assigned as its reasons that as 
Vermont was not yet recognized as one of the states by Congress, it was 
not bound to submit to its judgement. Only if Congress first allowed 
Vernillnt its independence would that state allow its boundary disputes 
with New Hampshire and New York to be resolved by Congress according to 
the Articles. 48 The refusal of Vermont had been accompanied by a fur-
ther encroachment on the lands of both New York and New Hampshire, keep-
ing the question of what to do with the Grants very much alive in Con-
gress. Madison noted that "there is at this moment every symptom 
approaching hostility" between Vermont and the states of New York and 
New Hampshire. While the necessity of congressional interposition was 
obvious, Madison observed that Congress was unsure as to how to proceed 
because of the varying views of the members of Congress. Some did not 
believe that Congress could decide either upon Vermont's independence 
or on admitting them into the confederacy. Others argued the danger of 
setting precedent. For Madison the problem was the preponderancy its 
49 
admission would give to the New England states. Amplifying his fears 
in April, 1782, Madison charged: "The true secret [for admitting Ver-
mont] is that the vote of Vermont is wished for as an auxiliary agst. 
. 50 
the western claims of Virga." 
47 clinton to the New York Delegates, Nov. 24, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, 
pp. 515-519. 
48 JCC, Vol. XXII, pp. 164-173. 
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50Madison to Pendleton, Apr. 23, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, p. 178. 
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Fellow Virginian Arthur Lee's fears encompassed more than Virgin-
ia's western claims. Noting that some in Massachusetts and Connecticut 
wanted Vermont entered as an independent state he argued that it could 
not be done within the powers of the Confederation. If such a power 
were admitted, small states would dismember large states, and since each 
state added would have an equal vote with the larger, they would propor-
tion quotas in such a manner that the large states would bear the whole 
burden. Therefore, Lee argued that a compromise might be to grant Ver-
51 
mont independence bu-t not permit it a vote in Congress. William 
Ellery and Ezekiel Cornell asserted: "Some states will oppose their 
[Vermont] being admitted into the Federal Union because it mi8ht affect 
the balance of power by throwing an additional weight into the Eastern 
scale; and because it might be a precedent for augmenting the number of 
52 
the Confederate states, already too large." 
The situation was further complicated because the Vermont Legisla-
ture finally decided to accept the boundaries for their states as con-
tained in the congressional offer of August 7 and 20. On January 1, 
1782, .General Washington had :Written to Governor Chittenden pleading 
with him to comply with the resolution. The core of the argument was 
that the "point now indispute is of the utmost political importance to 
the future union and peace of this great country." Noting that Vermont 
would be the first new state admitted to the union, he argued that if it 
was "suffered to encroach upon the ancient established boundaries of the 
51 
Arthur Lee to James Warren, Har. 8, 1782, WAL, Vol. II, pp. 171-
172. 
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adjacent ones, [it] will serve as a precedent for others ... II He 
also observed that Vermont's continued pressing of its boundaries was 
53 making enemies of its friends in Congress. Thus the Vermont Legisla-
ture, in a series of resolves and acts passed on February 20, 22, and 
23, complied with the congressional resolution. 54 
By the time Vermont's reversal reached Congress, however, the sit-
uation had changed measurably. The resolves of August 7 and 20, 1781, 
had been passed .in the crisis before Yorktown. The military pressure 
had now been relieved, and it seemed no longer expedient to offer inde-
pendence to Vermont. Many members of Congress, especially from the 
landed states, now generally opposed independence and insisted that Ver-
mont's original rejection of the congressional conditions must stand 
until Congress made the offer again; this Congress would not do, despite 
. 55 
Vermont's new willingness to cooperate. Vitally concerned in the 
issue, New York instructed its delegates to work against the indepen-
deuce of Vermont and even passed two acts in May, 1782, offering to 
confirm all grants of land in the region west of the Connecticut River 
56 
regardless of who granted them. 
Also vitally concerned with the outcome, but failing to achieve 
meaningful consideration of its case in Congress, Vermont continued to 
consolidate its position within the Grants. The methods it employed 
53 . 
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raised sharp objections in Congress, which issued another warning to 
Vermont on December 5, 1782. Noting that in disregard of previous con-
gressional reso·lutions, the government of Vermont continued to oppress 
the citizens in the Grants who owed their allegiance to New York "by 
means whereof divers of them have been condemned to banishment, not to 
return on pain of death and confiscation of estates." Congress resolved 
that the actions were "highly derogatory to the authority of the United 
States and dangerous to the Confed~racy. II Insisting that Vermont 
desist from these activities, Congress _warned: "That the United States 
will take effectual measures to enforce a compliance with the aforesaid 
resolutions, in case the same shall be disobeyed by the people of the 
'd d 1157 sai istrict. • • • This assertion of congressional authority was 
opposed by David Howell of Rhode Island who wanted the clause stricken. 
He was supported in his opposition by the assembly of Rhode Island which 
in. February, 1783, instructed its delegates to procure the repeal of the 
resolve against Vermont. In addition, the Assembly ordered its dele-
gates not to join in compulsory measures against Vermont so long as it 
continued loyal to the interests of the United States and to try to get 
C V . . d d 58 ongress to grant ermont its in epen ence. 
On the other hand, the delegates from Virginia strongly supported 
both the opposition of New York to the.independence of Vermont and the 
congressional resolution of December 5. Writing to General Washington 
as late as February, 1783, Joseph Jones observed that Virginia had 
57 JCC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 765-769. 
58Instructions to Delegates from the General Assembly, Feb., 1783, 
RICC, p. 431. 
186 
generally been among Vermont's opponents, "not so much, perhaps, upon 
the question of independence, as the impolicy of her admission into the 
union while several very important questions of local concern remain un-
determined; and, until these great points are settled, the consent of 
Virginia, I expect, will be withheld, and if before obtained, it will 
be a sacrifice of her opinion to the peace and common weal of the 
United States. 1159 
The "very important question's of local concern" Jones referred to, 
of course, were the problems of western lands and congressional indeci-
sion on whether or not to accept the conditions of the Virgin,ia cession. 
These problems plagued the conduct of Congress throughout much of its 
existence and in the years 1780 through 1783 drove an additional wedge 
between the states by increasing the friction among those which were 
landed and those which were landless. The conflicts eventually spilled 
over into other areas, weakening both congressional authority and the 
attempts to strengthen that authority as well. The controversy over 
western lands, as previously noted, had affected the writing of the 
Articles of Confederation, and the failure of the Articles to make 
western lands a common holding of the nation had led Maryland to refuse 
to ratify that document. 
The debates also reflected clearly the nature of the government 
created by the Confederation. The delegates, when they wrote the Arti-
cles, were aware that the basic relationship in political systems was 
between government and people, as mirrored in the relationship between 
59J. Jones to Washington, Feb. 27, 1783, CAR, Vol. III, pp. 554-
560. 
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the state governments and their own citizens. But for the purposes of 
unified action and policy the revolutionaries had been forced to create 
a national government. Since it was theoretically impossible to have 
two powers exercising authority over the same polity, they had created 
a central government whose only constituents were thirteen artificial 
persons. Such delegates as James Madison clearly understood this rela-
tionship. The debates over the trans-Appalachian West, however, not 
only involved adjustments between the jarring interests of the thirteen 
artificial persons but also attempts by individuals to create a direct 
relationship between Congress and citizens which did not exist under the 
Confederation. 
Madyland's declaration on western lands, read in Congress on Janu-
ary 6, 1779, succintly summed up· the views and fears of the landless 
states. It asserted that Maryland was "justly entitled to a right in 
common with other members of the union to that extensive trace of coun-
try which lies to the westward of the frontiers of the United States, 
the property of which was not vested in, or granted to Individuals at 
the connnencement of the present war; II Maryland argued that it 
would willingly accede to the Articles .of Confederation if they guaran-
teed equal shares of the western lands, but since they did not, Maryland 
esteemed "it fundamentally wrong and repugnant to every principle of 
Equity and good policy, on which a Confederation between Free, Sover.-
eign and Independent States ought to be founded; that this or any other 
State entering into such Confederations, should be burthened with heavy 
expenses for the subduing and guaranteeing i~ense tracts of country, 
if they are not to share any part of the monies arising from the sales 
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of the Lands within those tracts .•• More specifically, Maryland 
argued: "Virginia, by selling, on the most moderate terms, a small 
proportion of the lands in question, would draw vast sums of money" and 
would be .able to reduce taxes. Cheap land and low taxes, compared to 
neighboring states, "would quickly drain the States thus disadvantag-
eously circumstanced, of its most useful inhabitants; its wealth and 
its consequence in the scale of the confederated States would sink of 
course. 1161 
None of the landed states, however, would either permit the Arti-
cles to be modified or surrender their claims to the western territor-
ies.· Virginia especially was adament and even sponsored several 
expeditions into the West under the leadership of George Rogers Clark 
to expel the British and pacify the Indians. Its problems were immense-
ly complicated by claims made by such speculator groups as the Vandalia 
and Indiana companies, which asserted that they had purchased large 
tracts of land from the Indians in the region between the Ohio and Mis-
sissippi Rivers prior to the war; these claims overlapped those of 
Virginia. Many members of those companies were also delegates to Con-
gress. Consequently, Virginia was understandably reluctant to surrender 
62 
the dispute over those territories to Congress. 
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In December, 1779, protesting against Congress' accepting petitions 
from the Vandalia and Indiana Companies, the General Assembly of Virgin-
ia argued that Congress had no right to accept such petitions because, 
"when Virginia acceded to the Articles of Confederation, her rights of 
sovereignty and Jurisdiction within her own territory were reserved & 
secured to her and cannot now be infringed or altered, without her con-
sent." Willing to make great sacrifices for the connnon cause, as it 
had already done "on the subject of Representation," the Assembly de-
clared that it would consider any reasonable suggestion to hasten the 
completion of the Confederation. But the Assembly also asserted that 
"the commonwealth of Virginia expressly protests against any Jurisdic-
tion, or right of adjudication in Congress upon the petitions of the 
Vandalia or Indiana Companies, or any other matter or thing subversive 
of the internal policy, civil government, or sovereignty of this or any 
other of the United American States or unwarranted by the Articles of 
Confederation. 1163 
Meanwhile, in June, 1779, for various reasons, Virginia had opened 
a land office. 64 The anger aroused in Congress by that action virtually 
assured that Congress would not concede Virginia's demands on the peti-
tions. James Mercer, one of Virginia's delegates, reported: "I am 
sure the prejudice of Congress against Virginia on account of the land 
office is now so great that I cou'd not expect Justice at their Hands, 
and if I mistake not, the Nature of Virginia's Demand, is such as to 
63 
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The pressures of the war during 1780, and the necessity of complet-
ing the Confederation, however, caused both New York and Virginia to 
reconsider their western claims. Governor Clinton of New York noted in 
early January, 1780, that he would be willing to surrender a part of New 
York's claim if Congress would guarantee the rest. 66 The New York dele-
gate, Philip Schuyler, disagreed, arguing that a cession would be injur-
ious to New York because it would take property rightfully belonging to 
67 
the state and because Congress had no appreciation of Indian problems. 
The state legislature, however, agreed with Clinton and, o~ February 18:1\ 
surrendered its jurisdiction over its western territory, citing as its ) 
reason, "to accelerate the Federal Alliance, by removing as far as it 
depends upon them, the before mentioned impediment to its final accom-/_~-" 
plishment. 1168 
The Virginia delegates, Joseph Jones, James Madison and John 
Walker, also separately urged their government to cede a portion of its 
western lands since it was obvious that unless it did Maryland would not 
confederate. But none of them was willing to surrender the Virginia 
1 . . h d. . 69 c aims wit out some con itions. Writing to Washington, Joseph Jones 
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.noted that he would be attending the Virginia Assembly in order to par-
ticipate in its decision on the western lands. He observed: "We are 
already too large for the energy of republican government; and I fear, 
shall still be so, if the Assembly shall relinquish their claims to the 
north~west of the Ohio to the Continent. 1170 Meanwhile, George Morgan, 
a member of the Indiana Company, made the mistake of appealing to the 
Virginia delegates to support a special judicial body in Congress to 
judge the claims of the company. He noted that a number of prominent 
men were involved and that the company had lost its appeal in the 
71 Virginia Assembly by only the deciding vote of the speaker. Morgan 
was sharply rebuked by Madison, who declared that his state had already 
made its decision, and in accordance with the relationship established 
between Congress and the states, Morgan's request "could not reconcile 
with the respect due from every State to its own Sovereignty and honor, 
an appeal from its own decisions, to a foreign tribunal, in a case 
· which involves the Pre tens ions of Individuals only. . • • " 7 2 Moreover, 
the appeal moved Madison to remind Joseph Jones to call the Virginia 
Assembly's attention to "the conditions which prudence requires should 
be annexed to any territorial cession that may be agreed on. I do not 
believe there is any serious design in Congress to gratify .the avidity 
of land mongers, but the best security for their virtue in this respect 
70J. Jones to Washington, Nov. 12, 1780, CAR, Vol. III, pp. 103-
104. 
71 George Morgan to Virginia Delegates in Congress, Nov. 15, 1780, 
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will be to keep it out of their power." 
The cession, as passed by the Assembly on January 2, 1781, con-
192 
tained eight conditions which Congress was required to fulfill before 
the Assembly would transfer its claim to the territory north of the 
Ohio River. The first six, though causing some debate, were generally 
considered just by Congress. The last two conditions, however, caused 
much difficulty. The seventh insisted that Congress honor the relation-
ship established between itself and the states by declaring null and 
void the claims of any private persons to portions of the region if 
those claims had been made inconsistent with the law of Virginia. This 
last would rule out all the claims of the companies. Finally, the As-
sembly insisted that Congress guarantee to Virginia all the land south 
of the Ohio River and bounded by Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North 
. 74 
Carolina. 
While Congress would not accept all the conditions of the cession, 
Virginia's action was at least enough to persuade Maryland to ratify 
the Articles of Confederation. Some states, however, continued to ob-
ject to the opening of a land office in Virginia, and feelings against 
that state remained high. In January, 1781, New Jersey set the keynote 
of what would become the major objection to the Virginia cession. It 
declared that Virginia was selling and claiming lands '~hich before and 
at the commencement of the present war were confessedly vested in the 
Crown of Great Britain, when on the plainest principles of the law of 
73Madison to J. Jones, Nov. 21, 1780, PJM, Vol. 2, pp. 190-191. 
74Resolution of the General Assembly of the Conunonwealth of Virginia 
for a Cession of Western Territory, Jan. 2, 1781, PCC, R88, Item 75, 
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nations, of reason, truth and justice, they are become by the revolution 
vested in Congress for the use of the foederal Republic They repre-
75 
sent." Throughout most of 1781, however, the question of the cession 
remained submerged while Congress was involved in finances and the 
sout~ern campaign of the British. But in October, the issue was once 
again heatedly debated on the floor of Congress. 
The committee to whom the various cessions of New York, Virginia, 
and Connecticut, and all claims of several companies were referred, con-
sisted entirely of members from landless states--New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Madison·noted: "The 
ingredients of this composition prepared us for the complextion of 
their proceedings," 7 6 He also asserted.: "An agrarian law is much 
covete[d] by the little members of the Union, as ever it wa? by the 
indigent Citizens of Rome. 1177 Madison's equating states with people 
was perfectly consistent with the view that the Confederation consti-
tuted little more than a common council of thirteen artificial persons; 
so too was the attempt of Virginia's delegates to get the powers of the 
committee strictly defined, On October 16, the delegates argued that 
the committee could not accept the petitions of the land companies 
"because if the lands ..• lie within the limits of such State, by its 
authority alone can the merits of their claims be enforced, [and] be-
cause the jurisdiction of Congress in territorial questions, being 
75Representation of the State of New Jersey, Jan. 3, 1781, PCC, 
R82, Item 68, pp. 567-571. 
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confined to an adjustment of the confronting claims of different states, 
if the lands claimed by those companies lie within the limits of Virgin-
ia, or any of the other states, Congress are interdicted by the Confed-. 
eration from the cognizance of such claims •.• 1178 
Nevertheless, the couunittee continued to hear evidence over Virgin-
ia's objections. Edmund Randolph noted that the delegates had attended 
the hearings of the committee and listened to the voluminous evidence 
of New York and Connecticut. But the Virginia delegates declined to 
present any arguments, holding that they "were not free to submit to 
the inspection and decision even of congress itself the charters and 
other territorial documents of Virginia." The delegates grounded their 
refusal on two principles: First, the resolutions of Congress which had 
moved Virginia to make its cession, as they explicitly intended to elim-
inate all inquiries into territorial rights, ·~ere an actual fraud upon 
Virginia;" second, the assumption of jurisdiction being made by the com-
mi ttee and by Congress was "contrary to the confederation. . 1179 
Madison, writing to Jefferson in November, 1781, discussed the 
actions of the committee and of Congress towards Virginia and stated: 
"They clearly speak the hostile machinations of some of the States 
against our territorial claims, & afford suspicions that the predomi-
nant temper of Congress may coincide with them." He cautioned, however, 
that the committee's report had not yet been debated on the floor of 
Congress and "that the report itself is not founded on the obnoxious 
78JCC, Vol. XXI, pp. 1057-1058. 
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doctrine of an inherent right in the U. States to the territory in 
question, but on the expediency of cloathing them with the title of 
New York. " He also observed that the committee was largely made 
up of states which were "systematically & notoriously adverse to the 
claims of western territory and particularly those of Virginia" and 
therefore that its opinion was "no just index of the opinion of Con-
gr es s. • "80 
But the attempts of the landless states to violate the constitu-
tional relationships of the Confederation angered Madison. While he 
requested Jefferson to forestall any rash decisions on the subject by 
Virginia's Assembly, he still firmly believed that the Assembly had 
every reason to revoke or suspend its Act of Cession and to remonstrate 
against the invasion of its jurisdiction. Indeed, Madison was so dis-
turbed he urged that the Assembly "ought in all their provisions for 
their future security, importance & interest to presume that the present 
Union will but little survive the present war." He was "equally sensi-
ble nevertheless of the necessity of great temper & moderation with re-
spect to the first point, and in the last that.they ought to be as fully 
·impressed with the necessity of Union during the war as of its probable 
dissolution after it. 1181 
The corrunittee report accepted the cession of New York, since it 
was unconditional and because it encompassed much of the territory 
claimed by Virginia; and as expected, the corrunittee rejected the cession 
of Virginia. On the claims of the companies, it endorsed that of the 
80Madison to Jefferson, Nov. 18, 1781, PJM, Vol. 3, pp. 307-308. 
81 Ibid. 
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Indiana Company, rejected those of the Illinois and Wabash Companies, 
and dismissed that of the Vandalia Company except for guaranteeing 
compensation to those who had already purchased land from that company. 
The rest of the report, in essence, fulfilled Virginia's first six con-
82 
ditions, perhaps with hopes of gaining that state's support. But as 
was obvious from the Virginia delegates' previous stance, they would 
not accept the report. 
The consideration of the committee's report was delayed for several 
months by the press of other business. But beginning in April, 1782, 
the Virginia delegates began pu?hing hard for some kind of decision so 
that the Virginia Assembly could know how to react. On April 18, they 
proposed consideration of the report and moved to have each member of 
Congress "declare upon his honor, whether he is,· or is not personally 
interested directly or indirectly in the claims" of the companies, but 
83 through parliamentary maneuvers consideration was postponed. On April 
I 
23 the d~legates reported to Governor Benjamin Harrison that they 
"again endeavoured.to obtain from Congress some explicit division on 
the territorial cession of Virginia that the Assembly may not again be 
left in uncertainty on that subject." The reason they failed at this 
time, they noted, was the illness of the President of Congress, John 
Hanson, and the delegates considered it prudent to yield to postpone-
84 
ment. 
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The tensions building in Congress over the issue even led to ques-
tionable activities by prominent officials in Congress, and because of 
this, to Madison's urging that the requests of Congress be ignored. 
Writing to Jefferson in March, 1782, Madison noted that Congress had 
received a bundle of papers relative to the relations of Virginia with 
the Cherokees from Jefferson and that apparently these papers had been 
requested by former President Tbomas McKean 'without any written or 
verbal sanction .•. of Congress; and not improbably with a view of 
fishing for discoveries which may be subservient to the aggressions 
mediated on the territorial rights of Virginia.'' Madison noted that 
other papers had apparently been promised and requested from Jefferson 
that if he discovered "the papers contain anything which the adversaries 
of Virginia may make ill use of, you will not suffer any respect for the 
acts of Congress to induce you to forward hither. 1185 · 
6 'd . f d . . 86 On May the consi eration o the cession was postpone again. 
The delegates from Rhode Island justified the postponements on the 
grounds that they wanted specific instructions from their state's as-
sembly on how to proceed and also that·"the United States might have an 
opportunity of recommending to the state of Virginia and other states 
. . . to make unrestricted and unconditional cessions . . . and to check 
that rage for securing extensive possessions by sale and settlment 
which hath seized Virginia .... 1187 In the following months Virginia 
85Madison to Jefferson, Mar. 26, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, p. 125. 
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continued to press for some decision on its cession but failed in July 
88 
and again in September. Congress finally abandoned the committee's 
report in so far as to consider the New York cession by itself and on 
October 29, 1782, finally accepted it. 89 The question of the Virginia 
cession, however, had reached an impasse. 
Consequently, the consideration of the Virginia cession did not 
come up again until June, 1783. On the tenth, Madison wrote Edmund 
Randolph that the committee report, which had raised so many problems in 
1782, had finally been recommitted and that a new report had been made 
which he believed might serve as a basis for compromise, primarily be-
cause "it tacitly excludes the pretensions of the Companies. 11 He did 
foresee some difficulties, however, both from New Jersey and from 11 the 
90 thinness of Congress." .As Madison predicted, the consideration of the 
cession was interrupted on June 30 by a remonstrance from the Legisla-
tive Council and General Assembly of New Jersey. In this protest New 
Jersey once again argued that the western lands belonged in common to 
all the United States, as all states had spent both treasure ·and blood 
to guarantee that those backlands would be reserved for the United 
91 States as a whole. 
Despite the objections, Congress finally reached a settlement in 
September. After listing the eight conditions of the Virginia cession, 
Congress agreed to the first six. On the seventh, which would have 
88JCC, Vol. XXII, pp. 423-426; Vol. XXIII, pp. 550-553, 604-606. 
89JCC, Vol. XXIII, p. 694. 
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discounted the claims of the companies, Congress decided that it could 
not "declare the purchases and grants therein mentioned, absolutely void 
and of no effect" but that the sixth condition, already acceded to, 
which outlined how the lands beyond the Ohio should be disposed of, "is 
sufficient on this point." The final condition, that of a congressional 
guarantee to Virginia of the land south of the Ohio, Congress asserted 
it could not grant without entering into a discussion of the right of 
Virginia to that land. This Congress refused to do, as it was its orig-
inal intent to avoid all discussions of right "and only to reconunend and 
accept a cession of their claims, whatsoever they might be to vacant 
territory." 
92 
Only New Jersey and Maryland opposed the report. 
Though Congress had not acceded to all of the conditions of the 
Virginia cession, it had denied any congressional authority to interfere 
between individuals and states and had refused to assume the power to 
judge the question of right, thus finally conforming to the constitu-
tional relationships established by the Confederation. Consequently, 
in December, 1783, the Virginia Assembly acquiesced to Congress' condi-
. 1 . f h . 93 tiona acceptance o t e cession. 
Throughout the debates on the trans-Appalachian West and the New 
Hampshire Grants, the states aligned themselves on the questions strict-
ly according to their particular interests. On May 1, 1782, Madison 
described the impact of these debates on congressional politics. Dis-
cussing first the question of Vermont, he declared that its independence 
92 JGC, Vol. XXV, pp. 554-565. 
93 
J. Jones to Jefferson, Dec. 21, 1783; and Dec. 29, 1783, PTJ, 
Vol. 6, pp. 414-415, 428. 
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was supported principally by the "Eastern States" (Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire) because of three reasons; 
old prejudices against New York; interests which many citizens of those 
states had in lands granted by Vermont; and most importantly, because 
of the extra vote their region would achieve in Congress. Pennsylvania 
and Maryland also supported independence for Vermont, hoping to reen-
force the opposition to claim of western territory. New Jersey and 
Delaware joined the pro-Vermont forces, not only for the above reasons, 
but also "with the additional view of strengthening the interests of the 
little states. 1194 
The independence of Vermont was opposed by New York for obvious 
reasons, but it was also opposed by Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia, principally for four reasons; first was a "habit-
ual jealousy" of "Eastern Interests;" second was the opposition expected 
from Vermont to western claims; third was "the inexpediency of permit-
ting so unimportant a State, to an equal vote,'' in deciding peace and 
other current interests of the union; finally was the fear of setting 
precedents for dismembering other states in the Confederation. 95 
On the problem of western lands, Madison noted that the claims were 
most strongly opposed by Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, and Maryland. He asserted that Rhode Island's opposition was in-
spired by a desire "to share in the vacant territory as a fund of reve-
nue" and "by the envy & jealousy naturally excited by superior resources 
· 94observations Relating to the Influence of Vermont and the Terri-
torial Claims on the Politics of Congress, May 1, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, 
pp •. 200-202. 
95 Ibid. 
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& importance." He believed that the other four states were also partly 
influenced by these two factors, but charged that their opposition was 
caused "principally by the intrigues of their Citizens who are inter-
ested in the claims of land companies." He also observed that the set-
tlement of the claims was hampered by the delaying tactics of other 
states. Aware that if the western claims were settled, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania would quickly abandon Vermont, Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut were active "in keeping the territorial Controversy pending." Those 
which supported western claims were naturally the states which had in-
terests in the region--Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia 
96 
and New York. 
Obviously the pushing and hauling over the territorial problems of 
the Confederation generated as much friction among the competing inter-
ests of the states as had the financial problems during 1780 and 1781. 
These claims, as they were fought openly in the corridors of Congress, 
created much bitterness, and illustrated to both the members of Congress 
and the legislatures of the states that body's ineffectiveness as a 
judge of interstate conflicts. Equally as important, the conflicts 
over the territories illustrate the difficulties in classifying any of 
the delegates as either nationalists or states' rightists. When the 
interests of their particular states were involved, the delegates as-
sumed whatever constitutional posture which was expedient to promote 
or protect those interests. The ultimate victim of the competing in-
terests, of course, was congressional authority. 
CHAPTER VII 
IMPOST TO IMPOST 
The problem of conflicting territorial claims continued to plague 
interstate cooperation throughout 1782 and 1783, but so too did con-
gressional finances. At the close of 1781, the impost proposed earlier 
in the year had not been ratified by the states, and Congress once again 
resorted to apportioning quotas among the states based on estimated pop-
ulations in order to support its finances •. Throughout 1782, both Con-
gress and the Superintendent of Finance urged the states to comply with 
the requisitions and the impost resolution. In both cases they failed. 
The conflicts which had been developing among the states throughout the 
war became even more apparent after the capture of Cornwallis in Octo-
ber, 1781. After that event, the states began to turn their attention 
inward in order to solve their own pressing economic problems. In part 
this was due to the belief prevalent in many states that victory at 
Yorktown signaled Britain's ultimate defeat. In addition, many states, 
especially in the South, were fiscally, physically and psychologically 
exhausted by the strenuous efforts exerted in opposing Britain's inva-
sion of the South for more than two years. It can also be argued, how-
ever, that th~ l~ck of a serious British military threat after October, 
1781, simply unmasked the conflicts which had been building throughout 
the war. 
The conflicts became most apparent, once again, the realm of 
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finances, During 1782, without the passage of the impost, Congress had 
to continue to rely upon requisitions from the states. The returns from 
this method never amounted to much and dwindled even further in the 
months following Yorktown, as several states began to question the fair-
ness of the quota system. The contributions of the states also lessened 
because the citizens of many states urged their own governments to pay 
the debts owed them by the Continent, and the states responded by using 
the taxes raised for Congress to pay those obligations. Realizing that 
little aid was forthcoming from the states and spurred on by Robert 
Morris, in late 1782 and early 1783 Congress again tried to reorder its 
finances by establishing a source of income which would be independent 
of direct state control. 
Throughout his reign as Superintendent of Finances, Morris attempt-
ed to strengthen congressional finances and congressional power. As 
part of·his program he insisted upon hard money taxes and strict federal 
control over all money raised. Viewing the public debt as a potential 
bond of union, he opposed states paying any portion of the national 
debt and argued that such debts could be paid only by federal taxes 
levied and collected by Congress . 1 The so-called "~fationalist Congress" 
which existed almost coterminously with his period in office was ob-
viously sympathetic with part of his program but perhaps was not so 
nationalistically oriented as historians such as E. James Ferguson and 
Merrill Jensen have indicated. 2 
Morris, afte-r all, was the officer whom Congress had selected to 
1 
Ferguson, Power~ the Purse, pp. 140-145. 
2rbid., and Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 4-5. 
204 
bring order to the nation's chaotic finances, and members were inclined 
to support him as such. Each of them had experienced the frustrations 
and dangers inherent in relying upon the states to finance the war a,_nd 
many of them recognized the possible injustices which would result to 
individuals if the states were permitted to pay Congress' debts. At 
the same time, they were also representatives of their states, each of 
which was fearful that if any of Morris' proposed methods for acquiring 
federal taxes were imposed, the burden of financing the war and the 
post-war national government would fall unequally upon the states; The 
delegates responded to the fears of their states and rejected most of 
Morris' proposals. Those they accepted were considerably weaker than 
what Morris had intended. 
As discussed previously, even before Morris' appointment Congress 
had resolved on February 3, 1781, to ask the states to permit it to 
collect a five percent impost on imports and prize goods. Reluctant to 
comply with this request for various reasons, the states were slow to 
grant the permission. Thoroughly approving of the impost, Robert Mor~ 
ris, acting in his capacity as Superintendent of Finance, had written a 
harsh letter to the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and .Maryland 
in early January, 1782, demanding that those three states pass the 
impost. 3 A month later he wrote another circular letter, which was as 
strongly worded but less critical, outlin~ng the financial and military 
predicament of the country. Attempting to dispel the belief that any 
further aid could be expected from abroad, he declared that he had re-
ceived "the reiterated deterfilination of France to grant us no further 
3 
Supra, chp. v, pp. 160-161. 
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pecuniary aid." This situation had developed, he asserted, because 
America's domestic credit had ceased to exist and "until domestic credit 
is established foreign credit cannot exist, for it is absurd to expect 
that foreigners will confide in a government that has not the confidence 
of its own citizens." Noting that "many people flatter themselves with 
hopes of peace" because of the victory at Yorktown, he declared: "The 
successes of last campaign will undoubtedly derange the plans of the 
enemy, but whether or not those successes will prove decisive must de-
pend upon ourselves." He then pleaded with the states to fulfill their 
4 
federal obligatiO!J.S and comply with the resolutions of Congress. 
Perhaps, in part, because of Morris' importunings, Madison was able 
to report in early July, 1782, that every state had granted the impost 
except for Rhode Island and Georgia. 5 Rhode Island, however, would re-
main adamant~y opposed to the impost and sent delegates to Congress 
which reflected that opinion. In the judgement of the foremost histor-
ian of congressional finance, one of these delegates, David Howell, 
"almost singlehandedly wrecked the impost of 1781. 116 Indeed, on the 
question of the impost, Howell defended the interests of his state as 
ardently as the delegates from Virginia had defended their state's 
interests in the western lands. 
Beginning his campaign as early as July, 1783, Howell discussed 
his actions in a letter to Governor Greene. He noted that eleven states 
4 
Robert Morris, Circular, Feb. 13, 1782, PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, 
pp. 488-493; and MHS, 7th Ser., Vol. 3, pp. 324-332. 
5 . 
Madison to Randolph, July 2, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, pp. 386-387. 
6 
Ferguson, Power E!_ the Purse, p. 152, 
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had complied with the resolution but that various states had attached 
conditions to their consent. Some states insisted that it be replaced 
in a few years, other stipulated that the money derived from the duties 
could not be used to discharge the half-pay pensions for military offi-
cers, and still others demanded that the states retain the right to ap-
point the officers who would collect the tax. On behalf of Rhode 
Island, Howell argued that, because of his state 1 s exposure to attack 
and because its commerce had been destroyed, 11 if any substantial revenue 
could be derived from a duty of trade, this benefit ought in all right 
and justice, to belong solely and exclusively to the State, in compensa-
tion for losses already sustained, and as a security against still more 
fatal evils apprehended in all future wars. 117 
Attempting to measure the impact of the impost on his state, Howell 
noted that Rhode Island imported more goods than any of the surrounding 
states, and therefore would pay more than its fair share of the duties. 
He asserted that the impost would lead to a rise in the prices of home 
products and, since Rhode Island acquired most of these products from 
surrounding states, it would in effect be paying five percent on those 
goods as well. He also feared that neighboring states would raise their 
duties and thus leave Rhode Island at their mercy. He argued that only 
if trade remained free from duties could his state '~e enabled to treat 
with our neighbors, however extensive their territory, or however over-
bearing their temporary insolence, upon terms of equality. 118 
Pressing yet another point, Howell observed that passage of the 
7 
David Howell to Governor Greene, July 30, 1782, ~' pp. 381-382. 
8 Ibid., p. 383. 
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impost would lessen Rhode Island's sovereignty because money would be 
drawn out of it by officials appointed by the United States. He argued 
"that all moneys raised in a sovereign state ought to pass to the credit 
of that sovereignty exclusively, and all civil officers acting in a 
Sovereign State ought to be authorized by and acco~ntable to the sov-
ereignty." He also noted that Congress was not accountable for the 
monies collected under the proposed impost, and therefore there was no 
guarantee that a change in time or of Congress might not bring abuses. 
Howell finally observed that he had been specifically instructed by the 
assembly to gain a portion of the backlands for Rhode Island and de-
clared: "As some states pertinaciously persist in claiming exclusive 
rights to said lands, it was not to be expected that our State would 
part with all the benefits of its maritime situation until some assur-
ance could be obtained of a participation in conunon with other States 
in the back lands •. 
Both Howell and fellow delegate Jonathan Arnold continued to oppose 
the impost in Congress and in letters to individuals. Writing in Aug-
ust, 1782, to Welcome Arnold, a member of the state legislature, Howell 
observed: "At the moment of my writing this letter you are I suppose 
at So. Kingston deliberating the 5 per Cent. I hope you will not adopt 
it. You will thereby raise money for some States who will not raise any 
10 for you nor even for themselves." Meanwhile, over the objections of 
Arnold and Howell, Congress resolved on October 10, 1782, that Rhode 
Island and Georgia answer immediately whether or not they would comply 
9 Ibid., pp. 383-385. 
10 Howell to Welcome Arnold, Aug, 23, 1782, .!!!£, Vol. VI, p. 454. 
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11 with the impost. Communicating the resolution to Governor Greene on 
October 13, the Rhode Island delegates once again reminded their state 
that Congress had not yet solved the problem of western claims and won-
dered, under these conditions> "whether it will be expedient for our 
S h . ..12 tate to pass t e impost •... Two days later the delegates wrote 
still another letter to Governor Greene pleading that the state not 
1 . h h . 13 comp y wit t e impost. 
Following its own inclinations and importunings of its delegates, 
on November 1, 1782, the Rhode Island Assembly unanimously rejected 
14 the impost. The Speaker of the House, William Bradford, then wrote 
Congress on November 30 to explain the three reasons why the Assembly 
would not comply. First, he declared that the impost was unequal in 
operation because it would weigh most heavily upon the commercial 
states. Second, he observed that compliance would introduce officers 
into the states which were not accountable to the government of Rhode 
Island; to comply therefore would have violated the state's constitu-
tion. Finally, he noted that the assembly feared that with a separate 
source of income, Congress would become independent of its constituent 
. 15 
members, the states. 
llJCC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 643--645. 
12Jonathan Arnold and Howell to Governor Greene, Oct. 13, 1782, 
~' pp. 393-394. 
13J. Arnold and Howell to Governor Greene, Oct. 15, 1782, RICC, 
PP• 394-399. 
14 Ed. Note, RICC, pp. 399-400. 
15William Bradford to the President of Congress, Nov. 30, 1782, PCC, 
R78, Item 64, pp. 526-528. 
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Before receiving this letter Congress had appointed a committee to 
go to Rhode Island and urge the assembly to grant the impost. 16 But 
upon receipt of Bradford's message, Congress delayed the departure of 
the committee and referred the letter to the committee originally as-
signed the task of writing instructions for the delegation so that it 
ld h b . . 17 cou answer t e o Ject1ons. Meanwhile, Congress had become very 
angry at Rhode Island's delegates and at David Howell in particular. 
In designing the impost and in working diligently to obtain the consent 
of their states, most delegates had surrendered their role as state am-
bassadors on this issue and had acted for what they considered the na-
tional good. Thus for most congressmen, the Rhode Island delegates' 
adherence to their role as state emissaries violated a national legis-
lative trust. Consequently Congress attempted to censure Howell for 
his obstreperous conduct, charging that he had violated the secrecy of 
Congress by sending extracts from America's ministers abroad to news-
papers in Rhode Island which tended to prove that the country could ob-
tain foreign loans if it so chose. 18 Congress' efforts, however, proved 
unavailing as the legislature of Rhode Island approved the conduct of 
19 its delegates. In addition, the deputation sent to Rhode Island never 
arrived. While on the road, it received news that the Virginia assembly 
had repealed the impost. Consequently, with the usefulness of its 
16JCC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 771-772. 
17Report of the Committee on the Letter From the State of Rhode 
Island, Dec. 16, 1782, !9.£, R29, Item 20, Vol. I, pp. 213-230. 
18 RICC, pp. 411-424. 
19 Ferguson, Power £f 1!!!, P·urse, pp. 153-154. 
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mission lost, the corrunittee returned despondently to Philadelphia. 20 
The action of the Virginia assembly not only caused the deputation 
to Rhode Island to return, but it had other effects as well. First, it 
highly embarrassed Madison because he had been so active in opposing 
the stance of Rhode Island and in condemning the actions of Rhode Is-
21 land's delegates. It also aroused the anger of several members of 
Congress, who were already irritated by that state's claims to western 
territory. For example, Samuel Wharton of Delaware, writing to his 
state's Council in early 1783, called the repeal "extraordinary," es-
pecially as Virginia had "paid little, or no part of the Requisition of 
1782, had not one Soldier in the great Army last Campaign, and only a 
few hundred in the separate, southern Army," and as the state continued 
its "futile claim to the innnense Western Region. 1122 Finally, and most 
importantly, the repeal ended congressional efforts to impose the impost 
under the resolution of February 3, 1781. 
The rest of Congress' financial schemes during 1782 failed as well. 
After the·victory at Yorktown, many states, believing that peace was at 
hand, were reluctant to assist Congress further until their own local 
financial problems were solved. There was no assurance, however, that 
Britain had indeed given up its efforts. Frightened by the lethargy of 
the states, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, writing to his brother in 
February, 1782, noted that there was little prospect of peace and that 
20JCC, Vol. XXIII, p. 831. 
21Madison to. Randolph, Jan. 22, 1782[3], and Madison to Randolph, 
Jan. 28,·1783, PJM,_Vol. 6, pp. 55-56, 156-157. 
22samuel Wharton to the Delaware Council, Jan. 6, 1783, LMC, Vol. 
VII, pp. 2-3. 
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there was even a rumor that Britain was sending yet another Army to 
America. He reported that General Washington believed the campaign of 
1782 would be the most important of the war, but declared: "Alas! we 
are distressed with the langour & Inactivity of the States--All that 
can be done by Congress, has been, to rouse them from their Lethargy--
but all is treated as a matter of course. We have no official Informa-
tion of any spirited measure taken by any State in the Union equal to 
the necessity of the Times--1123 
Boudinot's complaints had much foundation, as the states began to 
complain even more loudly about the apportionment of congressional quo-
tas and about their inability to pay. As noted previously, Congress 
had passed another requisition on the states on October 30, 1781, and 
set quotas on November 2 for the $8,000,000 needed to finance the cam-
paign of 1782. Furthermore, answering the demand of Morris, these 
24 
quotas were to be paid in specie. Samuel Livermore, writing to Pres-
ident Meshech Weare of New Hampshire, noted that state's share of the 
$8,000,000 was $373,598 and complained that it was too high. Observing 
that· Congress based its quotas on population estimates of 1775, he 
asserted that New Hampshire had been assessed on the basis of a popula-
tion of 100,000 when a recent census had shown that New Hampshire con-
tained only 76,000 inhabitants. Congress, however, had continued to 
tax New Hampshire at the higher figure. He also noted that Congress had 
declared in its resolution that the apportionment on these erroneous 
23Elias Boudinot to Elisha Boudinot, Feb. 20, 1782, in J; J. 
Boudinot, ed., The Life, Public Services, Addresses and Letters of 
Elias Boudinot (New York, 1972), Vol. I, p. 244. 
24 
Supra, chp. v, p. 161. 
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figures would not "be drawn into example in future." But, Livermore 
declared that all previous requisitions had contained the same clause. 
Obviously frustrated, he acidly declared: "It is further held forth 
that if any state is ~ over burthened they shall be recompensed here-
after. I fear this word hereafter is to be taken in a theological 
sense." 
25 
President Weare responded in writing on February 23, 1782. He 
insisted that New Hampshire's quota be reduced according to the new 
enumeration of population. Listing the state's financial difficulties, 
he cited as one cause the lack of specie in NeY7 Hampshire, which had re~ 
sulted both from a lack of trade and because the state had mistakenly 
set a higher rate of exchange for the old continental bills of credit 
than surrounding states, and consequently much hard money had been 
drained from the state. He also reminded Congress again of the "embar-
rassments we are under on account of the disputes subsisting in the 
·western Parts of this State." He argued that if Congress considered 
these two factors alone "our Inability to pay (even the just proportion 
of the State) will be easily perceived. 1126 Congress referred Weare's 
letter to a conunittee, which advised on March 25, 1782, that Congress 
not accede to his request. The committee observed that the quotas had 
been assigned according to estimates of population instead of on the 
valuation of land because it was more practical. The committee also 
argued that to reduce New Hampshire's quota without official population 
25Livermore to the President of New Hampshire, Nov. 6, 1781, LMC, 
Vol. VI, pp. 256-258. 
26weare to Livermore, Feb. 23, 1782, PCC, R78, Item 64, pp. 218-220. 
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returns from the other states would prove unjust, and to adjust its 
quota without distributing the excess to other states would leave the 
d f . . 27 quota e 1c1ent. Virginia also notified Congress that it was going 
to enumerate its white inhabitants in order to "secure us against a 
repetition of the extravagant quota assigned to us in November last. 1128 
Virginia, more than any other state, complained of fiscal exhaus-
tion throughout 1782 and of its inability to pay taxes in specie. The 
assembly and most of the officials in the state were convinced that 
Virginia had carried the burden of the British campaign in the South 
throughout 1781 not only by supplying the Southern Army but also because 
it had been the battlefield. Early in 1782, David Jameson wrote to 
James Madison noting that the state could not even pay its own offic,-
ials. He asserted that "for the quarters Salary due to the Council the 
first day of April, they recd. as much paper Money as wld purchase only 
£72 Specie. Since that time, no officer of Government has been paid a 
shilling. 1129 
The British had not yet abandoned Charleston, and consequently 
General Greene and his Southern Army had to be maintained. But Governor 
Benjamin Harrison reported in January, 1782, that Virginia could no 
longer supply the Southern Army. He asserted that the state had suffer-
ed intolerable inflation due to its issuance of paper money and that the 
27Report of Committee on the Letter from President Weare of 23d of 
Feby, 1782, Mar. 25, 1782, Agreed to May 22, 1782, PCC, R79, Item 20, 
Vol. I, pp. 19-21. Printed Copies in PJM, Vol. 4, pp. 121-123; and 
JCC, Vol. XXII, pp. 158-160. ~-
28 . 4 6 Randolph to Madison, June 20, 1782, PJM, Vol. , p. 35 . 
29 . 
Jameson to Madison, ca. Jan. 12, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, p. 27. 
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state's credit was no longer any good. In addition, he noted that "the 
Legislature have followed the example of some States near you and not 
left it in the power of the Executive to send the Militia out of the 
State, nor can our Quota of troops be shortly filled up for want of 
specie" and therefore "the present wants of Gen. Greene must mostly be 
30 supported by Congress." 
The following month, Harrison wrote to the Virginia delegates and 
declared that Virginia could no longer support the Continental estab-
lishment in the state because it did not have "the Conunand of a Shilling 
for the present, nor the least prospect of obtaining money for several 
Months to come •••• " He requested that the delegates ''call on Con-
gress and· to insist that they deal by us as they have done by other 
States, that is to feed their Troops and to support their Posts by Con-
tracts and to furnish their Quartermasters and Commissioners with money 
to support their several Departments .... " He also demanded that Vir-
ginia be credited with the supplies it had furnished or would furnish 
for the troops. He asserted: "We wish not to exonerate the State from 
a single Farthing of its due Proportion of the American Burdens but we 
have a Right to share Benefits in connnon with other States and can not 
support the Southern Army alone any longer. 1131 In March, 1782, Harrison 
informed the delegates that the Assembly had already taken some actions 
to assure that Virginia was properly credited for supplies furnished 
30Benjamin Harrison to the President of Congress, Jan. 21, 1782, 
!ff, R85., Item 71, Vol. II, pp. 345-347. Printed copy in H. R. 
Mcilwaine, ed., Official Letters Ef the Governors of Virginia (Richmond, 
1926-1929), Vol. III, p. 131. 
31 Harrison to Virginia Delegates, Feb. 9, 1782, ~,Vol. 4, pp. 
58-59. 
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the Continent. He observed that it had forbidden him to forward any 
specific supplies to General Greene "unless by special order of Con-
gress, or the Financier; the meaning of which is, that the State may 
get credit for their amount on the money demand made on us; . 
Finally, in August, 1782, Harrison summed up his state's frustra-
tions not only with Congress but with the other states as well. He 
asserted: "No Country in the Union has been more prodigal of its blood 
and Money than Virginia nor has any one had more men in the field till 
the fall of Charles Town or endeavour'd more both before and since to 
keep their Battalions full. II He noted that the Assembly had 
passed laws recently to recruit more men and that a great number had 
been raised by paying the "most extravagant Bounties" but that they 
had been ,;marched and counter march 'd thro' this country till most of 
them have been lost either by Death or Dessertion. . . . " The last he 
attributed to the lack of clothing and supplies which the other states 
could have supplied, and he angrily declared: "Had the other states 
done by us as we did by them when in similar circumstances, I trust no 
complaints would have been heard. 1133 
George Clinton, the Governor of New York, also complained of his 
state's share of the quota and of the fact that Congress was now demand-
ing money payments instead of payments in specific supplies. Writing 
to Robert Morris in August, 1782, he noted that the state was trying to 
collect money but that the people complained loudly. The complaints 
32Harrison to Virginia Delegates, Mar. 1, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, pp. 
77-78. 
33Harrison to General Greene, Aug. 30, 1782, Official Letters of 
Governors~ Virginia, Vol. III, pp. 309-310. 
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he asserted were largely the fault of Congress, as that body had first 
introduced the idea "by substituting Supplies for the Army in Specific 
Articles to be furnished by the different States instead of so much 
cash." Noting that Congress had advanced this program by declaring 
that it would be easier for people to pay, he asserted that "they were 
led to conclude it be so from the Opinion they entertained of the Wisdom 
of that respectable Body. II Thus, 11When specific Supplies was 
abolished & Cash demanded in Lieu of them the People murmured & com-
plained of their Want of Money." Consequently the legislature found 
it expedient to receive wheat in payment of taxes until the people of 
34 New York could be convinced of the efficacy of cash payments. 
As for the quota, Governor Clinton recognized that every state 
claimed that it had exerted more than others and that Congress was th~ 
proper judge of such claims. But he declared that "if there be any who 
have exhausted their Resources from extraordinary Zeal, Sense of inuned-
iate Danger or whatever else may have been the motive, the public Bur-
thens ought now to be apportioned accordingly, for it is idle to ask 
more of any State than it is able to contribute .. II He believed 
that this had been the case when Congress assigned its last quota to 
New York and asserted that such a high quota "instead of promoting, it 
is most likely to discourage & prevent all kind of Exertion. 1135 
New Hampshire, Virginia and New York, however, were not the only 
states which were either reluctant or incapable of paying specie quotas 
to Congress. By mid-spring, Congress observed that some states had 
34c1· M . . A 2 1782 PGC V 1 8 21 1nton to orris, ug. , , __ , o . , p. . 
35Ibid. , p. 22. 
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not passed laws for collecting any part of their quotas. Others had 
provided only for the collecting of a portion of their obligations, and 
still others had passed laws for raising the whole, but at some distant 
point in the future. Consequently, it resolved to send two delegations 
of two men each to the northern and the southern states to persuade them 
36 
to comply. Madison urged Virginia to comply with the requests of 
these men because: "The Secretary of War has just given notice to Con-
gress, that the Department of Finance is unable to supply the essential 
. 37 
means of opening the campaign." When the delegation returned from the 
northern states, however, they complained to Congress that several of 
the states they visited were appropriating taxes which had been intended 
f. h f h c . f . 1 38 or t e use o t e ontinent or interna uses. 
Indeed, many states had resorted to paying the Continent's credi-
tors within their states and to paying at least a part of the arrears 
of their lines of the Army. In two petitions to Congress, Pennsylvania 
declared that since Congress had as yet made no provision for paying the 
interest on Loan Office certificates, the state planned to do so itself. 
This decision had been reached, the petition declared, because many 
citizens of Pennsylvania had given all they had to the Continent and 
depended on at least the interest being paid for their own survival. 39 
36 JGC, Vol. XXII, pp. 289-290; and The Virginia Delegates to the 
Governwof Virginia, May 28, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, pp. 283-285. 
37M d. R d 1 h ~-1 28 1782 PJM 1 4 294 295 . a ison to an o p , 1.· ay , , __, Vo . , pp. - . 
38Madison to Randolph, July 16, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, pp. 417-419. 
39The Memorial of the Representatives of the Freemen of the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Aug. 30, 1782, and Nov. 12, 1782, PCC, R83, 
Item 69, Vol. II, pp. 413-415, 417-418. 
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Congress, however, did not respond until December, 1782. It then 
stated that its delay had been caused by the belief that Rhode Island 
would soon consent to the impost and thus provide Congress with the 
means for discharging the debt. 
Pennsylvania's threatened action also raised a serious constitu-
tional question, and thus Congress appointed a connnittee to confer with 
representatives from the Pennsylvania Assembly. The committee argued 
that Pennsylvania's proposal was against the spirit if not the letter 
of the Confederation. Article VIII provided that the nation's debts 
would be paid out of a common treasury, which meant to the committee 
that Congress and Congress alone could discharge the debts which it had 
contracted. It warned that if the state persisted in its plan to pay 
Continental creditors, its example would be followed by other states. 
This in turn would partly dissolve the bonds of union, because one of 
the basic ties of the Confederation was the power granted to Congress 
to borrow and repay money for common purposes. Without this power, the 
credit of Congress would cease to exist. It would be unable to obtain 
foreign loans, and without those loans the country might well go down 
to defeat. The representatives from Pennsylvania accepted these argu-
40 ments, and the Legislature abandoned its plans. 
Similar arguments were used to answer those states which made par-
tial payments to their lines of the Army. Many state legislatures felt 
compelled to make partial payments since by mid-summer, 1782, the Army 
was once again without pay, Jedediah Huntington reported that the Army 
40Madison's Notes of Debates, Nov. 20, 1782, and Dec. 12, 1782, 
JGC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 850, 860-861. 
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had little prospect of receiving more money unless the states paid 
thei,r taxes. He observed: "Mr Morris can but just keep the Army in 
Bread & Meat.. it is not in his Power to make any Payment to the Sol-
diers, who are, for Want of it, daily deserting." He asserted: "if 
our Army ceases .to be formidable to the Enemy, we must make a dishonor-
41 
able Peace." As the discontent of the soldiery grew, Madison report-
ed: "The arrears to the Army in January next will be upwards of six 
million dollars. Taxes cannot be relied on. Without money there is 
some reason to surmise that it may be difficult to disband the Army as 
it has been to raise an Army. ,r42 At least two states succumbed to the 
distress of their soldiers and made partial payments in 1782. In June, 
Robert Morris wrote Governor Greene of Rhode Island that he had just 
learned that Rhode Island had made advances to its troops. Morris as-
serted "that Congress included in their estimates, amounting to eight 
million, the sums necessary for paying the Army." He declared that 
Rhode Island should desist, as partial payments led to a variety of 
·accounts and added: "The more our operations are simplified the better 
they will be understood, and the more satisfactory will they be con-
43 ducted." In October, 1782, New Jersey also proposed to satisfy the 
complaints of its soldiers by making partial payments. Congress, still 
hoping for an income of its own from the impost and attempting to sup-
port the plans of its Superintendent of Finance, warned New Jersey that 
41Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 31, 1782, Connect-
icut Historical Society, Collections, Vol. XX; p. 454. 
42Madison to Randolph, Sept. 24, 1782, PJM, Vol. 5, pp. 158-159. 
43Mortis to Governor Greene, June 26, 1782, Rhode Island, Records 
of Rhode Island, Vol. IX, p. 577. 
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no money paid by the states to the Army would be considered as an ad-
vance on behalf of the United States and that no state would be credited 
44 
with such payments. 
Hoping to head off further state appropriations of tax money meant 
for the Continent and in order to support Morris' program, Congress re-
solved on October 18 that "it be impressed on the several states as 
absolutely necessary to lay taxes for raising their quotas of money for 
the United States separate from those laid for their own particular 
use .... " To implement this resolution it even advocated a direct 
violation of the constitutional relationship established by the Confed-
eration by requesting the states to permit persons appointed by the 
Superintendent of Finance to receive taxes levied for Congress within 
each state and to allow "such receivers to recover the monies of the 
collectors for the use of the United States, in the same manner, and 
under the same penalties as state taxes are recovered by the treasurers 
of the respective state; 1145 
Implementing the key element of the Financier's program, federal 
taxes, however, proved almost impossible because of the division of the 
states in Congress. This division was well illustrated in early Septem-
ber, 1782, when Congress tried to get the states to pay $1,200,000 immed-
iately in order to defray the interest on the public debt. 46 Reluctantly 
adhering to the old quota system, Congress apportioned the amount among 
the several states on September 10, 1782. On this assessment, the 
44JCC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 629, 631. 
45 rbid., p. 669. 
46 rbid., p. 545. 
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delegates from at least eight states demanded ad.justments. New Hamp-
shire, Connecticut, New York and Georgia simply wanted their quotas re-
duced; Pennsylvania and Massachusetts not only wanted theirs reduced 
but requested that the excess be placed on Virginia's quota as well; 
Maryland's delegates desired Connecticut to pay additional money; and 
Rhode Island insisted that part of its quota be assigned to New Jersey. 
Obviously there could be no agreement on these adjustments, and conse-
quently the requisition was apportioned as originally assigned. 47 
The lack of cooperation among the states in Congress was also ap-
parent in the last months of 1782 during discussions of the means for 
finding some other method for financing congressional activities. Since 
the states had paid little of their quotas and because Rhode Island had 
not yet accepted the impost, Congress desperately sought some other 
48 source of revenue. On September 14, 1782, acting upon the suggestions 
of Robert Morris, a committee of thirteen proposed four possible 
sources of additional federal taxes. The first presented was the sale 
'--~ 
of public lands, which could be accomplished if those states which had 
claims in the western region would cede them. The committee also rec-..._ 
ommended that every state impose a land tax of one dollar for every 100 
acres of land. Yet another method proposed was a poll tax of a half 
~ 
dollar on all male slaves between sixteen and sixty years of age and on 
all freemen from twenty-one to sixty. Finally, the committee recommend-
~ 
ed an excise tax upon all distilled liquors of one-eighth dollar per 
gallon. The delegates from North Carolina were especially upset by the 
47 rbid., pp. 564-570. 
48rbid., p. 545. 
i 
222 
land tax and argued that with their state's extensive territory and 
small population it would be required to pay taxes far beyond its 
ability. 49 The delegates had little to fear, however, because they were 
able to report on October 27 that "when the report was taken up by Con-
gress, every part of it which respected the subject of Taxation was re-
jected.1150 The New York delegates despaired of Congress ever agreeing 
on another source of revenue as the hopes of most members were still 
focused on Rhode Island's accepting the impost and most were willing to 
' f h I , , 51 wait or t at state s acceptance or rejection. 
The inability of the delegates to agree on any other revenues, 
Rhode Island's rejection of the impost, and Virginia's repeal left Con-
gress totally without a source of income except for foreign loans and 
for .those quotas already assessed the states. Since little money was 
produced by either of these methods, Congress was forced to spend most 
of the first three months of 1783 seeking some way to establish a per-
manent, independent income. During the first half of January the dis-
cussion revolved around the method contained in Article VIII of the 
Confederation which required taxes to be assessed according to the valu-
ation of lands and improvements thereon in each state. The debates 
illustrated not only the concern of the delegates with the interests 
of their own states but also raised doubts as to the efficacy of the 
method. 
49Hugh Williamson to the Governor of North Carolina, Sept. 2, 1782, 
LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 462-463 .. 
50North Carolina Delegates to the Governor of North Carolina, Oct. 
22, 1782, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 516-519. 
51L 1Honunedieu to Clinton, Sept. 11, 1782, PGC, Vol. 8, pp. 37-38. 
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The delegates from Connecticut argued on January 8 and 10 that 
the implementation of Article VIII ought to be postponed because it was 
impossible to implement that method fairly while parts of New York were 
still occupied by the British, They also asserted that Connecticut at 
that time was flourishing more than other stat es, and consequently it 
would pay more than its fair share of the debts. Alexander Hamilton of 
New York and James Madison of Virginia, on the other hand, opposed im-
plementation of Article VIII because it permitted individual states to 
valuate the land within their own boundaries, and there was a great 
probability that the evaluations would be made in accordance with the 
interests of the particular state. Even if the valuations were done 
justly, there was no way for other states to check, and thus the sus-
picion would always remain that the valuations had not been made fairly. 
Hamilton and Madison also argued that the method could not be implement-
52 
ed without large expense and long delay. Arnplifyin8 these arguments 
in a letter to Edmund Randolph, Madison declared: "The difficulties 
which attend that rule of apportionment seem on near inspection to be 
in a manner insuperable. The work is too vast to be executed without 
intervention of the several States, and if their intervention be em-
ployed, all confidence in an impartial execution is at an end .. 
Nevertheless, on February 17, 1783, Congress resolved, over the 
objections of New York and Virginia, to implement Article VIII and re-
quested the states to take measures to evaluate their lands so that 
52Madison's Notes of Debates, Jan. 8-10, 1783, JCC, Vol. XXV, pp. 
847-848. 
53Madison to Randolph, Jan. 14, 1783, PJ1.L, Vol. 6, pp. 40-41. 
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taxes could be levied in accordance with the Confederation.& William 
Floyd of New York, informed Governor Clinton that he had argued against 
the resolution because of its unfairness to New York. He believed that 
it would "not Operate Justly for our State which has been.so long, so 
much in the power of the Enemy, but they were carried against us by a 
G M . . 1155 reat aJority. Even Hamilton, undeniably a nationalist, moved to 
protect the interest of his state by proposing on March 4, 1783, that 
since "the resolution of the 17 of February, would operate greatly to 
the prejudice of such states, and to the calamities of war, add an undue 
proportion of the public burthen" to those states, that Congress should 
"make.such abatements in favor of the said states as from a full con-
sideration of circumstances shall appear to them just and equitable." 
This resolve, however, lost overwhelmingly. 56 The state itself made 
one last attempt in March by repassing the impost in conformity with 
the congressional resolution of February 3, 1781, abolishing all condi-
tions and making the tax collectable until all interest and principal 
·of h · 1 db 'd 57 t e nationa e t was pal . 
Meanwhile, recognizing that implementation of Article VIII would 
still leave Congress totally dependent upon the willingness and ability 
of the states to pay, Congress sought methods which would not only be 
more just but which would also establish permanent funds independent of 
(~cc, Vol. XXIV, pp. 135-137; 
55william Floyd to Clinton, Feb. 18, 1783, PGC, Vol. 8, pp. 74-75. 
56 JGC, Vol. XXIV, pp. 162-163; and Madison's Notes of Debates, JGC, 
Vol. XXV, pp. 912-915. 
57 . 
New York Session Laws, Feb. 14-Mar. 27, 1783, EAI, No. 18060, 
pp. 279-280. 
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state legislatures. One of the most intense debates, occurring at the 
end of January, centered on whether Congress even needed a permanent 
revenue at all. Some delegates believed that, as peace appeared to be 
approaching, Congress need do no more than rely upon the states, since 
in time of peace the states would be able to pay their taxes. Others 
like James Madison, however, were deeply concerned with preserving the 
union as created by the Articles. He was disturbed by the splintering 
tendencies at work in the union as exemplified by the threats of the 
states to pay congressional debts. If this were permitted to happen, 
he asked,. "what then w[ould] become of the confederation?" After two 
days of lengthy discussion, Congress resolved that a permanent fund, 
based on either taxes or duties, was necessary if it was to pay its 
creditors, restore public credit, and provide the funds for the war. 
It then began to discuss various modes of taxation, including poll 
taxes, imposts, taxes on salt and western lands, as well as taxes on 
h . 58 ot er items. 
As the discussion developed, Congress still had to find some way 







foreign loans.. Some delegates objected to borrowing more money, because 
it would augment the national debt and because 'N'ithout permanent funds 
there was no assurance that the loans could be repaid. Madison, on the 
other hand, favored asking for more money, because even if foreigners 
59 
refused, the country would not be any worse off. Meanwhile, Congress 
58Madison's Notes of Debates, Jan. 28-29, 1783, JGC, Vol. XXV, 
pp. 870-884. 
59Madison 1s Notes of Debates, Jan. 13, 1783, JCC, Vol. XXV, pp. 
850-851. 
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authorized Robert Morris to draw bills of exchange on America's foreign 
ministers even though it was not sure that the applications for loans 
had been honored. Congress did instruct Morris to draw no more bills 
60 
than what the ministers had been asked to borrow. 
Meanwhile, Robert Morris applied enormous pressure on Congress in 
order to gain compliance with his plans for a full schedule of federal 
taxes. His methods included organizing public creditors to make demands 
for immediate payment from Congress and capitalizing upon the discon-
tent in the Army. In addition, he even threatened to resign his posi-
61 
tion as Superintendent of Finance unless Congress acted. The 
pressures were so intense that old revolutionaries such as Arthur Lee, 
still fearful of centralized authority, angrily observed: "Every Engine 
is at work here to obtain permanent taxes." While noting the necessity 
of paying the Army, he declared that "to remedy temporary evils by 
permanent Ones is· neither wise nor safe. I am persuaded that real ina-
bility to pay taxes is the reason that the states do not furnish their 
1162 quotas, .•. 
Congress, however, refused to succumb to the·pressures. Knowing 
the interests, fears, and desires of their states and not nearly so 
attuned to Morris' brand of centralism, the most that Congress would do 
was summed up in a resolution on April 18, 1783, which included a four-
. f. . 1 63 point inancia program .. The only portion of that resolution which 
60JCC, Vol. XXIV, p. 44. 
61 " 
Ferguson, Power of the Purse, pp. 149-152, 157-164. 
62 
Arthur Lee to Samuel Adams, Jan. 29, 1782, LMC, Vol. VII, p. 28. 
63Madison's Notes of Debates, Feb. 21, 27, Mar. 7, 27, 1783, JCC. 




included permanent taxes was another attempt at imposing an impost. 
Reasoning that the states had almost granted such a tax in 1781 and 
1782, Congress resolved to assess duties of various amounts on imported 
liquors and wines, different kinds of tea, pepper, various forms of 
sugar, and on cocoa and coffee. On all other imported items, Congress 
requested that it be permitted to collect a duty of five percent ad 
valorem "at the time and place of importation." Unlike the resolution 
of 1781, however, Congress attempted to forestall the objections of the 
states by incorporating certain limitations on the act. First, it pro-
vided that the duties could be applied to no other purpose than to dis-
charge the interest and principal of the public debt "contracted on the 
faith of the United States, for supporting the war .... " Congress 
also provided that the law would be in effect for only twenty-five 
years. The resolve permitted the states to appoint the collectors of 
the duty, but they had to "be amenable to, and removable by the United 
States in Congress assembled, " Finally, Congress provided that 
the impost would not go into effect until ratified by all thirteen 
64 
states. 
Congress also attempted to make some reforms in its method for ap-
portioning quotas on the states. On April 7, having received authenti-
cated returns of the inhabitants of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut and Maryland, Congress assigned the percentages states 
would have to pay on future appropriations. The percentages of the 
other states were based upon such information as Congress was able to 
obtain. In addition, Congress also estimated the amount of money which 














would be necessary to sustain public credit at $2,500,000 and, on the 
basis of the new percentages, suggested apportioning $1,500,000 of that 
amount among the states. The other $1,000,000 would be provided by the 
d f h . 65 expecte returns ram t e impost. In the resolution of April 18 these 
. . d . h 1 . 1 . 66 suggestions were incorporate wit on y minor a terations. 
In .the same resolution, Congress also requested the states to make 
future assessments of taxes easier by amending Article VIII of the Con-
federation. Instead of assessments based on the valuation of lands and 
improvements, Congress asked that the article be made to read that the 
expenses for war and for the general welfare ''be defrayed out of a 
connnon treasury, which shall be suppl.ied by the several states in 
proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound in 
servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons 
not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not pay-
ing taxes in each State; .•. " The entire resolution was agreed to by 
nine states with Rhode Island voting no, New York divided, New Hampshire 
67 
underrepresented, and Georgia not represented. 
The objections to the proposals contained in the resolution began 
even before they were passed. The request of Congress for an indepe.n-
dent income in the form of the new impost was actually much more limi-
ted than had been the one in 1781, which had nearly passed. But the 
65rbid., pp. 230-231; and Madison's Notes of Debates, Apr. 3-7, 
1783, ~.Vol. XXV, pp. 953-954. 
66JcC, Vol. XXIV, p. 259. 




pressure tactics employed by the Financier reawakened the old pre-war 
fears of centralization in some members of Congress. Arthur Lee com-
plained in February, "The Confederation is a stumbling block to those 
68 
who wish to introduce new, and I think arbitrary systems.'' Jonathan 
Arnold of Rhode Island expressed similar views and hoped that when the 
preliminary articles of peace had arrived, Congress would abandon its 
.. plans for an impost as "it could not be doubted that the states, when 
eased of the inunediate expense of prosecuting the war, and enjoying 
unmolested the advantages to be derived from agriculture and commerce, 
would be able to draw out their resources timely and sufficient to an-
swer the necessary and constitutional requisitions of .Congress. " 
He noted, however, that some delegates still persisted in efforts to 
strengthen the powers of Congress, and this goal "seems in the minds of 
some to prevail over every other consideration, and it appears that 
nothing will give satisfaction but to send out the impost, differently 
modified, for another trial among the states." 
69 
r~en the resolution finally passed, however,lArnold softened his 
~ ~ 
/ 
attack ori Congress and turned his wrath upon the landed states. He 
noted that Congress had tried to make the act palatable, but he believed 
it would still violate the constitution of Rhode Island and suggested 
that the New England states work to alter who would control those ap-
pointed to collect the duties. He also charged tqat while the measure 
was under consideration, a land tax had been proposed, but "it met with 
such warm opposition from the western and largely landed states, as 
68 
Arthur Lee to James Warren, Feb. 19, 1783, WAL, Vol. II, p. 190. 
69 
Arnold to Governor Greene, Mar. 3, 1783, ~. P. 433. 
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prevented its being inserted, and the delegates from some of them ex-
plicitly declared that they never would consent to a land tax of any 
kind, but what should be to their own separate advantage. 1170 
James Madison, who had helped to hammer out the resolution, was 
not optimistic himself that his own state would comply. The rough draft 
of the resolution had originally contained a clause which provided that 
Congress would compensate the states for "all reasonable expenses which 
shall have been incurred by the States without sanction of Con[gress], 
in their defense ag[ainst] or attacks upon British or savage enemies. 1171 
But this clause had been stricken, and Madison had been unable to rein-
state it. Consequently, the remainder of the resolution could not at-
tract Virginians because they were "not particularly interested either 
in the object or mode of the revenues recommended, . II Madison be-
lieved: "A respect for justice, good faith & national honor is the 
only consideration which can obtain her [Virginia's] compliance. 1172 
Virginians, however, were not concerned with the last considera-
tions. That state's financial woes continued. Governor Harrison re-
ported in January, 1783, that the state was "so drained of money that 
tho' Tobacco is very scarce no Quantity of it can be sold at any Price 
for Cash. the Merchants have it not nor can they procure it and the 
Planters are so totally without it that the Sheriffs from many Counties 
70collins and Arnold to Governor Greene, Apr. 23, 1783, RICC, p. 
435. --
71Madison's Notes of Debates, Mar. 7, 1783, JCC, Vol. XXV, pp. 921-
922. 
72Madison to Jefferson, Apr. 22, 1783, PJM, Vol. 6, p. 481. 
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have declared it impossible to make collections. 1173 Three months later 
Edmund Randolph noted that many of the sheriffs had been called to ac-
count: "But the excuses they have made argue the poverty of the coun-
try. They have distrained, they say, but cannot sell for !i; of the value 
74 
of the thing taken, even in produce." The lack of specie in the state 
was blamed in part on the expenditures made by Virginia for the Southern 
Army. Consequently, the Assembly was in no mood to accept any congres-
sional resolution concerning finances which did not guarantee compensa-
tion for the sums it had spent for the Continent. In addition, many 
members of the Assembly feared the strengthening of congressional 
75 power. 
Madison continued to press the Assembly to comply with the resolu-
tion asserting: "The example of Virga. will have great and perhaps de-
cisive influence. on the event of it. 1176 Nevertheless, the Assembly 
ignored Madison's pleas. It was forced not only to delay the collection 
of taxes until April, 1783, leaving nothing even to support Virginia's 
own government, but it also adjourned without passing any part of Con-
' 1 . 77 gress reso ution. 
fartions of the resolution of April ii)had some advocates in the 
73Harrison to the Virginia Delegates, Jan. 31, 1783, PJM, Vol. 6, 
p. 176. 
74Randolph to Madison, Apr. 26, 1783, PJM, Vol. 6, p. 500. 
75 . 
Pendleton to Madison, May 4, 1783; Randolph to Madison, May 4, 
I 
1783; Madison to Jefferson, May 20, 1783; and John Beckley to Randolph, 
June 20, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, pp. 12-)_3, 32-33, 56-57, 170-171. 
76Madison to Randolph, May 27, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, p. 89. 
77Jacquelin Ambler to Madison, June 1, 1783; and J. Jones to 
Madison, June 28, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, pp. 102, 196-197. 
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northern states. Benjamin Lincoln supported the proposed amendment to 
the Articles. While he objected to southern slaves counting as three-
fifths their actual number because it was unfair to the northern 
states, he urged Massachusetts to comply, since there was no unbiased 
judge in the controversy and because the method as originally written 
in Article VIII was so difficult to apply and so much more unfair to 
78 New England. The northern states, however, objected to the resolu-
tion not because of fears of centralized authority but because the 
duties collected could be used to pay pensions for officers or cormnu-
tations thereof, 
.During the critical year of 1780, in order to maintain an Army in 
the field, Congress had promised its officers that they would receive 
pensions upon .retirement equivalent to half their regular pay. All the 
New England states voted against this resolution because they believed 
h h . ld 1 d h . f ·1· 79 t at sue pensions wou ea to t e creation o a mi itary caste. 
The New England states continued to agitate the question and in July, 
1782, even argued that the measure had been passed by only eight states, 
while under the Confederation nine states were required to agree to 
such measures. In effect, they argued vainly that the Confederation 
Congress was not bound by acts passed by Congress prior to ratif ica-
tion. 80 The officers themselves brought the question forward again in 
78Benjamin Lincoln to James Warren, Apr. 5, 1783, WAL, Vol. II, pp. 
200-204. 
79 Ferguson, Power~ the Purse, p. 156. 
80 Charles Thomson's Notes of Debates, New York Historical Society, 
Collections, 1878, Vol. 11, pp. 70-79. 
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early in 1783, demanding that the pensions be commuted to cash sums. 
Their dissatisfactions and demands led in part to the so called Newburgh 
conspiracy which was defused by General Washington. Congress, however, 
frightened by the prospect of the Army's refusing to disband, passed a 
resolution commuting the pensions to a cash equivalent of five years 
salary at full pay. Once again this resolution passed over the objec-
81 tions of the New England states. 
Consequently, the New England states used the new impost as a 
weapon, hoping that non-compliance with the resolution of April 18 
would force Congress to repeal both the half-pay and commutation reso-
lutions. Infonned by Rhode Island's delegates that they had strongly 
opposed the half-pay resolution and the commutation to no avail, Gov-
ernor Greene instructed them to continue to exert their efforts for a 
repeal and declared: "The General Assembly of this State cannot comply 
with a requisition of this kind because the measure tends to a military 
establishment in time of peace; is unjust in its operation,. as the 
states that have raised the greatest proportionate number of soldiers, 
82 with the smallest number of officers will be the greatest sufferers." 
In July, the Assembly of Massachusetts reported that there had been 
riots in its state because of the pension resolutions. The Assembly 
warned Congress "that the extraordinary grants and allowances which 
Congress have thought proper to make to these Civil & Military officers 
have produced such Effects in this Commonwealth as are of a threatening 
81 Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 164. 
82collins and Arnold to Governor Greene, Feb. 4, 1783; Arnold to 
Greene, Mar. 28, 1783; and Greene to the Rhode Island Delegates, May 10, 
1783, RICC, pp. 424-426, 432, 440 •. 
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Aspect--From these sources, & particularly from the Grant of halfpay to 
the Officers of the Army, & the proposed Commutation thereof, it has 
arisen, the General Court has not been able hitherto to agree in grarrt-
ing the United States an Impost. 1183 This did not, however, deter 
Massachusetts from passing an impost on July 10 for its own use. 84 
By mid-August, only three states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Hary-
land, had granted the impost, and only Delaware had accepted the entire 
congressional plan. James Madison noted that the major objection in 
the north was the use of part of the revenue to pay the commutations 
while the southern states objected to an increase in congressional 
power. Consequently, he predicted: "The Budget of Gongs. is likely to 
85 have the fate of many of their other propositions to the States." In 
part, he blamed his own state. He observed: "Rhode Island did not even 
bestow a consideration on them. Mr. H--1 from the latter State after 
being informed on the course taken by Va. said that her backwardness 
very much emboldened the States that were disinclined to a Genl' 
86 
Revenue." 
With no agreement among the states to the resolution of April 18 
many states moved to protect the interest of their own citizens. In 
July Congress was informed that Maryland had given its line of the Army 
five months' pay and had even repealed a tax laid specifically for the 
83Assembly of Massachusetts to Elias Boudinot, July 11, 1783, ~' 
R79, Item 65, Vol. II, pp. 185-188. 
84Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, July 10, 
1783, EAI, No. 18021, pp. 16-30. 
85Madison to Jefferson, Aug .. 11, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, pp. 268-269. 
86Madison to Randolph, Aug. 12, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, p. 273. 
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87 
use of Congress to do so. The Connecticut delegates complained that 
both Rhode Island and Massachusetts had passed imposts for their own 
benefits and warned their state: "The burden of this being sustained 
by the consumer must be eventually borne by the industrious inhabitants 
of our State, in proportion to the goods we purchase from them whilst 
we have our whole quota to pay without an equal advantage of a tax on 
connnerce." The delegates argued that this suggested "the necessity of 
promoting trade in our own State, and withdrawing it from those States 
whose policy is as much as possible to lay their burthens on us." They 
also noted that,this was proof "of the injustice that will take place in 
consequence of the local and illiberal measures that will be adopted by 
the several States in their separate proceedings, tending to disaffec-
tion, animosity, and disunion. 1188 
The failure to comply with the resolution of Apri 18 forced Con-
gress to rely upon such methods as issuing Loan Office certificates 
and led to some bitterness on the part of Congress' administrators. 
Robert Morris condemmed the further use of the certificates, because 
they would contribute to a future source of confusion. But he found 
them a necessary evil "because the States in the Confidence of their 
own separate Sovereignty and regardless of the general Government will 
as long as they please continue to make nominal instead of actual pay-
men ts." 89 
87JCC, Vol. XX:IV, pp. 454-455. 
88s. Huntington and B. Huntington to Trumbull, Sept. 2, 1783, HHS, 
7th Series, Vol. III, pp. ,440-441. 
89JCC, Vol. XX:IV, pp. 489-491. 
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Thus Congress entered the years of peace once again with little 
prospect of financial stability or independence. In the months follow-
ing Yorktown, the states turned almost totally inward, attempting to 
solve their own financial difficulties. Focused in this way, there was 
little concern in any state over the financial plight either of Con-
gress or of the other states. Equally as important, without the press-
ing necessities of war, which in the past had led to some measure of 
reluctant cooperation, the underlying resentments towards the claims 
of some states and towards unpalatable congressional resolutions now 
became even more apparent. With little or no threat of further British 
invasion the states could now use their acceptance or rejection of con-
gressional finances as a lever either to force changes in national poli-
cy or to pry.concessions from other states with claims in the western 
lands. 
The states themselves were trapped between the demands of their 
own citizens and the requirements of Congress. With little cooperation 
on the national level, Congress was without funds to pay either the Army 
or the demands of its private creditors. Both groups, therefore, turned 
to their state governments. As mentioned previously, Pennsylvania's 
citizens depended upon payment of the Continental debts for their sur-
vival. The lines of the Army in Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Maryland 
demanded at least a partial payment of their arrears in pay. The citi-
zens of Massachusetts rioted against the appropriation of their tax 
monies for purposes of which they did not approve. The sheriffs in Vir-
ginia could not collect taxes from citizens who were unable to pay, and 
in fact, the courthouse at Tunensburgh, Virginia, was burned in early 
1783 "partly to prevent the obtaining of those documents which are 
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90 
necessary to execute" taxes. Owing their existence not to Congress 
but to their own citizens, state governments naturally responded first 
to the demands of their constituents rather than to those of Congress. 
Consequently, Congress remained fiscally weak, having been unable to 
establish an independent income in 1782 and 1783, and almost totally 
dependent upon the distracted states for its own fiscal survival. 
90Randolph to Madison, Apr. 26, 1783, PJM, Vol. 6, p. 500. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONFLICTS AND COLLAPSE 
Throughout the years 1780 through 1783 the relations among the 
states and between the states and Congress suffered from other con-
flicts besides those over finances and western claims. In many in-
stances these other disputes raised questions over the locus of 
authority in areas that had been ill-defined by the Articles of Confed-
eration. For example, what exactly were the powers granted to congres-
sional administrators and how rigidly should they adhere to their 
instructions? Could Congress grant passports for the movements of per-
sons and property in the face of state laws to the contrary? And how 
rigidly must the states themselves adhere to congressional resolutions? 
Other incidents illustrated the limitation of the method contained in 
Article IX for solving interstate disputes. These conflicts, combined 
with those previously disucssed, further weakened state cooperation and, 
consequently, congressional prestige and authority. 
While incidents of this sort occurred throughout the war, those 
which developed during 1780 through 1783 helped to exacerbate the ten-
sions building over finances and western claims. One such conflict, 
involving congressional administrators and state officials--between 
Congress' Connnittee at Headquarters and various state officials--has 
been previously discussed. Another such incident occurred in New York 
during the summer of 1781 between Colonel Udny Hay, the newly appointed 
238 
239 
State Agent in charge of procuring supplies for the Army, and Colonel 
Timothy Pickering, the Quartermaster General for the Northern Army. 
The controversy originated in early spring when General Washington 
began operations in Westchester County, north of New York City. Needing 
forage for the army's animals and finding the count:ry unfenced and vir-
tually deserted, Pickering simply assumed that "the forage growing on 
the desolate lands would be freely used by the army, without any claim 
for payment from the owners of the soil. 111 The state of New York dis-
agreed. The legislature had appointed Hay as State Agent and had made 
him responsible for the produce of the sequestered and confiscated 
estates in Westchester County. It specifically ordered him to insure 
"that the said forage and other supplies shall be disposed of by the 
said Agent, as other supplies furnished by the State for the use of 
. . 2 
the Army." To Colonel Hay this meant that the Army should at least 
give certificat~s for the forage it had used. 
Having had private conversations in early July with Pickering, and 
having reached no decision, Hay determined to wait upon General Washing-
ton to get his opinion. Washington, however, declined to interfere. 
Consequently, Hay wrote Pickering on July 25 requesting that he grant 
certificates for the forage used and suggested two methods by which a 
value could be placed on the amount already consumed. If Pickering 
still refused to comply with the request then Hay demanded that he 
answer in writing by what authority Pickering was acting and exactly 
1Timothy Pickering to Thomas McKean, July 27, 1781, FCC, RlOO, 
Item 78, Vol. XVIII~ pp. 423-425. 
2 
Extract from an Act Relative to the Office of State Agent, July 
1, 1781, .!'.££,Vol. 7, p. 213. 
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how the property of the state of New York had been alienated so that 
h Ar ld . . h 3 t e my cou use its resources wit out payment. 
Pickering replied the following day. Noting first that Hay had 
threatened to have him arrested, he attacked the injustice of such a 
move by declaring "that notwithstanding the sufferings, for many years 
past, of thousands of public Creditors, not two instances I believe can 
be adduced where the person or property of the public officers have been 
touched." Moving then to Hay's demand, Pickering asserted that he could 
not comply as he could not determine how many cattle had been fed on 
the lands of individuals and how many on the lands of the sequestered 
estates. He also argued that the Continent could not possibly pay the 
full price for the forage because much of the land now occupied was 
within enemy lines and at such a distance from markets that the produce 
of the estates could not have been sold at the prices Hay was asking 
for it. In addition, he asserted that it was only because the Army had 
marched into the country and rescued "the forage from the jaws of the 
enemy" that it had achieved "any value at all." Ee also argued: "The 
pasturage in this Country is a~so lessened in value because the lands 
lay desolate & waste, without enclosures, which obliges us to employ 
great numbers of herdsmen to watch the Cattle to prevent their going 
astray." Finally, Pickering observed that the pasturage was of less 
value than an equivalent amount of hay needed to support the cattle. 
Be was willing, however, to issue certificates indicating how much for-
age had been used, the value of which would be determined at a later 
3 
Udny Hay to Pickering, July 25, 1781, enclosed in Hay to Clinton, 
July 26, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, pp. 129-132. 
date, if Colonel Hay would accept them with all the foregoing condi-
tions listed on them. 4 
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Hay transmitted a copy of this letter to Governor Clinton and also 
informed him that Pickering had sent an express to Congress to determine 
that body's sentiments on the dispute. He further notified Clinton: 
"I shall write our Delegates very fully but have told the Colonel 
[Pickering] should the opinion of Congress be different from that of 
the State I shall not pay the least respect to it, should they however 
desire him to pay upon the terms I propose it will tend to an immediate 
settlement of the whole dispute." He also noted that he had requested 
the refugees from Westchester County to meet with him to discuss the 
. . . 5 
situation. 
The refugees assembled on July 30 at White Plains and unanimously 
agreed to send a letter of protest to Pickering. They considered Pick-
ering's attitude tantamount to thievery and declared that he was at-
tempting "to trample on the Laws of that State to which we are subject, 
II They asserted "That we are determined to have full and speedy 
satisfaction for the insults offered us, by taking such Steps as the 
Laws of our Country will warrant for compelling you to do us Justice; 
II They added a few gratuitous insults, declaring that they "would 
make no observation, Sir, on the absurdity & childishness of your rea-
saning but impute that to the weakness of your head, did not the wicked-
ness of your heart appear too glaring for us to pass over unnoticed. 116 
4Pickering to Hay, July 26, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, pp. 213-216. 
5 
Hay to Clinton, July 26, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, p. 133. 
6Robert Graham to Pickering, July 30, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, pp. 216-
217. 
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Fickering answered this caustic letter rather coolly, observing 
that it was not his intent to treat the laws of New York with·contempt. 
But he asked, "whether a particular state may pass a Law which an of-
ficer of the United States might justly hesitate to obey?" Answering 
his own question, he declared.that he could do no more than issue a 
certificate.of facts "untill the United States in Congress (whose ser-
vant I am) should determine" the question. He also asserted: "Be 
pleased to bear in mind that I am an officer of the United States, 
under Oath 'to discharge the trust reposed in me with Justice~ integ-
rity to the best of my skill & understanding. 1117 The debate continued 
into August with the refugees agreeing to postpone their suit against 
Pickering until August 20 if he would agree to post a bond that he 
would be accountable for the losses sustained by the refugees prior to 
8 that date, but Pickering refused. The most that he was willing to do, 
while awaiting the decision of Congress, was to appoint agents and di-
rect them to cooperate with those named by the refugees to valuate the 
forage taken and to issue a certificate declaring only that he agreed 
with that valuation. 9 Colonel Hay, recognizing that an impasse had been 
10 
reached, ordered the refugees to cooperate until Congress responded. 
The decision of Congress, when finally made on September 7, went 
against its own officer and in favor of Colonel Hay. On that day, 
192, 
7p. k . ic ering to Hay, Aug. 8, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7' pp. 217-218. 
8 Enclosure in Pickering to McKean, Aug . 12' 1781, PCC, Rl99, Item 
PP· 7 9-82. 
9Pickering to Abraham Leggett, Aug. 9, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, p. 221. 
10nay to Pickering, Aug. 16, 1781, PGC, Vol. 7, pp. 223-224. 
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Congress ordered the commander of the Eastern Department to ascertain 
the quantity of forage used by the .Army in Westchester County and to 
give certificates for the same according to the instructions of the 
11 
State Agent of New York. In deciding this issue, however, Congress 
side-stepped the question of the relations between.federal officers and 
the states, and, consequently, Pickering's problems in New York had not 
ended. 
Writing to Congress in February, 1782, Pickering declared: "I am 
sorry to inform you that suits, with which for a year past public offi-
cers have been threatened, are now commenced." He noted that his as-
sistant in Albany, New York, Nicholas Quackenbush, had been arrested by 
holders of certificates in the area. He warned: "If they succeed, 
multitudes of public creditors stand ready to follow the example. The 
evils that would result from hence are obvious. 1112 Congress responded 
on March 19, requesting that the states pass laws preventing confeder-
ation officers from being sued for performing their official duty and 
that such officers not be held accountable for the debts of the United 
13 States. New York, however, failed to comply with the resolution and 
Pickering reported to General Washington in January, 1783, that he 
himself had been arrested by a deputy sheriff from Ulster County, New 
York, for the failure of the Continent to make good those certificates 
under his signature. He advised Washington that "on the same ground, 
llJCC, Vol. XXI, pp. 943-944. 
12Pickering to John Hanson,. Feb. 25, 1782, PCC, Rl99, Item 192, 
p. 89. 
13JcC, Vol. XXII, pp. 138-139. 
244 
some thousands of suits may be brought against me in this State 
14 alone." The state of New York finally acted, however, by passing a 
law in March, 1783, to suspend suits against all persons who contracted 
for supplies under the direct orders of Congress or the Conunander-in-
Ch . f h b 1 . h . . 15 ie or ot er pu ic aut orities. 
Another controversy between congressional officials and state 
officials occurred in Maryland over the manner in which the state's 
quotas of cattle were to be delivered to the Army. In November, 1780, 
the Maryland Council notified its delegates that in accordance with the 
resolution of February 25 the state had purchased as many of the cattle 
required of the state as possible and had delivered them to the Head of 
Elk as instructed by the Connnander-in-Chief. But when the cattle were 
delivered, the state's agent, Colonel Henry Hollingsworth, reported 
that Continental officers refused to receive and deliver them to the 
Army. They had declared that it was not a part of their business to do 
so. Consequently, Hollingsworth had been forced to sell some of the 
cattle in order to buy provisions for the rest. The Council pointedly 
declared: "We could not expect, after Cattle were procured for the im-
mediate Subsistence of the Army, and driven to the Verge of the State to 
be delivered to the Officers of Congress, that we should have had any 
further Difficulties to encounter." It asserted that the sufferings of 
the Army had moved the state to exert itself to ease those sufferings, 
but "it excites no small uneasiness to find our Designs frustrated and 
the Army thereby deprived of the Subsistance provided for them, by the 
14Pickering to Washington, Jan. 18, 1783, CAR, Vol, 3, pp. 544-545. 
15New York Session Laws, EAI, No. 18060, pp. 287-288. 




The controversy between Maryland and congressional officers over 
cattle continued into 1781. Maryland exerted every effort to meet its 
quotas but encountered enormous difficulties because of the financial 
difficulties of the state. Hollingsworth reported in March, 1781, that 
he had tried to comply with the Council's orders for beef but "after 
riding almost two days have been able to purchase one Bullock only, and 
one hundred weight of dryed Beef. II He had encountered others, 
"but the people will not sell one pound without the Cash being paid 
them on delivery •••• " Consequently, he had resorted to giving up a 
part of his own household supplies, hoping that his neighbors would do 
l 'k . 17 1 ew1se. 
Under these circumstances the Council was naturally disturbed when 
it was informed in September, 1781, by Hollingsworth that he had at-
tempted to deliver 200 head of cattle on hand to the Deputy Quartermas-
ter General for the state, Donaldson Yeates, but that Yeates "declines 
receiving them, and gives me for answer that his orders are to receive 
Beef Slaughtered and Barreled up, and not Cattle as this may throw both 
him and my self into fresh difficulties. 1118 Ephraim Blaine, the Quar-
termaster for the Army, defended the actions of his deputy, observing 
16Maryland Council to Maryland Delegates, Nov. 22, 1780, ~' R84, 
Item 70, p. 447. 
17Henry Hollingsworth to the Governor and Council, Mar. 3, 1781, 
MA, Vol. XLVII, pp. 100-101. 
18Hollingsworth to T, S. Lee, Sept, 28, 1781, MA, Vol. XLVII, p. 
509. 
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that "the requisition of Congress in beef from the respective States is 
neat beef •..• " He interpreted that to mean that the state ought to 
pay the expenses of slaughtering and argued that the cost would be less 
than the Continent would have to pay for drovers and pasturage. He did 
agree, however, "That if Mr. Morris with a Conunittee of Congress say the 
expense of Slaughtering the Cattle shall be a charge against the United 
S I . 11 1 d h i" t . d 1119 tates, wi p e ge my onour to you to see pai . 
The two incidents involving state and congressional administrators 
illustrated further the weakness of the Confederation. Pickering's 
problems in New York demonstrated that Congress was not able even to 
protect its own officers unless the states interceded directly on their 
behalf. The conflict in Maryland portrayed the problems that poor com-
munications between Congress and its officers could create. These dis-
putes also displayed, to a certain extent, the insensitivity both of 
the states and. of Congress toward the peculiar problems of one another. 
During the years 1780 through 1783 congressional powers also occa-
sionally encountered state laws which resulted in the diminution of the 
former and the enhancement of the latter. One of the best illustrations 
of this point consisted of the grant of a passport by Congress in July, 
1780, to George Howell, a citizen living on British-held Long Island. 
The passport permitted him to remove himself and his possessions from 
under British control and to take up resident in whatever state he 
20 
chose. In the process of moving, his vessel was stopped by citizens 
19Blaine to Mathew Tilgham, Oct. 16, 1781, MA, Vol. XLVII, p. 525. 
20s. Huntington, Proclamation, July 7, 1780, PCC, R80, Item 66, 
Vol. II, p. 109. 
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of Connecticut who, upon inspecting his papers and property, complained 
to Governor Trumbull that Howell was using his congressional passport 
to bring British goods into the state for sale. In a letter to Presi-
dent Huntington, Trumbull complained that if his information was cor-
rect, then Howell was violating Connecticut's law against trading with 
the enemy. More importantly, Trumbull was disturbed by the way the 
passport had been addressed: "To all Governors, Generals, Admirals, & 
Officers civil and military of the United States, and to all others to 
whom these shall come or may concern." The Governor argued that the 
document which Howell presented must be false because he "could not 
conceive that Congress, under the proposed Articles of Confederation 
have a right to, or much less in the present unconnected, unfederated 
state of the union, would assume such diction as the permission con-
veys. 1121 Congress was somewhat taken aback by Trumbull's strong 
letter and replied that it had acted on what it considered good evidence 
to grant the passport, but that it in no way intended the passport to 
interfere with the laws of any state. Congress did defend this type of 
passport in general and noted that it had been the policy of Congress 
since the onset of the revolution to allow persons favorably disposed 
to America's cause to remove themselves and their possessions from under 
22 
the control of the enemy. Nevertheless, Congress resolved on August 
30, 1780, "that Congress in granting said passport ..• did not claim 
21rrumbull to S. Huntington, Aug. 21, 1780, and Enclosures, PCC, 
R80, Item 66, Vol. II, pp. 91-109. 
22President of Congress to Governor of Connecticut and Connecticut 
Delegates to Governor of Connecticut, Sept. 1, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 
350-351, 351-353. 
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~right . , . to contravene the laws, or interfere with the civil police 
23 
of any State." 
Even after the ratification of the Articles, however, state laws 
continued to conflict with Congress' power to issue passports. In No-
vember, 1782, General Washington authorized a flag of truce for the 
ship Amazon to transport supplies for Britiah prisoners of war from New 
York to Wilmington, Delaware. 24 In January, 1783, the ship and its 
cargo were seized by several persons in Chester County, Pennsylvania. 
Under a law of that state, they had judged the goods not necessary for 
the support of the prisoners and consequently the property of those who 
had seized them. The courts of Pennsylvania had then been asked to 
judge the controversy. Upon learning of the confiscation, Congress 
unanimously declared that such action encroached upon its constitutional 
and essential rights and appointed a conunittee to confer with the execu-
tive of Pennsylvania to obtain the release of the goods. President 
Dickinson, upon consultation with the committee, asserted that he was 
bound by the law of the state but would lay the matter before the leg-
. 1 25 is ature. 
The legislature appointed its own committee to meet with the one 
from Congress. The Pennsylvania conunittee argued that although Congress 
had been given the general power of war "the mode of exercising that 
power might be-regulated by the States in any manner which [would] not 
23 JCC, Vol. XVII, p. 795. 
24washington to Secretary of War, Nov. 27, 1782, WW, Vol. 25, pp. 
376-3 77. 
25Madison 1s Notes of Debates, Jan. 24, 1783, JGC, Vol. XX.V, pp. 
859-860. 
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frustrate the power, & which their policy might require." In addition, 
the committee argued that even if the legislature repealed its act, it 
would not provide a remedy for this specific case without an ~ post 
facto law which would violate the constitution of Pennsylvania. The 
committee of Congress, on the other hand, argued that if Congress had 
the power.of war, at all, "it could not either by the Articles of Con-
federation or the reason of things admit of such a controuling power in 
each of the States, and that to admit such a construction [would] be a 
virtual surrender to the States of their whole federal power relative 
to war. 
After reaching an impasse, the committees finally arrived at a com-
promise in which the most prominent of the persons who had confiscated 
the goods would be urged to transfer their request for judgement from 
the courts of Pennsylvania to Congress. Some of those who had seized 
the goods took the hint and applied to Congress for relief. Madison 
warned, however, that the conflict had not actually been settled: "As 
few of the Seizors only were parties to the Memorial to Congress, it is 
still uncertain whether others may not adhere to their claims under the 
law in [which] case all the embarrassment will be revived. 1127 
Still another area in which congressional authority was damaged 
was in its power to issue commissions to privateers. These commissions 
were authorized by Congress but given to state governors for distribu-
tion. The problem here was that states sometimes used these commissions 
in ways not intended by Congress and in ways which resulted in conflicts 
26 Ibid .• , p. 860. 
27 Ibid. , pp. 860-861. 
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between states with Congress trapped in the middle. One such incident 
occurred in the sununer months of 1781. In March, 1781, Congress had re-
solved to authorize reprisals against the citizens of Great Britain. 
Specifically, it permitted states to "seize all ships, vessels, and 
goods belonging to the King or Crown of Great Britain or to his subjects 
or others inhabiting" any of the territories belonging to Grat Brit-
ain. 28 While Congress probably intended these commissions to be used 
only against enemy shipping, Connecticut chose to use the permission 
granted to raid the British on Long Island. In July Congress received 
two letters from Governor Clinton of New York complaining that citizens 
of Connecticut were not only raiding British citizens on Long Island 
but were confiscating the goods of loyal citizens of New York as well. 29 
A month later Congress resolved that the Governor of Connecticut innned-
iately revoke the conunissions he had issued "so far as they authorized 
the seizure of goods on Long Island, or elsewhere, on land not within 
the State of Connecticut. 1130 
Following the resolution, Governor Clinton also wrote to Governor 
Trumbull and attempted to define the conditions by which states could 
issue conunissions. He argued: "By the Confederation no state shall 
grant a Conunission except only under such Regulations as Congress shall 
establish, so that a previous Regulation El_ Congress is essential to a 
Conunission, and the states separately have only a Power to determine 
28JCC, Vol. XIX, pp. 314-316. 
29clinton to S. Huntington, July 1 and 5, 1781, PCC, R81, Item 67, 
Vol. II, pp. 390-411, 412-419. 
30Report of Connnittee on Governor Clinton's Letter of 1 & 5 July, 
passed Aug. 7, 1781, PCC, R29, Item 20, Vol. I, pp. 381-382. 
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the Persons to whom they will grant Commissions, .. 
,.31 
Recognizing 
that Congress had no power to force Trumbull to withdraw the commis-
sions, Ezra L'Hommedieu reported in late August: "I must Question 
whether any resolution will be so much regarded in Connecticut as to 
prevent their plundering. Retaliation from the State of New York will 
be the only thing that will prevent it. 1132 Trumbull, however, appar-
ently bowed to the wishes of Congress and the complaints of New York, 
as the controversy disappeared. 
Other powers of Congress under the Confederation were tested and 
found equally as unenforceable. One of these was the method contained 
in Article IX of the Confederation which was designed to settle inter-
state disputes. The only time this Articles was applied was in the dis-
pute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over the Wyoming Valley in 
the northeastern part of the latter state. The dispute over this region 
illustrated, once again, that even when provisions in the Articles were 
closely adhered to, their effectiveness depended entirely upon the 
cooperation of the states. 
The controversy over the Wyoming Valley began in the 1750s. The 
government of Connecticut had insisted that under its charter the land 
of northern Pennsylvania actually belonged to Connecticut. In order to 
exploit a portion of this claim a group of Connecticut citizens formed 
the Susquehannah Company in 1754 and purchased the lands in the Wyoming 
Valley from the Indians. The proprietors of Pennsylvania strongly 
31clinton to Trumbull, Aug. 20, 1781, PCC, R81, Item 67, Vol. II, 
pp. 434-435. 
32L 1 Hommedieu to Floyd, Aug. 28, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 201-202. 
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objected to this encroachment on what it considered its territory and 
the dispute between the two colonies was referred to British courts for 
settlement. Meanwhile, the Susquehannah Company began to move citizens 
into the valley in 1762. The proprietors of Pennsylvania reacted by 
persuading the Indians to renounce their sale of the lands and by plac-
ing people of their own in the valley. More Connecticut settlers came 
in 1769 and, by 1771, after some blood-letting between the two groups 
of settlers, the Pennsylvanians were driven out of Wyoming. At the out-
break of the Revolution, Pennsylvania once again tried to dislodge the 
Connecticut settlers, this time with an army. But the settlers defeated 
this attempt and drove the army off. The conflicts might have become 
even bloodier had the two states not partly obeyed the request of Con-
1 h fl ' d . h . h B . . 33 gress to et t e con ict rest uring t e war wit ritain. 
The dispute remained quiet until November, 1779. At that time, 
noting that both states had agreed to the Articles of Confederation, 
the Pennsylvania Assembly proposed to Connecticut that the dispute be 
referred to Congress and settled in accordance with Article Ix. 34 The 
General Assembly of Connecticut refused. It observed that Connecticut 
had expected the dispute to be settled in London and consequently had 
sent the appropriate documents to prove its claim to England where they 
now remained. The Assembly also argued that the decision should be de-
layed because the Confederation had not yet been completed and because 
the contest between Britain and the United States had not yet been 
33Nevins, The American States During the Revolution, pp. 584-585. 
34Resolution of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, November 18, 
1779, in Julian P. Boyd and Robert J. Taylor, eds., The Susquehannah 
Company Papers (Ithaca, 1962-1971), Vol. V, p. 54. Hereinafter, SCP. 
253 
35 settled. Connecticut's refusal led Pennsylvania to put pressure both 
upon the settlers of the Valley and upon Congress in 1780. Attempting 
to force a congressional decision, the Pennsylvania Council ordered 
that supplies from Pennsylvania which had been used to provision the 
Continental post in the Valley be cut off. President Reed asserted 
that the Council had taken this action for several reasons. First, the 
primary purpose of the fort was to protect the state from Indian at-
tacks, but this was the responsibility of the state which owned the 
territory, not that of Congress. The implication was that if the Valley 
belonged to Connecticut, it was up to that state and not Pennsylvania 
to provision the post. He also charged that the Continental Officers 
who.were stationed at the post were all claimants to the land under 
Connecticut's title and used their position to extend their holdings in 
36 
the Valley. Congress responded to Pennsylvania's complaints in De-
cember, 1780, by asserting that the post was indeed necessary in order 
to guard the frontiers. But it did direct the Connnander-in-Chief to 
replace the troops in the Valley with others which were from neither of 
the two states in the controversy and that the post be supported on the 
credit of the Continent. 37 
The conflict came before Congress again in mid-sununer, 1781. 
Shortly after the final ratification of the Articles in March, the Penn-
sylvania General Assembly ordered the Council "to take all necessary and 
expeditious measures for the consideration and determination of said 
35connecticut, The Public Records of Connecticut, Vol. II, p. 463. 
36 
Reed to Board of War, Nov. 20, 1780, SCP, Vol. V, pp. 67-69. 
37 
JCC, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1147-1148. 
254 
dispute agreeable to the ninth Article of the Confederation of the Uni-
38 ted States." Following its instructions, on July 7, 1781, the Supreme 
Executive Council of Pennsylvania petitioned Congress for a hearing 
under the method proposed in the Articles. 39 On November 11, acting 
upon the petition, Congress resolved to notify Connecticut and Pennsyl-
vania that a hearing would be held and the dispute settled in June, 
1782. 40 Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Council, with some note of alarm, 
warned the Assembly in March, 1782, that Connecticut had passed a law 
to raise a regiment of militia to protect its western frontiers. The 
Council observed that it knew "of no western frontiers of Connecticut 
which should seem to stand in need of special defense," and therefore 
it warned that "the regiment mentioned may too probably, hereafter be 
stationed at Wioming and under the pretense of defending their western 
frontier, may be designed to strengthen the post against the just Claim 
of this state. ,,4l 
Thus in an atmosphere of increasing tension, both the agents of 
Pennsylvania and some of the agents of Connecticut presented their cre-
d i 1 C J 24, 1782. 42 ent a s to ongress on une Connecticut, however, request-
ed a further delay until Jesse Root, one of the agents for Connecticut 
38Resolution of the General Assembly, Mar. 12, 1781, PA, 1st Ser., 
Vol. IX, p. 4. 
39Petition of the Pennsylvania Council to the Continental Congress, 
July 20, 1781, SCP, Vol. V, pp. 87-88. 
4oJCC, Vol. XXI, pp. 1115-1116. 
41 Council to Assembly, Mar. 7, 1782, PA, 1st Serr, Vol. IX, pp. 510-
511. 
42JcC, Vol. XXII, pp. 345-347. 
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who was away on congressional business, returned. But this request 
met stiff opposition from the agents of Pennsylvania, who "urged with 
the greatest vehemence for an entry of the non-appearance of the State 
of Connecticut, & that Congress immediately proceed according to the 
direction of the Articles of Confederation. " The problem was 
that Article IX declared that in a controversy between states, if the 
agents for a particular state did not appear on the day assigned by 
Congress, the Secretary of Congress had to represent the missing agents 
and, in cooperation with the agents of the other state in the dispute, 
to select judges who would try the controversy. In this case the Secre-
tary, Charles Thomson, was himself a Pennsylvanian and the Connecticut 
delegates warned that if Congress proceeded to implement the Article's 
method "it may very easily be seen what a set of judges we should be 
left with to decide this most important controversy; ... " The dele-
gates noted that the debate over this question had lasted three or four 
days but believed that Congress was content to let the matter lie with-
d . . 44 out ecision. 
Root finally returned from his mission, and on August 28, 1782, 
Congress wrote commissions for those who were to try the case and order-
45 ed them to meet at Trenton, New Jersey, on November 12, 1782. The 
commissioners met on the assigned day and during the res.t of November 
and December heard the arguments and evidence from both states. On 
43Ibid., pp. 351-352. 
44Dyer and B. Huntington to Trumbull, July 1, 1782, MRS, 7th Ser., 
Vol. III, pp. 362-365. 
45JcC, Vol. XXIII, pp. 533-536. 
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December 30 the connnissioners announced their decision: "We are unan-
imously of Opinion that the State of Connecticut has no right to the 
46 lands in controversy." The decision stunned and angered the agents 
for Connecticut, as they fully expected to win the case. When the pro-
ceedings of the court were delivered to Congress on January 3, 1783, 
James Madison noted: "It was remarked that the Delegates from 
Con[necticut] particularly Mr. Dyer were more captious on the occas[i]on 
47 than was consistent with a perfect acquiescence in the decree. 
Discussing the case in a letter to William Williams, Dyer asserted 
that he had made every effort to get the proceedings delayed, but as he 
could not, he had aided in selecting the judges, because he did not 
trust Congress to do so properly if he refused. Believing that Connect-
icut had been unfairly outmaneuvered, he urged the Assembly, as he had 
done in a letter prior to the opening of the trial, to revoke its ces-
. f h 1 . . f h I d . . 48 I sion o t at c aim as compensation or t e court s ecision. n re-
sponse to the decision, the Assembly of Connecticut, at its session in 
January, 1783, resolved "that the Delegates of this State in Congress, 
be instructed & Directed • • . not to proceed any farther towards car-
rying into Execution the Powers Authorities & Directions to them 
given • • . touching the Cession & Relinquishment of this States Right 
46Proceedings of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, 
Jan. 3, 1783, JCC, Vol. XXIV, pp. 6-32. For various papers relating 
to the dispute and presented to the Connnission, see SCP, Vol. V, pp. 
144-246; PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, pp. 446-447, 679-733-:-r54-755; and PCC, 
R89, Item-r7. ~-
47Madison1s Notes of Debates, Jan, 3, 1783, JCC, Vol. ¥..XV, p. 845. 
48 Dyer to Trumbull, Oct. 19, 1782, and Dyer to Williams, Jan., 
1783, ~' Vol. V, pp. 126-129, 258-260. 
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d .. 49 in western lands, for the Benefit of the Unite States ...• 
The Assembly also sought to reopen the case. Seizing upon infor-
mation it received from some of those involved in the dispute, which 
accused the agents from Pennsylvania of suppressing evidence favorable 
to Connecticut during the trial, the Assembly, in its session of May 3, 
1783, resolved to form a committee to investigate 'whether some redress 
cannot be obtained against the Judgement given by the Commissioners in 
the Case between this State & the State of Pennsylvania and make Report 
to this Assembly at their next Session. 1150 The Assembly of Pennsylvan-
ia, meanwhile, worsened the problem by repealing an act which had 
temporarily forbade removing the Connecticut settlers from their lands 
51 in the Valley. In reaction to the complaints of its citizens, the 
Connecticut Assembly at its session in October, urged the settlers to 
appeal to Congress for the creation of a court to try their right of 
soil and assured them that the Delegates would aid them in that effort 
in whatever way they could. The Assembly also instructed its delegates 
to work for a new trial of the controversy between Pennsylvania and 
Connecticut because of new evidence uncovered by the committee assigned 
to look for such evidence between the sessions of the Assembly. In 
addition, perhaps in part to bring pressure on Congress, the Assembly 
49Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly Concerning the 
Western Cession, Jan., 1783, ~'Vol. V, p. 260. 
50 Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly, May, 1783, Zebu-
lon Butler to Elizur Talcott, May 16, 1783; and William Judd to Butler, 
Sept. 15, 1783, .§.£!, Vol. V, pp. 292-293, 296-297, 305-306. 
51 Act of Pennsylvania to Stay Suits of Ejectment Against Wyoming 
Settlers, Mar. 13, 1783, and Repeal of Act Staying Suits of Ejectment 
against Connecticut Settlers, Sept. 9, 1783, SCP, Vol. V, pp. 270-271, 
304-305. ~ 
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repealed its cession of western territories and ordered Governor Truro-
bull to issue a procl~ation asserting the rights of the state to the 
lands west of the Western Pennsylvania boundary and strictly forbidding 
anyone to settle there without special license from the General Assembly 
f C . 52 o onnecticut. Thus, the method written into Article IX of the Con-
federation was not very effective in solving this interstate dispute. 
Connecticut refused to accept the decision as final and by the end of 
1783 was demanding that Congress reconsider the matter. Equally as im-
portant, the method and the ultimate decision of the court was in part 
responsible for Connecticut's rescinding its cession of western lands. 
During the years 1780 through 1783 disputes also occurred between 
states which were not referred to Congress for settlement. Such dis-
putes helped further to define the relations of states with one another 
during the Revolution. On July 12, 1781, the delegates from Virginia 
notified President Reed of Pennsylvania that fifteen bales of clothing, 
arriving on the ship Franklin from France and intended for the troops 
of Virginia, had been attached by a citizen of Pennsylvania, Simon 
Nathan, and.that representatives of Virginia had been ordered to appear 
before a Justice of the Peace in Philadelphia to show cause why the 
goods should not be attached. The delegates ·argued that "the property 
of the State of Virginia cannot be arrested or detained by process is-
suing from any of the Courts or Magistrates of Pennsylvania or any other 
State in the Union." They observed that Virginia must either "suffer 
the Inconveniences of an exparte adjudication ever dangerous to the 
52Resolution of the General Assembly of Connecticut, Oct. 9, 1783, 
enclosed in Trumbull to Dickinson, Nov. 15, 1783, PA, 1st Ser., Vol. 
IX, pp. 116-117, 146-148. 
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Rights of Property, or abandon its Sovereignty by descending to answer 
before the Tribunal of another Power.'' The delegates therefore declared 
the proceedings not only unwarranted but also "derogatory to the Rights 
of Sovereignty of the State of Virginia and requiring the immediate 
Interference of the authority of the State of Pennsylvania to put a 
stop there to. . 1153 
President Reed innnediately requested an opinion from Pennsylvania's 
Attorney General, William Bradford, who responded: "We are of the Opin-
ion That the Conunonwealth of Virginia being an independent & Sovereign 
power, cannot be compelled to appear or answer in any Court of Justice 
within this State. That all process directed against the person of a 
Sovereign or against his Goods is ~bsolutely void; ... and that all 
concerned in issuing or serving such process are guilty of a violation 
of the laws of nations. 1154 Reed then informed the Virginia delegates 
that measures would be taken immediately to restore the property which 
. 55 
had been attached. The delegates were pleased with Reed's response 
and especially with his readiness to "punish the attempts made on the 
rights and dignity of the State they represent in the presumptuous 
seizure of its property." They noted that they would inform their con-
stituents and would "embrace with pleasure every occasion of manifest-
ing a correspondent attention & respect to the State over which your 
53Delegates of Virginia to President Reed, July 12, 1781, PA, 1st 
Ser., Vol. IX, pp. 260-261. 
54william Bradford to Reed, July 12, 1781,. PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, 
p. 272. 
55Reed to Virginia Delegates, July 12, 1781, PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, 
p. 271. 
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Excellency presides. 1156 
A similar assertion of sovereignty occurred in a dispute between 
Maryland and Rhode Island in 1783. On being informed that a Maryland 
vessel, sent out under a flag of truce to supply Maryland's prisoners 
of war in New York City, had been captured by ships operating out of 
Newport, Rhode Island, William Paca, the governor of Maryland, com-
plained that the captain of the Rhode Island vessel "must appear to 
have paid as little reguard to the Rights of Humanity, as to the 
National Rights appertaining to the Sovereignty and Independence of the 
State of Maryland;" Paca assured the Governor of Rhode Island that in 
similar circumstances 11we beg you to be assured every Step shall be 
taken that our Law and Constitution authorizes, to vindicate your 
National Rights. 1157 
These last expressions of state sovereignty and independence indi-
cated the problem which plagued congressional-state relations throughout 
the Revolution. Almost every conflict, including those mentioned above, 
and those over western lands and finances, resulted in increased irri-
tations between the states and Congress, in decreased state coopera-
tion, and in the loss of congressional prestige. The loss of prestige 
was especially apparent during 1783 and was symbolized by the Philadel-
phia mutiny in June of that year. 
As mentioned previously, the grumbling of the soldiery in early 
1783 had forced Congress to commute the officers' pension to cash 
56virginia Delegates to Reed, July 13, 1781, PA, 1st Ser., Vol. IX, 
pp. 274-275. 
57william Paca to the Governor of Rhode Island, MA, Vol. XLVIII, 
pp. 385-386; 
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payments, but the dissatisfactions in the Army continued. John Arm-
strong noted in May: "The intelligence from the army verifies all our 
predictions. The soldiers are loud and insolent, the officers broken, 
dissatisfied and desponding. The States obdurate and forgetful and 
58 
Congress weak as water and impotent as old age." Some few' of the 
soldiers went beyond complaining, and on June 19 Congress received in-
formation from the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania that eighty 
soldiers from Lancaster, who would probably be followed by others, were 
on their way to Philadelphia to demand justice from Congress. Congress 
immediately appointed a committee to confer with the executive of Penn-
sylvania. But after the conference, the committee informed Congress 
that the Militia of Philadelphia probably would not help and "that it 
would hazard the authority of Gov[ernment] to make the attempt, & it 
would be necessary to let the soldiers come into the city, if the offi-
cers who had gone out to meet them could not stop them." Many members 
of Congress were angered and declared "that if the City would not sup-
port Congress, it was high time to remove to some other place." The 
59 soldiers came into the city the following day. 
On June 21 the mutineers presented themselves before the State 
House where Congress and the Executive Council of Pennsylvania had 
assembled. Badly shaken, Congress called upon the President of Penn-
sylvania demanding again that he interpose the forces of the Philadel-
phia militia. Once again President Dickinson asserted that the militia 
58John Armstrong, Jr. to Gates, May 9, 1783, LMC, Vol. VII, p. 
160n. 
59 d. • I Ma ison s Notes of Debates, June 19-20, 1783, JCC, Vol. XXV, pp~ 
971, 973. 
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would not respond to such a call unless the mutineers committed acts of 
·violence against persons or property. Unsure what to do, Congress 
fretted awa~ the hours until its time of usual adjournment, and the 
soldiers, who had remained essentially orderly throughout the day, per-
mitted the delegates to depart and pass through their ranks. Congress 
reconvened that evening and passed a series of three resolves. First, 
Congress would inform the Executive Council of Pennsylvania that it 
had been insulted and would demand that the Council take effective 
measures to prevent a repeat of the insult. Second, if no action was 
forthcoming, the President of Congress was authorized to reconvene Con-
gress at either Trenton or Princeton, New Jersey. Finally, Congress 
sent a message to General Washington requesting his aid in suppressing 
h . 60 t e mutiny .. 
As the re.sponse of the Executive Council was negative, President 
Elias Boudinot determined that Congress should adjourn and reconvene at 
Princeton. Explaining the situation to his brother, Boudinot declared: 
"The President and Counci.l [of Pennsylvania] have not firmness enough 
to call out the Militia and aledge the reason that they would not obey 
them •..• This handful of Mutineers continue still with Arms in their 
hands and are privately supported, and it is well if we are not all 
Prisoners in a short time." He noted that he had changed Congress' 
place of Residence hoping that "the Inhabitants of Jersey will protect 
.. 61 us. 
60rbid., pp. 973-974; and JCC, Vol. XXIV, p. 410. 
61Elias Boudinot to Elisha Boudinot, June 23, 1783, Life of 
Boudinot, Vol. I, pp. 336-337. 
263 
For many, the mutiny and the removal of Congress from Philadelphia 
to Princeton symbolized the impotence of that body. Many, both before 
and after the mutiny, asserted that this impotency had been reached be~ 
cause of the lack of cooperation of the states. Writing to General 
Washington in February, 1783, AleKander Hamilton declared that Congress 
was "a body not governed by reason or foresight, but by Circumstances. 
It is probable we shall [not] take the proper measures; and if we do not 
62 
a few M[onths] may open an embarrassing scene." In March he repeated 
these sentiments, and borrowing figures from mechanics and biology, 
pessimistically reported that "the centrifugal is much stronger than 
the Centripetal force in these states; the seeds of disunion much more 
numerous than those of union. 1163 Ralph Izard of South Carolina, observ-
ing that Britain was violating a promise made in the preliminary treaty 
of peace, to return slave property, declared that Congress could do 
nothing to force the British to comply. He argued: "The conduct of 
the States respecting Revenue, has so totally annihilated all Continen-
tal Strength, and Credit, that no Enemy need be afraid of insulting 
1164 us. 
In mid-July, 1783, Oliver Ellsworth conveyed the news of the mutiny 
to his government and asserted that Congress would not return to Phila-
delphia. But he warned that "it will soon be of very little consequence 
where Congress go, if they are not made respectable as well as 
62namilton to Washington, Feb. 7, 1783, I.MC, Vol. VII, p. 33. 
63Hamilton to Washington, Mar. 24, 1783, LMC, Vol. VII, pp. 94-95. 
64Ralph Izard to Arthur Middleton, May 30, 1783, I.MC, Vol. VII, 
p. 17 5. 
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responsible which can never be ,done without giving them a power to per-
form engagements as well as make them." He argued that the Confedera-
tion had intended to give Congress that power, but that "in practice it 
amounts to nothing." Most states complied with congressional requisi-
tions "so far only as suits their.particular opinion & convenience: & 
they are the more disposed at present to go on in this way from the 
inequalities it has already produced, & a mistaken idea that the danger 
is over; . 1165 Richard Peters reported: "Each State thinks it has 
done the most. Each endeavours by Refusals of General Plans to obtain 
66 what they think is particular Justice in its own Case." Hamilton 
argued in late July: "The road to popularity in each State is to in-
spire jealousies of the power of Congress, though nothing can be more 
apparent than that they have no power; 
The lack of power and prestige of Congress after the Philadelphia 
mutiny was no better illustrated than by its inability to muster quorums 
during the last months of 1783 to conduct important Continental busi-
ness. In part, non-attendance in Congress during these months was the 
result of increasing state conflicts, overwhelning financial problems 
on both the national and local levels, and the lack of a common enemy; 
but it was also partly the result of the heavy burden and dwindling 
rewards of congressional service. 
Throughout the years 1780 through 1783, the delegates of Congress 
65 
Ellsworth to Trumbull, July 10, 1783, }IllS, 7th Ser., Vol. III, 
pp. 432-434. 
66Richard Peters to Oliver Wolcott, July 15, 1783, LMC, Vol. VII, 
pp. 224-225. 
67 Hamilton to John Jay, July 25, 1783, _!£!£, Vol. VII, p. 233. 
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suffered severely for the want of money. Inflation during 1780 quickly 
ate up whatever resources the delegates brought with them to Philadel-
phia and throughout that year they constantly requested money from their 
f h . 68 states or t eir support. In the first part of 1780, however, the 
delegates had been able to draw money from the Continental treasury. 
But after Congress stopped emitting paper money and the treasury became 
emptier, the resistance to drawing money on the Continent began to 
build. In October President Huntington notified the states that on! 
September 29 Congress had resolved not to permit the delegates to re-
69 
ceive money from the treasury any longer. In the early months of 
1781 the states apparently complied since few delegate complaints were 
heard, but in the disastrous months of May and June the Continental 
collapsed entirely. Trapped in Philadelphia, the delegates suffered 
greatly for the want of cash and appealed urgently to their states for 
1 . f 70 re ie . From that point, on into 1782 and 1783, many delegates 
68 . 
For examples of these requests for money, see S. Huntington to 
the Treasurer of Connecticut, Jan. 18, 1780, LMC, Vol. V, pp. 10-11; 
New York Delegates to the Governor of New Yoriz:-May 21, 1780, LMC, Vol. 
V, p. 161; Virginia Delegates to the Governor of Virginia, Nov. 5, 
1780, I.MC, Vol. V, p. 437; Duane and Scott to Clinton, June 2, 1780, 
PGC, Vol. 5, pp. 777-778; Ellery to Governor Greene, May 16, 1780 and 
May 23, 1780, RICC, pp. 287, 289; and Cornell to Governor Greene, Aug. 
22, 1780, RICC~ 307. 
69 The Secretary of Congress to Meriwether Smith, Sept. 15, 1781, 
I.MC, Vol. VI, p. 218; and S. Huntington, Circular, Oct. 3, 1780,· PCC, 
R24, Item 15, p. 120. 
7°For the financial problems of the delegates in 1781 see LMC, Vol. 
VI, pp. 84-97, passim; Nicholas Van Dyke to Thomas Rodney, Oct. 15, 
1781, I.MC, Vol. VI, pp. 241-242; Livermore to ,the President of New Hamp'.""" 
shire, Nov. 27, 1781, I.MC, Vol. VI, p. 269; Scott to Clinton, May 10, 
1781, PGC, Vol. 6, pp.Ss2-854; Scott to Clinton, Dec. 1, 1781, PGC, 
Vol. 7-:-?"p. 532-533; Bland to Jefferson, June 3, 1781, PTJ, pp. 72-73; 
Boudinot to John Stevens, Nov. 5, 1781, Life of Boudino~Vol. I, pp. 
228-229; and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer andl5aniel Carroll to T. S. 
Lee, May 15, 1781, MA, Vol. XLVII, p. 244. 
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d 1 . f b . 'd 71 continue·· to comp a1n o e1ng unpa1 . 
Some states did try to help, but their own financial problems made 
it exceedingly difficult. For example, the Maryland Council, having no 
cash, sent its delegates super-fine flour which could be readily sold 
in Philadelphia for cash. 72 Other delegates were not so fortunate. 
The treasurer of Virginia informed James Madison that he could not pay 
him from the treasury. He asserted: "We have not ten pounds Specie in 
it [the treasury] since my corning into Office, and it is much to be 
feared there will not any come in for a long time. ,,7 3 
The enormous labor and personal costs involved in congressional 
service were also high. Thomas McKean of Delaware declared in July, 
1780: "The public duty I am required to perform is too much for me and 
as our State affords me no relief in Congress I shall be obliged to de-
cline the Delegation." He observed that if his health held out his 
finances would not and noted: "I have not received a farthing since 
the first of January, 1779, and I am not a single day out of Congress 
unless when attending some court of Justice so that I cannot in the 
least attend to my private affairs nor the wants of my family; 
71For the pleas of delegates in 1782 and 1783, see Scott to the 
Governor of New York, Apr. 23, 1782; and May 28, 1782, LMC, Vol. VI, 
pp. 333, 356; Samuel Osgood to the Secretary of the Connnonwealth of 
Massachusetts, June 12, 1782, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 371; Duane to the 
Governor of New York, July 1, 1782, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 377; and Dyer to 
Trumbull, Oct., 1782, Nov. 8, 1782, and May 21, 1783, MRS, 7th Ser., 
Vol. III, pp. 394-~95, 397, 413. ~-
72 Maryland Council to Maryland Delegates, June 4, 1781, and June 22, 
1781, MA, Vol. XLV, pp. 461, 483. 
73 Madison, May 11, 1782, PJM, Vol. 4, 231. · Ambler to p. 
74 c. Rodney, July 24, 1780, LCR, 359; and McKean McKean to p. to 
John Dickinson, Dec. 25, 1780, LMC, Vol. v' p. 498. 
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John Sullivan of New Hampshire requested that the assembly make provi-
sions for his copyist, explaining that: "I have so much writing to do 
as the Connnander in Chief the principle officers of the Army and others 
keep up a Constant Correspondence with me and in addition to this I 
have so many Reports to frame, Copy and prepare for Congress That I am 
Compelled to keep Mr. Smith [his copyist] almost wholly Employed with 
75 Penn." Turbutt Wright of Maryland upbraided his state for not send-
ing delegates to relieve him and complained: "Upon the whole I find 
the Duty extremely heavy and the Rewards light. I can't think of re-
maining long in this Situation. . . 117 6 
The uncertain pay and personal costs might have been endured by 
most, but during the years 1780 through 1783, Congress lost prestige 
and along with it one more attraction of congressional service. Daniel 
of St. Thomas Jenifer, writing to the Governor of Maryland in October, 
1780, declared that "Congress have it not in their power to do much 
service at present having neither Credit or Money. in such distressing 
situation, who could wish to be of that Body? 1177 James Duane, ordered 
to service again in June, 1782, wrote sarcastically to Philip Schuyler: 
"I can have no Objection! Young and rich and Vigorous, and of little 
Consequence to my Family, why should I fear summers Heat in an unhealthy 
Climate? Is not the Honour of serving as a member of Congress--tho' so 
many others have shaken it off--quite a sufficient Consideration for ~; 
75sullivan to the Pr~sident of New Hampshire, Nov. 25, 1780, LMC, 
Vol. V, pp. 499-500. 
76Turbutt Wright to John Hall, June 4, 1782, Li~C, Vol. VI, p. 366. 
77naniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to the Governor of Maryland, Oct. 2, 
1780, LMC, Vol. V, p. 398. 
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and abundantly productive of Peace and Comfort to my Family, of Improve-
ment and Instruction to ~ Children! and will it not lay a sure foun-
dation for plenty and Affluence in old Age? 1178 
Underlying the complaints of these delegates and of many others 
was the belief that their efforts were unappreciated. During the crisis 
of the years 1780 through 1783 they had repeatedly tried to assume the 
role of national legislators only to be rebuffed by their own states. 
During this period almost every congressional program, on which the 
delegates had spent many hours and much labor, was rejected by the 
states. The unwillingness of the states to accept these programs nat-
urally led to frustration and probably to an attitude among the dele-
gates that the job they were doing was not worthwhile. 
The results of these factors meant that as the war drew to a close 
it became increasingly difficult to make quorums in Congress in order 
to c.onduct congressional business. Delegates often attended only when 
issues before that body vitally concerned the interests of their states. 
Ezra L'Hommedieu reported to Governor Clinton in September, 1781, after 
a crucial portion of the debate over Vermont: "Since the departure of 
Ira Allen and his associates, we have had a very thin Congress, when 
before there was twelve States represented and one member from the 
thirteenth, which shows what pains were taken to carry a favorite point 
79 
to the New England States." Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire as-
serted in October, 1781: ''My wish is to get home, from this intolerable 
78 
Duane to Schuyler, June 4, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 365. 
791 1Honunedieu to the Governor of New York, Sept. 8, 1781, LMC, Vol. 
VI, pp. 211-213. 
269 
1 "f b . . d 1180 expensive p ace, 1 once Vermont us1ness was one. Richard Peters 
declared in October, 1783, that Congress "want influence & power to do 
themselves & the public justice, & while gentlemen come to execute in-
stead of control the prejudices of their States, a seat will neither be 
81 
an object of ambition or pleasure." 
The states themselves were at fault, insisting that their delegates 
represent them explicitly in all their dealings in Congress. For exam-
ple, Thomas Rodney writing to Caesar Rodney urged that strong state 
loyalists be placed in Congress, "for you may be assured that State in-
terest prevails so much in that Council at present that you want members 
whose particular and strong attachment to this State will not let them 
be carried away by Junta's or parties. 1182 If the delegates failed to 
pursue their state's interest, they paid the price by being called home 
in disgrace. For example, the delegates from Massachusetts were dis-
missed and others appointed in their place in 1783, because the old 
members had voted for the commutation of the Army's pensions. 83 
In addition, states further added to friction in Congress by often 
times appointing as delegates or as agents persons who were vitally con-
cerned with the outcome of territorial disputes. James Duane, who· 
represented New York in the controversy over the New Hampshire Grants, 
had invested heavily in the region west of the Connecticut River. 
80Livermore to the President of New Eampshire, Oct. 30, 1781, LMC, 
Vol. VI, p. 251. 
81 Peters to Thomson, Oct. 20, 1783, New York Historical Society, 
Collections, 1878, Vol. 11, pp. 177-179. 
82 
T. Rodney to C. Rodney, Oct. 18, 1781, LCR, p. 429. 
83Madison to Jefferson, Aug. 11, 1783, PJM, Vol. 7, p. 269. 
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Likewise, Samuel Livermore, who represented New Hampshire in the contra-
versy, was interested in the lands on the east side of the River. In 
the dispute over the Wyoming Valley, Eliphalet Dyer, who represented 
Connecticut, was a member of the Susquehannah Company and had even 
d h I • d . h 84 presse t at company s case in Lon on prior to t .e war. 
The heavy burdens of congressional service were reflected in con-
gressional attendance, which decreased almost in direct proportion to 
the increasing financial problems and interstate conflicts of the per-
iod. Consequently, Congress often had to call upon the states to send 
members so that business could be conducted. 85 After the fall of York-
town, the problem of non-attendance worsened, and in May, 1782, Congress 
had to call upon six of the thirteen states--New Hampshire, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and New York--to send delegates 
86 
to Congress. After the Philadelphia mutiny and the transfer of Con-
gress from there to Princeton, non-attendance became chronic, and Con-
gress was unable to conduct business throughout much of the remainder 
of 1783. In part, this was perhaps because the mutiny proved not only 
that Congress was unable to protect its members from assaults and in-
sults, but also, as evidenced by the citizens of Philadelphia, the 
people would not do so either. The complete loss of congressional 
84Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., Dictionary .£i. American 
Biography (New York, 1946), Vol. V, pp. 466, 581-582; and Vol. XI, 
p. 307. 
85Even in the crucial months before Yorktown Congress was forced to 
request attendance from New Hampshire, Connecticut, North Carolina, 
Delaware, and New Jersey; see The President of Congress to Certain 
States, Aug. 25, 1781, LMC, Vol. VI, p. 198. 
86JCC, Vol. XXII, p. 301, and The President of Congress to the 
Several States, May 28, 1782, LMC, Vol. VI, pp. 355-356. 
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prestige caused by the mutiny removed entirely that reward for congres-
sional service, and consequently the Journals of the last half of 1783 
were full of congressional pleas for the attendance of its members. 87 
Attendance had become so spotty that in October Congress appointed 
a committee consisting of Carroll, Huntington, and Duane to investigate 
congressional absenteeism. It reported on November 1, perhaps a bit 
dishonestly, because each of the members of the connnittee had themselves 
complained at various times of the hardships of congressional service, 
that it was at a loss to explain why Congress had never had a full rep-
resentation and why on many occasions nine necessary states could not 
be found to conduct congressional business. Nevertheless, the committee 
did point out that the Articles were silent on the question, since when 
they were written it was expected that every state would do its duty. 
It argued that without full representation, Congress would be forced to 
conduct business year round instead of appointing a Committee of the 
States for a part of each year· as provided by the Articles of Confeder-
ation. The only remedy that the committee could suggest, however, was 
that Congress take attendance of the members each day and report that 
88 
attendance once a month to the governors of the states. 
The lack of quorums hampered congressional operations prior to the 
mutiny, but the problem became exceptionally serious after that event. 
Samuel Huntington reported that it had been impossible to ratify a com-
mercial treaty with the King of Sweden until July 29, 1783, even though 
87As of July the Journals reflect numerous pleas to specific states 
to send delegates. See JCC, Vol. XXIV, p. 422; and Vol. XXV, passim. 
88 Report of Mr. Carroll, Mr. Huntington, Mr. Duane, On Keeping Up a 
Full Representation in Cong., passed Nov. 1, 1783, PCC, R31, Item 23, 
pp. 145-146. 
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Congress had received the treaty several weeks before, because of the 
lack of enough members present to ratify. 89 More importantly, congres-
sional absenteeism threatened the very peace itself. Congress had re-
ceived the definitive treaty of peace in Nbvember, 1783. One of the 
conditions of that treaty was that it be ratified and returned to Brit-
ain prior to March, 1784. Thomas Jefferson, writing to Governor Harri-
son on December 17 noted that seven states had finally met on the 
thirteenth, "but nine states being requisite to ratify the treaty, we 
have been unable to get this done; II Jefferson found this laxity 
on the part of the states inexcusable and declared: "I am sorry to say 
that I see no immediate prospect of making up nine states, so careless 
are either the states or their delegates to their particular interests 
as well as the general good .. .. 90 A week later he was even more 
anxious, reporting: "The departure of a member two days hence leaves 
us with only six states and of course stops all business. We have no 
certain prospect of nine states within any given time; ••. In the 
meantime only a little over two months remain for their assembling, 
ratifying and getting the ratification across the Atlantic to Paris. 1191 
Thus at year's end, congressional power, authority, and prestige 
had reached a nadir. The state cooperation so necessary for each of 
these attributes had all but disappeared. Throughout the critical years 
of 1780 through 1783, constant conflicts had occurred between the states 
89 
S. Huntington and B. Huntington to Trumbull, July 30, 1783, MRS, 
7th Ser., Vol. III, p. 437; and Boudinot to Franklin, Aug. 15, 178~ 
Life .£!_ Boudinot, Vol. I, pp. 352-353. 
90Jefferson to Harrison, Dec. 17, 1783, PTJ, Vol. 6, p. 388. 
91Jefferson to Harrison, Dec. 24, 1783, PTJ, Vol. 6, p. 419. 
273 
and Congress over finances, western lands, and the sphere of other con-
gressional actions. In each case, limited by the Articles of Confeder-
ation, governed by necessity and expediency, and with few independent 
powers of its own, Congress had to yield to the desires of the states. 
Throughout these critical years, the evidence was clear; rather than 
exercising a controlling power, Congress itself was controlled. By 
the end of 1783, Congress could neither command the respect of its own 
membership nor could it even put a period to the great cause which had 
called it into being eight long and bloody years before. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout the American Revolution, the United States was little 
more than thirteen independent polities loosely bound by a similarity 
of culture, an accident of geography, and a struggle against a common 
enemy. The idea of a united nation on the North American Continent was 
the dream of many revolutionaries, but transforming that dream into 
reality proved almost impossible. Though united in sentiment at the 
outbreak of the Revolution, political union among the colonies was 
greatly hampered by a lack of a national polity. The colonies had de-
veloped in the pre-revolutionary period virtually isolated from one 
another and had been connected only tenuously by the activities of mer-
chants who plied the coastal trade, and by the strands of Imperial 
government operating from London. 
Irritated by the abuses of British administration, the thirteen 
separate polities had called the Second Continental Congress into being 
during 1775 in order to present a united front against those abuses. 
Once the decision was made for independence, the new state governments 
recognized the necessity of maintaining some form .of central direction 
if the struggle was to be successful. They were content to continue to 
allow Congress to perform that function. They were willing to do so in 
part because from its inception, Congress had been structured to conform 
to the revolutionaries' erroneous assumptions about the governmental 
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relationships which existed in pre-revolutionary America. 
In the colonial period the goverrunental relationship which had been 
nonnally practiced had been essentially a straight line system which 
operated from colonists to colonial governments to British administra-
tion. While British government could act directly upon the colonists, 
it rarely did so prior to the French and Indian War. In the years im-
mediately preceding the Revolution, however, Britain began to exercise 
its prerogative by by-passing colonial governments and acting directly 
upon the colonists themselves, while at the same time not permitting 
the colonists a voice in shaping the policies which were imposed. Thus, 
one of the major abuses perceived by Americans, which had impelled them 
toward revolution, had been Britain's decision to step outside what the 
colonists viewed as the proper constitutional relationships established 
in the Empire. Consequently, when the colonies declared their indepen-
dence and established their own central goverrunent they attempted to 
restore the non-existent straight line constitutional relationship. In 
this case the line ran between the citizens of the states, state govern-
ments and Congress, To insure that Congress could not abuse the system 
as had the British, the state governments also shifted the locus of real 
power from Congress to themselves, leaving Congress without the ability 
to coerce either citizens or states. 
The Articles of Confederation did little more than legitimize this 
relationship. Both before and after the writing and ratification of 
that document Congress was left without coercive authority. Thus its 
powers were either extremely limited or virtually meaningless, as the 
effective, sustained exercise of those powers depended totally upon the 
consent and cooperation of the states. The best example of the 
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ineffectiveness of those powers was that granted Congress to issue 
bills of credit. Implementing its authority to do so, Congress printed 
millions of dollars during the early years of the Revolution. But since 
the states failed to cooperate in supportin·g those bills, Congress was 
forced to abandon that power altogether, not only because it was use-
l~ss but also because it was even becoming dangerous. 
Poor cooperation among the states was caused by several factors. 
First was the lack of a national identity. In their separate develop-
m~nt. the! colonies, and later the states, were naturally more concerned 
with th@ events occurring in and affecting their own environs. These 
local cotfii!lunities, in the less mobile civilization of the eighteenth 
G.entury world, were the major sources of an individual's identity, 
wealth; pr@$tige, and social standing. Such identification sometimes 
extgfided r@giona.lly but not nationally. For example, a Virginia tobacco 
planter could mor@ easily identify with the problems of a rice grower in 
South Carolina than he could with those 0£ a New England merchange. 
ThtH~ th~ colonial experience produG.ed men with fierce local and some-
Hffi(gs regional pride but with li tt:le feeling for the nation as a whole. 
Merrill Jeniiililn put it best when he declared: "It was loyalty to one's 
country that movll!d men, whether radical or conservative; and one's coun-
try was the state in which one lived, not the thirteen more or less 
united states .dong the Atlantic Coast ,il1 The consequences of such at-
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nation as a whole, that government felt little obligation to obey such 
policies. 
Another factor which led to conflict among the states was the 
disparity of wealth in each caused by different economic evolutions. 
The New England states were more commercial than the southern states, 
and consequently their property and goods were more readily converted 
to the uses of war than was the tobacco and slave capital of the south. 
Thus even though the southern states often tried to meet congressional 
demands for money they constantly complained that little was available. 
Northern states, on the other hand, observing the large landholdings 
and numerous slaves in the South, could not understa~d why those states 
could not carry their share of the burden. 
Still another factor was the problem of community force. In their 
colonial developments, different regions had created community organi-
zations which fit their particular environments and the inclinations of 
those who settled there. The compact, highly organized connnunities of 
New England were much.more effective in drawing out their resources than 
were the more privatistically oriented, scattered organizations of the 
plantation communities of the South. While governmental coercion was 
sometimes necessary in both regions, because of the community organiza-
tion of the New England states those governments could accomplish much 
more with much less force. The governments of New England also operated 
over a much smaller geographic region and thus were able to focus their 
authorities much better than could large states like Virginia and Penn-
sylvania. The results of these differences in governmental energy nat-
urally led to charges and countercharges over whether some states were 
doing all that they could for the war effort. 
278 
Some states also experienced difficulties within their own poli-
ties. The force of independence turned loose by the states' declara-
tion against Britain was adopted by some frontier communities against 
their own state governments. Such was the case of Kentuckians in Vir-
ginia and also with many of the citizens of New York and New Hampshire 
in the Connecticut River Valley. These conflicts added to the distress 
of those states involved, reducing further their ability and sometimes, 
because of adverse reactions in Congress, their willingness to respond 
to congressional requests. Closely related to these problems were the 
jealousies aroused in landless states by those which had large claims 
in the trans-Appalachian west. 
Perhaps if these conditions had not existed, if the national polity 
had been more integrated, the form of government established by the 
revolutionaries might have worked. But of course these conditions did 
obtain and because they existed, they defeated the possibility that 
such a national government could be effective. The weakness of the 
national frame became starkly apparent during the crises of the years 
1780 through 1783. The problems of this period, rather than integrating 
the divergent polities in the union, amplified the differences. 
Prior to 1780 the states had experienced considerable distress in 
attempting to answer both the needs of their citizens and the exigencies 
of war. Many of them entered the crucial years of 1780 through 1783 
exhausted by their previous four years of effort. The military and fi-
nancial crises of these years brought many of them to the verge of 
collapse. Without an integrated national polity there was little 
understanding in any state of any other state's peculiar hardships. 
Without this understanding, at one time or another every state 
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government suspected and charged that all other states were not doing 
their share. Such charges naturally created friction among the states 
and made them less willing to cooperate with one another either inside 
or outside Congress. The victim of these increasing tensions was con-
gressional authority. 
As the military and financial difficulties multiplied, the weakness 
of congressional government became clearly evident. Under the building 
pressures and tensions during 1780 state governments found more and more 
reasons not to respond to congressional requisitions. The lack of coop-
eration and contributions left Congress virtually powerless. By the end 
of the year the situation had become critical. Consequently, there were 
movements both inside and outside of Congress to increase congressional 
authority. Thes-e movements were not generally motivated by any desire 
to create a stronger national authority but from genuine fears that if 
something were not done the Revolution would fail. The result of these 
movements in the early months of 1781 was an attempt to establish an 
independent income for Congress and an effort to give Congress the au-
thority to coerce the states. Neither of these movements were success-
ful, since both of them violated revolutionary ideology and since both 
raised fears that the programs were aimed at specific states. 
The attempt to grant Congress an independent income was the con-
gressional passage of the impost, which would have done little more than 
provide that body with an income on which it could borrow mo"re money. 
But the acceptance of the impost would have violated the constitutional 
relationships created by the Confederation. Granting Congress the im-
post would have created the same kind of system practiced by the British 
in pre-revolutionary years. That is, Congress would be permitted to 
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bypass state governments by exercising direct authority over the citi-
zens of the states. That, of course, had been the crux of the dispute 
with Britain. In addition, many conunercial states were convinced that 
if the impost were ratified, the burden of financing the war would rest 
mainly on them. 
The movement to grant Congress coercive power over the states was 
consistent with the constitutional relationships created by the Confed-
eration, but it was repugnant to most states because to make that grant 
would be to shift the locus of authority back to a central government. 
If this occurred the states would surrender a portion of their sover-
eignty. Equally as important were the motives of those who argued for 
coercion. The government of New York obviously wanted such a power in 
Congress in order to shift part of its burden to other states. Like-
wise, James Madison pointedly argued for coercive authority in orGer 
to force such states as Delaware to do their duty. Other states, 
recognizing that such power could be and probably would be used by 
some states to force others to do more than their fair share, refused 
to permit Congress that authority. 
Consequently, the most that Congress coc:.ld accomplish in 1781 was 
to reduce its expenses and to give the direction of its finances to one 
man, Robert Morris. Morris indeed was able to introduce economy and 
through his private credit and French loans was also able to success-
fully finance the war's last campaign at Yorktown. But Morris' personal 
style, caustic letters and insistent demands disturbed many state exec-
utives and aroused old visions of British administrators. The growing 
irritation witl1 Morris, because he was Cong~ess' officer, was transfer-
red to his employer, Congress. 
281 
After the victory at Yorktown most state governments were convinced 
that the war had been ~on, and thus the urgency of congressional demands 
now seemed hollow. The southern states, already irritated by what they 
viewed as a failure of both Congress and the northern states to aid 
them during the British invasion, turned their attentions inward trying 
to salvage their own shattered economies and virtually ignored congres-
sional pleas for cooperation. On the other hand, the northern states 
were angered by what they perceived as a lack of energy displayed by 
the southern states in their own defense. 
Complicating interstate relations and further reducing congression-
al authority during the years 1780 through 1783 were the problems of 
conflicting territorial claims. These potential disputes had their 
roots in the pre-revolutionary period and had arisen occasionally in 
the years prior to 1780. After that year, however, these conflicting 
claims were hotly debated in Congress. Though the Articles of Confed-
eration provided a method for solving these disputes, the inability of 
Congress to enforce its decisions and the personal interests of several 
states in the outcome of these conflicts made the Confederation's method 
for settling the claims ineffective. In fact, congressional interfer-
ence, as in Virginia's cession and the dispute over the Wyoming Valley, 
actually increased the tensions already existing in the disputes. 
Congress, however, made one more effort to recover its authority in 
the early months of 1783. This move was made in part because of the 
maneuverings of the Superintendent of Finance who envisioned a national 
government for America as strong as that of the British Parliament in 
England. But it was also due in part to congressional inertia. Con-
gress had been trying to gain an independent income since February, 
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1781. Having almost succeeded in 1782, they naturally reacted with 
another attempt. By early 1783 there were also compelling reasons for 
such an income. With little contributions coming from the states, with 
no assurance that further foreign loans would be available, with the 
Army unpaid, and with public creditors clamoring for payment, Congress 
desperately needed a source of dependable revenue. 
Attempting to exploit Congress' fears and inclinations, Morris 
applied enormous pressures to that body in order to achieve a full 
schedule of federal taxes. The remarkable aspect of the situation was 
that Congress did not succumb to the pressures. Many Congressmen, like 
James Madison, were perhaps nationalists, but they were also pragmatic 
politicians. They knew the desires and conditions of their states and 
were also keenly aware of the constitutional relationship established 
by the Confederation. Consequently, Congress rejected both Morris' 
brand of centralism and his specific proposals for taxes. 
Struggling to achieve an independent source of income which would 
be both compatible with the Confederation and acceptable to the thirteen 
separate polities, Congress' efforts resulted in a new impost proposal 
in April, 1783, which was even more limited than the one offered in 
1781. Congress not only limited the number of years the act would be 
in force but this time also tried to permit the states a voice by giving 
them the power to appoint the officials in thei.r states who would col-
lect the duty. Even then, realists like Madison recognized that there 
was little probability that the proposition would pass in their home 
states. 
Their analysis was correct. The tensions and pressures of the 
years 1780 through 1783 had reduced state cooperation to a minimum. 
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Since Yorktown, Congress had been little more than an agency through 
which the states had pursued the interests of their particular polities. 
The new impost was doomed to failure because it failed to incorporate 
the interests of some of the states. Both the Articles of Confederation 
and Congress had failed to achieve national integration and in fact had 
aggravated and amplified the differences in the union. Congressional 
authority and prestige, so vitally dependent upon state cooperation, 
had ceased to exist, at least temporarily, as was evidenced by the 
Philadelphia mutiny in June, 1783, and by the inability of Congress 
even to achieve quorums for conducting business. 
During the years of crisis and distress little was accomplished im-
mediately in integrating the thirteen polities into a national polity 
because of the increasing tensions among the states. Nevertheless, the 
years of conflict revealed the difficulties, if not the impossibility 
of achieving a permanent union based upon the straight-line constitu-
tional relations established by the Articles of Confederation, at least 
insofar as they permitted the locus of real authority to remain centered 
in state governments. The stresses of these years also revealed to 
many men, perhaps for the first time, the basic differences in the poli-
ties which made up the union, and they recognized that any future na-
tional government, if it were to be effective, would have to accommodate 
those differences. Thus perhaps the most significant portion of the 
financial proposals offered to the states in April, 1783, was not the 
impost at all, but rather was that of amending the Confederation's 
method of assessing taxes. In writing the amendment Congress tried to 
accommodate the differences between northern and southern polities by 
incorporating a three-fifths provision to compromise the conflicting 
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views over how slaves were to be counted for the purpose of taxation. 
It would be this willingness to compromise which would result in the 
writing and ratification of the Federal Constituion in 1787-1788. 
The years of distress also provided another source for future na-
tional integration. This was the common fund established by the ces-
sions of western territory .. While conflicts over western claims had 
greatly disturbed the relations among the states, a major beginning had 
been made in surrendering those claims to the nation as a whole. In 
the postwar years the necessity of deciding how those lands should be 
apportioned provided a further bond of union. The revolutionary ex-
perience itself provided a psychological basis for future national 
unity. The common struggle against Britain had been successful, and 
after time had lessened the memory of interstate·conflicts during the 
war what remained was the pride in the common effort. In the years 
1780 through 1783, however, the willingness to compromise, the common 
bond of the western lands, and the pride in the common effort were ab-
sent. Concerned with the problems of their own polities, state govern-
ments had little opportunity or inclination to consider the problems 
of the nation. Thus it would not be until after the war ended and after 
the states had largely recovered their separate economies that state 
governments could begin to turn their attentions outwards towards the 
problems of union and national political integration. 
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